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ABSTRACT
The Growth and Development of Sheffield*s Industrial Structure, 1880-1930
by
M.J. Levis
Sheffield presents an ideal location for a study of the 
structure and performance of a major industrial sector, iron 
and steel, in the crucial years 1880-1930. The major emphasis 
of this work is on the structure and strategy of Sheffield's 
industries which faced increasing competitive constraints in 
this period. Thus, the response of the firm to change is 
examined by studying business development both from the point 
of view of individual firms and from the view of firms as part 
of a wider business system. The former is achieved by 
developing a theory of business strategy which aids the 
understanding of managerial decision making and the internal and external constraints on development. The latter, however, 
requires a reconstruction of Sheffield's iron and steel 
industry, which is undertaken for the period 1880-1901, and 
identifies the structural characteristics of the industry. The 
retention of a structure of small-scale firms is clearly 
illustrated, especially in cutlery, and this in turn shaped the 
the competitive strategy of the firm in relation to market and 
resource development. For example, the issue of managing the 
firm’s labour input, in terms of a skilled workforce, was a key 
area for management, and this determined the type of product 
produced and the market strategy adopted, and ultimately the 
competitive success of the firm. Furthermore, the study of a 
key sector of the economy in this period lends itself to a 
broader analysis of British industrial development, with its 
emphasis on the alleged conservative response of British 
businessmen to increasing competitive constraints. On this last 
issue, there is a need to consider the political response of 
Sheffield's business community to issues such as protection, 
state intervention and rationalisation. Thus, a novel component 
of this work is to incorporate a political economy approach to 
business history, linking local industrial issues to the wider 
political environment in the period 1880-1930.
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Preface.
The decline of steel in the 1980's, especially in the 
Sheffield region, has witnessed the demise of a city which 
since the late eighteenth century had been at the forefront of 
that industry. However, the long term decline of Sheffield can 
be traced back to the period 1880-1930 when growing competition 
and economic depression put considerable pressure on business 
firms. The motivation underpinning this thesis is to study a 
crucial period in the industry's fortunes and to investigate 
the structure of the industry from both an economic and 
political standpoint. This work has been a long time in the 
making and needless to say a considerable academic debt has 
been accumulated. The two outstanding ones are firstly to Roger 
Lloyd-Jones, who stimulated my interest in the reconstruction 
of business systems and provided the theoretical and empirical 
expertise for our joint study of the Manchester economy in the 
early nineteenth century. Secondly, to L.J. Williams, who 
instilled a long-term interest in the steel industry and whose 
help and guidance in my years at UCW Aberystwyth were 
invaluable. As usual in an historical study, one relies on the 
help and goodwill of numerous archivists, and special thanks is 
due to David Postles and Richard Childs at the Archives 
Department, Sheffield Central Library. Finally, but not least, 
gratitude must be bestowed on those who have to put up with 
those obsessed with academic research, so a great debt is owed 
to my wife, Ishbel.
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Introduction, A Theory Of Business Strategy.
Alford has claimed that there is a need to examine the role of 
the entrepreneur and the firm ’’within the broader context of 
the development of business structure and strategy,” -^ This 
thesis will explore the structural features of Sheffield's 
business system between 1880 and 1930 from the point of view of 
a theory of business strategy. It is not the intention to offer 
another history of the Sheffield steel industry,^ but rather to 
concentrate on the properties and changing characteristics of a 
key industrial sector in a major' industrial city, an area of 
the British economy which has come under increasing scrutiny by 
economic historians concerned with Britain’s long-term 
industrial decline. The study of industrial structure requires 
an analysis of firm populations and the interconnections 
between business components both economically and politically. 
Furthermore, this study examines the response of business firms 
to the changing economic environment they faced, thus, as a 
starting point, we need to develop a theory of business 
strategy which will aid our understanding of the development of 
firms and business systems. Therefore, this work adopts a dual 
approach by studying business development both from the point 
of view of individual firms and from the view of firms as part 
of a wider business system.
As Ghannon claims, business historians ’’have been 
reluctant to generalise ... about broad trends in the
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development of or managerial guidance of ... enterprise as a 
population" of firms. Thus we should view the firm "both as a 
totality and as a member of a population" of firms.^ Chapter 2 
sets out the methodological framework for the reconstruction of 
Sheffield's business system c.1880-1901, and starts to explore 
the characteristics of the industrial sectors identified, 
especially the survival of small-scale firms. This then sets up 
the basis for exploring business strategy in following 
chapters. In particular, the cutlery trades demonstrate a 
system overwhelmingly confined to small, private, competing 
firms and the effects of this on business strategy are analysed 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Essentially, it is argued that
Sheffield's system was characterised by a process of uneven 
development in the light Sheffield trades. However, what are 
the theoretical parameters for studying business strategy?
According to Mathias, the decision to innovate and invest 
remain "in the hands of business firms" and "the more 
historians can learn about the evolution of the business firm 
and business systems the better."^ We thus need a clear 
conceptual idea of business strategy which will provide a 
framework for the analysis of firm behaviour. In particular, 
this will provide the theoretical base for exploring the 
business strategies devised by Sheffield firms^ in response to 
the changing economic environment they faced in the crucial 
years between 1880 and 1914. Thus, business strategy is 
perceived as a response mechanism both to internal constraints
within the firm and to external changes in the market 
configuration facing firms. For example, Chapter 3 examines the 
competitive constraints on Sheffield firms and considers the 
question of a crisis in the industry in the 1880's which placed 
increasing pressures on businessmen faced with change.
Certainly, recent contributions to the methodological
cdebate in business history, have called for a greater 
symbiosis between economic theory and the historical context in 
which firms operate. Thus, the evolution of the firm should be 
examined in its historical setting, and appropriate economic 
theory applied to aid our understanding of business 
development. However, what economic theory should the business 
historian utilise, given that a great deal of such theory tends 
to be inappropriate for historical analysis? As Coleman points 
out, "Orthodox British economic theory, built upon the neo­
classical synthesis and then from Keynesian and post-Keynesian 
macroeconomics, is simply of very little use to business 
historians." In terms of the neo-classical theory of the firm, 
Coleman emphasises that this is inappropriate for historical 
analysis, and "even when modified to take account of varying 
sorts of market imperfections, is not about firms as entities." 
Rather, it is concerned with the mechanisms of price adjustment 
for both commodities and productive factors "in various assumed 
conditions of competition."^ If the business historian is 
concerned with analysing changes in these parameters, then 
orthodox theory is perfectly acceptable, but for those
concerned with the growth and development of the firm as an
historical process then this framework has its limitations.^
An alternative line of approach is therefore required and 
here the theory of business strategy, developed by Scott 
Moss,1-^  will be explored and utilised. The value of this work 
to the business historian lies in the fact that Moss 
specifically locates firm theory within an historical context. 
The antecedents of this theory are to be found in the works of 
Chandler, Penrose, and Andrews, x who all integrate the theory 
of the firm with historical experience. Commenting on the
contribution of these studies to our understanding of business 
history, Coleman claims that "all such work has an historical 
dimension in that it seeks to relate the firm’s decision-making 
process over time to the frameworks of markets and institutions 
in which it takes place. What then is the theory of
business strategy and how can it be applied to the historical 
evolution of the firm?
For Moss, the key role of the economic theory of business 
strategy, is to "identify the broad forces which constrain
firms and which create business opportunities."^ In turn,
there is a need to specifically define the firm as an entity
because the theory of business strategy "is largely about firms 
and the determinants of their growth and development." Moss, 
defines the firm as "a collection of productive resources with 
organisational structure." The productive resources of the
firm, include both physical and human resources. In turn,
physical resources are defined as the firm’s tangible assets, 
plant, equipment, stocks of raw materials, semi-finished and 
finished goods etc.; while human resources include the firm's 
endowment of skilled and unskilled labour, clerical,
administrative, financial, legal, technical and managerial 
staff. It therefore follows that the firm's resource 
composition will essentially "determine the range of activities 
undertaken by the firm."1^
But what mechanism decides the appropriate resource mix of 
the firm? The coordination of these resources requires a
central unifying principle which Moss identifies with the
organisational structure of the firm. Thus, the organisational 
structure of the firm is the key to understanding how 
management delineates "responsibility for particular kinds of 
decisions" and directs various information flows.18 Therefore, 
the business historian needs to specify the organisational 
structure of the firm which "is not itself a resource but 
rather derives from the services ... rendered by the human and 
physical resources of the firm."1  ^ The heart of the 
organisational structure is the managerial team who effectively 
coordinate the activities of the firm and take "strategic
decisions with regard to both investment strategies and 
competitive strategies."18 Organisation is therefore the key 
factor in understanding the process of business development, 
however, in the short-run the managerial resources of the firm 
may impose constraints on the growth and diversification of the
firm.^
Given the emphasis on the organisational structure, what 
is the composition of this structure? In other words, who are 
the economic actors who organise business decision making? Of 
course, the economic actor refers to the entrepreneur and the 
theory of entrepreneurship has fascinated economists and 
historians from Marshall and Schumpeter onwards. The 
entrepreneur is associated with the growth of the firm and the 
entrepreneurial role in economic development and as Loasby 
claims, "Entrepreneurship is connected with change" although 
"there are many kinds of change, and correspondingly many 
concepts of the entrepreneurial f u n c t i o n . T h u s  the concept 
of the entrepreneur provides the business historian with a 
minefield of theoretical complexity. According to Gasson, there 
is a need to integrate both an indicative and functional 
analysis of entrepreneurship and provide some basic theoretical 
observations concerning entrepreneurial performance.^But what 
is the role of the entrepreneur?
An interesting functional definition of entrepreneurs, or 
top executives is provided by Chandler: "entrepreneurial
decisions and actions refer to those which affect the 
allocation or re-allocation of the resources for the enterprise 
as a whole."^2 Similarly, Casson defines the entrepreneur as 
"someone who specialises in taking judgmental decisions about 
the coordination of scarce resources. Thus, the entrepreneur 
within the organisation is a functional specialist who
organises, controls, plans and coordinates the operations of 
the business enterprise. ^  However, as Gasson argues, 
managerial specialism is not necessarily identical to 
individual entrepreneurship, as functions can be delegated to 
managers, and therefore a further function of the entrepreneur 
is the ability to distribute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ^  Thus, as Hannah 
claims, in relation to the development of managerial structures 
in the inter-war years, "The proliferation of functional 
specialists was important’* because it allowed central 
management to delegate "routine” and "administrative*1 functions 
allowing the higher echelons of management to concentrate on 
planning, policy strategy and supervision of the various units 
of the firm.2°
To successfully perform these various functions, 
entrepreneurs must be endowed with specific indicative 
qualities. These range from a "self knowledge" of the principle 
objectives of the firm to imagination and foresight, practical 
knowledge of business constraints, analytical ability, 
computational and communication skills.^ Thus, entrepreneurs 
have to identify the business opportunities and constraints 
facing the firm and to develop strategies to take advantage of 
or overcome these constraints. Furthermore, entrepreneurs may 
well not be endowed with all these qualities and therefore the 
ability to organise and delegate managerial responsibility is 
essential to the successful performance of the business firm.^ 
As Alford points out, we need to consider the concept of
"diffused entrepreneurship’1, a consequence of which ”is that 
hardly anybody is acting as an entrepreneur all the time,” 
Also, diffused entrepreneurship is entrepreneurship diluted 
with other business functions.^ The integration of the 
indicative and functional approach to the question of 
entrepreneurship will provide a framework for assessing the 
contribution and function of business organisation in 
Sheffield's iron and steel sector.
Central to discussions on entrepreneurship are the motives 
underlying managerial decision making within the business 
organisation. Here again the theory of business strategy 
provides an analytical base for the business historian. 
Theories of managerial motivation are often postulated in terms 
of "a universal goal for managers"-^ ranging from neo­
classical profit maximisation models to behavioural hypothesis 
concerned with growth, sales or utility as the principle target 
of entrepreneurial endeavour.However, as Moss points out, 
these are highly simplistic models of firm behaviour and "The 
cost of this simplicity is the heroic assumption that a single 
assumption can describe the hopes, desires and ambitions of all 
individuals in a wide variety of circumstances.” Indeed, 
before these abstract criterion can be realised, the 
overriding objective of the firm is to survive. Neo-classical 
theory however, does not reflect the fact that the firm as a 
business entity "should survive a day longer than its ability 
to earn at least normal p r o f i t s . T h u s  the notion of survival
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is central to the formulation of economic strategy by the 
business organisation. For example the decision to expand and 
diversify business activities is related to the prime objective 
of survival in the face of the internal and external 
constraints facing the firm at a given moment in time.
Such a conclusion, relating as it does to the primary
survival motive of the firm, would seem to be relevant to the
analysis of the iron and steel industry in the period 1880 to
1914. Iron and steel firms were faced with increasing pressures
to innovate and reorganise in the face of market, financial,
resource development and technological constraints. Hyde, for
example, referring to the period after 1850, claims that faced
with a changing economic and technical environment, the iron
master "made innovations to ensure his s u r v i v a l . T h i s  in
turn reflects the indicative qualities of entrepreneurship;
namely the ability to effectively identify and to develop
policies to overcome such constraints. Thus, it will be argued
that firms operate in an environment of constant change and are
subject to both internal and external constraints. As Hartman
and Wheeler point out, utilising a neo-Schumpetarian model,^
The competitive environment in which firms operate is one 
of struggle and motion. It is a dynamic selection 
environment, not an equilibrium one. The essential forces 
of growth are innovation and selection, with augmentation 
of capital stocks more or less tied to the process.^
Clearly the emphasis, as in Schumpeter’s analysis, is on the
innovating entrepreneur and decision making is conditioned by
changes in the economic environment. As the authors note,
changes in the environment lead to changes in the "production
rules" under which firms operate and the organisational
structure^ of the business firm. Therefore, economic
development is "promoted by repeated shifts in favour of firms
whose decision rules are favourably attuned to the economic
environment" and where entrepreneurial decision making is
"crucial to the process.
The ability of the firm to tackle the constraints thrown
up by a changing economic environment will in turn depend on
Moss's notion of the organizational structure of the business
enterprise. As Hannah claims, it was management that was the
critical factor in the realisation of scale and market
economies. ^  Chandler's excellent work on the rise of
managerial capitalism in American business enterprise^
reflects the importance of organisation to managerial success:
As long as an enterprise belonged in an industry whose 
markets, sources of raw materials, and production
processes remained relatively unchanged few
entrepreneurial decisions had to be reached. In that 
situation such a weakness (the centralised organisational 
structure) was not critical, but where technology,
markets, and sources of supply were changing rapidly, the 
defects of such a structure becomes obvious. ^
Thus, as Marshall noted, the firm has to organise its
production and marketing activities "in an environment of
uncertainty and change.
Therefore, the organisational structure of the firm may
well be crucial to the survival and continued prosperity of the
business concern, in the face of changes in the constraints
under which firms operate in the short-run. According to Moss,
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the constraints will be enhanced when the firm faces growing 
competitive pressures. Such constraints are "conceptually, 
problems which arise in the day-to-day operations of the firm, 
and which cannot be handled within the routine procedures 
adopted for these operations." Constraint changes are 
associated with changes "in the conditions of supply of inputs 
(ie, factors of production) or increasing pressure on existing 
plant and equipment or the existing administrative structure of 
the f i r m . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Moss argues that competitive 
pressures are associated with business uncertainty, which in 
turn is related to a "lack of information on the part of 
entrepreneurs. This uncertainty may well engender a degree of 
"inaction," excessive caution and entrenched conservatism by 
businessmen faced with change.^
Clearly then, the development of effective business 
information flows, both internally, between managers and 
departments within the organisation; and externally, between 
the firm, its agents, distributors and customers is a specific 
function of the organisational structure. As Casson argues, the 
market needs to be monitored and the firm requires product 
information, transactor information and contract information.^ 
The development of the firm’s managerial resources devoted to 
exchange are considered in Chapters 5 and 6. The development of 
information flows is a key area of managerial decision making. 
Information is essentially an economic commodity, defined as a 
"satiation good."^ Thus the firm can be inundated with too
much information, and the role of management is to develop 
systems which prioritise information for managerial decision 
making.
Given then that market information is a key aspect of 
business organisation the functional parameters of the firm are 
not only routed through the circuit of production but also
j rthrough the function of market exchange.40 It therefore follows 
that information is part of the firm’s economic resource base 
which needs to be developed and controlled in relation to 
changes in the economic environment facing firms. Thus, 
although the commodity, information, is not a physical resource 
of the firm, as defined by Moss, nevertheless it relates
directly to the determination of the business activities
undertaken by the firm. For example, how management, through 
its channels of information, perceives new geographical or 
product areas of market demand may well shape the type of
product the firm produces, the technology and labour input that 
is utilised, the firm’s marketing strategy and the 
organisational parameters of the firm.
For example, a decision to enter new markets may well 
induce a number of strategic decisions by management. Firstly, 
it may require an expansion of productive capacity; an 
expansion of the firm’s stock of physical and human resources. 
Secondly, a shift in product design; in other words changes in 
the physical composition of commodities. Thus products have 
readily definable characteristics which are shaped by market
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preferences and by the techniques of production.^ Thirdly, 
changes in the marketing and production organisation of the 
firm. As Gassson claims, "To overcome... the obstacles to 
trade, market making activities are required."^® The firm may 
well require to increase its output of information to customers 
through advertising and developing market contacts or by 
establishing direct sales outlets. By the same reasoning, the 
firm will also require to increase its inputs of information 
flows via the development of organisational structures for 
directing transport and administration functions, monitoring 
and screening of quality, dispatch etc. Attached to this is the 
need to extend information flows to adequately monitor 
production costs, market prices and demand fluctuations. These 
developments also require an extension of the firm’s resource 
base devoted to such functions: more technically trained
managers,^ accountants, office workers, salesmen etc., 
together with the introduction of office equipment for 
coordinating business activity.
Thus, the development of effective channels of information 
are crucial to business success, in the face of constraints 
facing the firm, and may overcome the entrenched conservatism 
referred to by Moss. Indeed, in a theoretical exploration of 
entrepreneurship by Israel Kirzner, entrepreneurs are defined 
as independent agents each possessing only limited market 
knowledge, thus Information flows act as a dynamic to market 
changes which are "set in motion by the initial market-
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ignorance of the participants.”-^ Thus the market acts as a 
sounding board for devising strategies in a world of limited 
and imperfect knowledge. Such arguments clearly undermine two 
central concepts of the neo-classical theory of the firm; 
firstly, that the external environment is taken as given and 
secondly, that there is perfect knowledge.
As to the first assumption, the external environment needs 
to be reconstructed and the competitive nature of the market 
defined, which is the task of Chapter 2. In the case of the 
perfect knowledge assumption then this poses a basic problem 
for historians; firms operate in an environment of uncertainty 
and change and a basic condition of capitalist economies is the 
uncertainty of future outcomes.^ Thus, as Jones argues, the 
concept of the firm employed in neo-classical theory tends to 
abstract from most of the characteristics of the real world 
firm. The neo-classical firm simply converts inputs into 
outputs within given cost and revenue parameters.^  This static 
vision of the firm abstracts from the concept of business 
strategy in different historical epochs and the changing 
external environment and constraints facing firms.
Returning to Moss's concept of constraints, then there is 
obviously a need to analyse these factors more fully. Moss 
identifies three possible constraints to firm development. 
Firstly, limitations of the firm's resources which prevent 
expansion when there is "unsatisfied demands for its outputs or 
which result in underutilisation of resources because other,
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complementary, resources are fully utilised.” Secondly, 
limitations of the firm’s administrative structure which are in 
turn related to ’’inadequate or incomprehensible information 
flows.” Thirdly, market limitations which restrict the firm 
expanding in relation to its resource base "because the demands 
for its outputs are growing too slowly or because it is unable 
to acquire the necessary inputs to sustain the existing or 
growing activities of the firm.”^
These constraining factors are analysed in the context of 
the Sheffield iron and steel sector, but they also relate to 
general studies of British economic and business development, 
particularly in relation to the assumed failings of late 
nineteenth century entrepreneurs.-^ For example, in terms of 
the organisational limitations of large scale British firms 
before 1914, Payne has claimed that "management remained only 
loosely centralised and organisational change was desperately 
slow even in the vertical combines.Furthermore, Alford 
argues that higher echelons of management were hampered in 
their attempt to wrest control over policy making from lower 
management, before 1945, "by the standard of accounting 
practices and the undeveloped state of knowledge on
c rmarketing. Also, economic historians have emphasised the
exogenous factor of the slow rate of growth of the market. For
Vexample, Temin claims that the slow relative development of the 
British steel industry in the late nineteenth century was 
causally related to the fact that it "had access to a market
which was growing less rapidly than those served by its
competitors.” The consequence of this, was slower growth and 
investment and the retention of outmoded and less productive 
plant and equipment.^ However, a smaller market is in itself 
related to business activity and Supple notes, that "Mass 
markets simultaneously shape and are shaped by business
„ c opolicies and structures.
These factors are discussed in relation to human and
resource development throughout this work, especially in
Chapters 3-6. However, the above historical illustrations are 
relevant to the theory of business strategy in the sense that 
they suggest that British entrepreneurs failed to tackle the 
internal and external constraints facing them. Such arguments 
have been directed at the alleged failure of British 
entrepreneurs particularly in the period 1870 to 1914.-^ 
Somehow they lacked the indicative qualities emphasised by 
Casson and failed to generate adequate response mechanisms to 
changing market circumstances. Summarising MossJs earlier 
argument, growing competitive pressures will lead firstly to 
changes in the constraints under which firms operate in the
short-run; and secondly increasing competition may well lead to 
business uncertainty which may well engender excessive caution 
in formulating an effective strategy. But what response can the 
firm make to the increasing competitive constraints placed on 
it?
It is possible to identify three broad sets of changes:
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resource development, market expansion and structural change. 
Resource development, of course, refers to changes in the 
firm’s physical and human resources. For example, changes in 
the type and quality of labour utilised in the production 
process will constitute a change in the firm’s human resource 
base. This has obvious connotations for the study of business 
response in Sheffield firms where the issue of managing the 
firm’s labour input, in terms of a skilled workforce, was a key 
area of the firm’s management strategy. In turn, this will 
rebound on the firm’s physical resource base; in other words, 
decisions to change the capital-labour mix of the firm through 
increased mechanisation may overcome the supply constraint of 
limited skilled workers and thus change the pattern of the 
firm’s human resources. Thus changes in the physical and human 
resource base are causally interrelated, as shown in Chapter 5.
In terms of the firm’s market expansion response, this 
involves attempts to open up new areas of trade and demand. In 
particular the expansion of firms into new export markets is 
one obvious area of business strategy that needs to be fully 
explored. Thus firms constrained in traditional export markets 
may seek avenues of demand in the new and expanding areas of 
international trade. This has obvious links to the exploration 
of business strategy in the late nineteenth century British 
economy. Numerous commentators have argued that British 
businessmen lacked the drive to penetrate new and fast growing 
areas of world trade and were instead satisfied to rely on the
undeveloped colonial markets for trade expansion.^ These 
arguments reflect an inadequate market response by businessmen 
faced with competitive constraints^ and this will be examined 
in relation to the marketing strategies of Sheffield firms.
However, it must be pointed out that the market expansion 
response is not divorced from changes in the firm’s resources 
and structural change.^2 The marketing strategy of the firm 
cannot be separated from the development of the firm's physical 
and human resources and the structural and organisational 
changes which accompany market expansion. The type of product 
produced and the techniques utilised will shape both the 
institutional market structure adopted and the form of 
competitive strategy instigated. This can be illustrated by 
taking the development of standardised production techniques as 
an example.
Moss refers to the fact that the development of 
standardised products is a physical property of a commodity 
’’which has been changed or even created by technology.” Thus, 
the definition of standardisation, or cognizability, is for 
Moss related to the ’’technological environment” in which firms 
operate. However, standardisation, either within brands or 
among the output of several producers provides the possibility 
of economies of scale reflecting specialisation at both the 
level of production and exchange. Economies in production will 
be realised by an increasing division of labour and longer 
production runs which reduce unit costs. At the level of
exchange, Moss invokes Adam Smith's famous dictum that the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. 
Therefore, the physical properties of commodities, shaped by 
the technological parameters of production and exchange, as the 
capability of increasing the number of firms or consumers "with 
which any one firm can trade, and which increases the volume of 
commodities which the firm has to sell or requires to buy, will 
increase the opportunities to secure economies of 
specialisation in exchange.
Exchange economies, in this example, refer to reductions 
in transaction costs as a consequence of standardised 
production. Standardisation allows purchasers to buy the output 
of manufacturers "located at considerable distances from them 
without incurring the costs of prior inspection ... and ... the 
costs of agreeing a transaction are very much lower and do not 
require direct contact between producer and user."^ Therefore, 
the development of standardisation (a resource change) is 
related to structural developments in the firm; in this example 
the expansion of the firm forward into direct mechanisms of 
exchange. Indeed, according to one commentator of Britain's 
marketing performance in the late nineteenth century, "The 
major innovation in selling overseas after 1870 was the control
by manufacturers of the channels of distribution." In their
/
most sophisticated form British firms integrated forward, 
developing sales branches overseas which gave them greater 
control over marketing and information flows.^
19
The firm thus constitutes a number of distinct functions 
and if we assume that a firm is geared towards growth then as 
the firm expands the various functions may well be prone to 
internal imbalances. For example, investment in new technology 
which increases the scale of operations may well outpace the 
existing market mechanism for creating effective demand. 
Similarly, before undertaking capacity investment, firms must 
be aware of market conditions, which requires an effective 
knowledge of markets and competitive trends. These imbalances 
are constructed into a theoretical analysis by Moss who defines 
the response process in terms of focussing and inducement 
effects. Focussing effects are directed towards "imbalances 
arising from the resources and administrative structure of the 
individual firm." Thus focussing effects occur because of 
purely internal factors relevant to the firm’s physical and
a?human resources. ' Historically, focussing effects within firms 
has often led to the development of products and markets which 
generate general demands for their outputs. Supply factors 
"dominated the demand factors in order to create extensive 
markets in which economies of specialisation could be secured 
in exchange as well as production.
In contrast, inducement effects "turn on technological 
linkages among the productive activities of different firms and 
forces arising from competition among firms." These factors 
then focus the direction of management initiative on new 
markets and methods of producing commodities for existing
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markets "and so pre-empt internal imbalances as objects of 
managerial attention.” Inducement effects are characterised as 
external to the firm; they "are forced upon the firm as a 
result of events taking place outside the firm.” Nevertheless, 
the business response will in turn depend upon the internal 
resources and organisational structure of the firm.^
The concept of focussing and inducement effects clearly 
relate to the earlier argument concerning the need not only to 
study internal changes but also to look at the firm in its 
broader external environment. As Moss points out these effects 
"are crucial to the analysis of ... those strategies involving 
either the expansion of existing activities of the firm or 
related diversification.”^  However, if it is technology which 
determines markets, and competitive pressures are strong, the 
firm’s external response may in itself not be sufficient. The 
type of physical commodity produced, the cost effective nature 
of the technology utilised, the speed of dispatch and the 
ability to meet consumer specifications turn on the ability of 
management to focus in on specific constraints. Essentially, 
then, to maintain markets products have to compete and this 
effectively "means change: the development of new designs, of
new standards of performance and so on.” Thus, "product change 
is central to economic growth simply because without it, demand 
is unlikely to grow."^
The theory of business strategy provides the platform for 
exploring the constraints and responses of Sheffield firms in
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various historical periods. The entrepreneur will be viewed as 
part of the wider business system of the Sheffield iron and 
steel industry. In particular, business records of firms will 
provide a base for exploring Moss's response mechanisms in 
their historical context.^ However, before applying this 
theory to Sheffield, the theoretical analysis remains 
incomplete. So far, the analysis has been developed in a purely 
economic form, after all, the firm is a business unit operating 
in an economic environment. However, to view the firm simply in 
economic terms is to abstract from the political factors which 
may enhance or constrain business performance and thus in 
itself may demand a political response on the part of 
businessmen. As John Turner argues, "the special contribution 
of businessmen, who were after all intimately concerned with 
industry’s problems has never had the attention in Britain 
which has been accorded to it in other industrial countries."*7^  
Therefore, we need to consider not only the economic 
constraints and responses but also the political factors 
relevant to business development. In other words, we need to 
incorporate a political economy approach to business history 
within the framework of the Moss analysis. For example, Elbaum 
and Lazonick emphasise the political-institutional constraints 
facing British businessmen, notably the retention of free trade 
in an environment of growing competition, which "obstructed 
individualistic as well as collective efforts at economic 
renovation."^4 As Pollard claims, the significance of the
political system, 1870-1914, "and the consequential negative 
role of government in this period, has been overlooked far too 
long in the literature. The political response of
Sheffield's business community to issues such as protection, 
government intervention, and rationalisation are taken up in 
Chapters 7 and 9 where the relationship between local and 
national political economy is considered. However, we now turn 
to a reconstruction of the Sheffield steel industry before 
1914, moving from the theoretical world of business strategy to 
the historical world in which real firms operated.
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2
The Business Structure of Sheffield's Iron and Steel Industry, 
1880-1901.
By 1880, few observers would deny Sheffield its premier role as
the major iron and steel producing centre in Britain.
Sheffield's industrial structure revolved around a myriad of
distinct though interlocking trades, ranging from basic steel
production to heavy engineering and armaments, and the light
industries of cutlery and tool fabrication. Thus industrial
structure constituted a mixture of both light and heavy
industry producing iron and steel products for both the
consumer and capital goods markets:
On the heavy side of the industry, Sheffield was the home 
of the great works ... On the lighter side, Sheffield 
crucible steel ... remained the worlds finest material for 
knives, tools, and machine parts ... perhaps best known of 
all were the cutlery and silver plating firms.
Thus Sheffield's economic structure was directly
associated with the development and prosperity of its various
metal industries. However, the business structure of this key
industrial sector has received little systematic analysis, with
the exception of the work by Timmins on the Sheffield crucible
steel industry, and a preliminary investigation of industrial
structure by Lloyd-Jones and Lewis.“ The aim of this chapter is
to build on this latter work, analysing the business functions
of a population of firms, the size structure over time and the
rentier characteristics of the industry.^ Furthermore, an
analysis will be made of the role of small firms and the
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retention of a business organisation which retained the 
principles of family control. This chapter outlines a system of 
small competing firms which forms the basis for later chapters 
on business strategy.
By 1880, Sheffield could boast some of the largest steel 
and heavy engineering firms in the world, household names such 
as Vickers, Charles Cammell's, Firth's, and John Browns.^ These 
firms expanded rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the number of workers employed by Browns, for example, 
increasing from 200 in 1856 to 5,000 by 1872.^ By 1907, four 
heavy steel producers, based in Sheffield, were listed amongst 
the largest 104 manufacturing employers in the UK.° In the 
light trades, large cutlery producers such as George 
Wostenholme1s, and Joseph Rodgers & Co. had established
-jthemselves as prominent exporters to all corners of the world. 
According to D. Smith, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
"the huge factories and monotonous workplace routines of large- 
scale industrial capitalism were a gigantic social fact", and 
dominated the structure of the industry.^ However, before 
accepting such a proposition we might do well to heed Hannah's 
observation that the pattern of development in such industries 
as cotton, iron and chemicals "favoured the multiplication of 
small firms rather than the dominance of large ones."^ As Dobb 
points out, the existence of small-scale business "has been a 
pronounced feature of each stage of economic history"; every 
economic system is a mixed system, comprising large, medium and
small firms and ’’any full understanding of economic movement
and development’1 is largely influenced by the interaction of
1 0these conflicting elements.x This view is reinforced by
Timmins, who observes that even by 1900, ’’the day of the small-
scale steel firm was by no means at an end."-^
Thus in order to examine the structure and pattern of
change in Sheffield’s iron and steel sector, what is required
is a reconstruction of firm populations over time. How dominant
was the large-scale firm, was there any discernible tendency
towards increased concentration, and what was the pattern of
development in terms of survival, exit and entry rates? The
primary data source for this reconstruction is the Sheffield
rate books-1-'1 which provide a mine of information on the numbers
and size of iron and steel firms in the city. The books give a
detailed description of property, the location of the property,
the owners and or occupiers, the rateable value (RV), and
whether the property is fully or partly utilised. RV's are thus
utilised as a proxy for the fixed capital assets of the firm.-^
Furthermore, by detailed cross-referencing with the local trade
and commercial directories, it is possible to provide a
breakdown of the numerous trades which made up the complex
system of business organisation in the metal industries.
Table 2:1: A Profile of Sheffield firms, 1880.______________
No of firms Total RV Average size per firm(£) (£)319 133,700 419
Source: Sheffield Rate Books, 1880.
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As a starting point, the structure of the industry in 1880 
was reconstructed. A total of 319 firms was identif ied^ and 
the number, the total and average RV is given in Table 2:1. An 
average RV of £419 would locate the typical firm as a medium 
size enterprise, within the range RV £151-£500.-^ However, 
average figures may well disguise the wide range in size 
patterns and the concentration of small firms in various 
industrial sectors. Thus, we require a classification of 
industry type and of size categories. Turning first to the 
issue of industrial classification, then this obviously creates 
problems. Payne, for example, in an extensive study of early 
Scottish limited companies, utilises the American Standard 
Industrial Classification but notes that exact precision, on 
the basis of company information on business activity, is 
virtually impossible to achieve.^ The problem here refers to 
the diversity and overlapping of business activity in 
Sheffield's trades. For example, it would be easy to define a 
steel firm as such, as a basic commodity producer. However, in 
many instances steel firms combined basic production with 
fabrication. To illustrate this point, the firm of Brown, 
Bailey & Dixon Ltd., operating an extensive plant rated at 
£6,893 in 1880, produced various heavy Bessemer steel products 
for railway and shipbuilding demand, but also produced light 
steel files and saws. Similarly, the smaller firm of Thomas 
Colver & Co. (RV £125) produced basic steel and fabricated 
saws, files and machine knives. In cutlery, a firm such as
Christopher Johnson & Co. (RV £274) combined cutlery production 
with steel and tool production.^
Given this structural characteristic, there is an obvious 
need to simplify the industrial classification and provide a 
working definition of the term industry in relation to the 
Sheffield trades. Sargent Florence defines an industry as any 
kind of transactions, products or processes, usually 
specialised in by a number of plants which do not necessarily 
perform much of any other kind of transaction. Furthermore, he 
distinguishes between basic producers and fabricators, the 
former "refining or producing the raw material and the latter 
"converting and assembling it into the final product."-^ It 
thus follows that there are three rules for industrial 
classification: differences in type of product produced;
differences in selling markets; differences in technical 
processes. These rules for classification have been analysed by 
Nightingale who defines an industry as "any grouping of firms 
which operate similar processes within a given planning 
h o r i z o n . T h i s  definition of industry thus mirrors Moss’s 
definition of the firm, which is defined in terms of the 
physical and human resources which constitute the business 
enterprise.
Using this definition, and by a systematic analysis of the 
trade directories and description of plant in the rate books, 
it was decided to group firms under the four major industrial 
categories shown in Table 2:2. (See Appendix A, Table 1). The
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divisions between the industries are based on the following 
criteria. Firstly, basic producers (B) are defined on the 
grounds that they produce the basic raw material for finishing
elsewhere. Secondly, G and TE are distinguished by the fact
? 0that one is a consumer good and the other a capital good. 
Hence they produce different goods and sell to different 
markets. GT is a catch-all category which includes firms 
producing both capital and consumer goods. However, a 
distinction based on technical processes is more problematic, 
due to the fact that similar techniques were used in all four 
categories.^  For example, as indicated throughout this work, 
the use of skilled labour as a human resource of the firm was a 
key characteristic of Sheffield firms, although firms in the
? 9heavy steel sector tended to employ more unskilled resources.  ^
For example, Thomas Vickers referred to the small-scale and 
high labour input of producing steel ingots in the crucible, 
in comparison to the less labour intensive operations of the 
small number of firms producing by the Siemens process. J
Table 2:2: Industrial Classification of 319 Sheffield firms in 1880
Industrial No % Total RV 7/o Av. RVtype (£) (£)3 60 18.8 21,107 15.8 351.3G 97 30.4 14,832 11.1 152.9TE 148 46.4 94,923 70.9 641.4
cr 14 4.4 2,838 2.2 202.7
Total 319 100. Ci 133,700 100.0 419.1Source: Rate Books, 1880; Directory 1880.
Table 2:2 indicates that the largest sector was TE which 
represented 46% of all firms and accounted for 71% of the total 
RV. Furthermore, 90 TE firms were integrated, confirming
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Timmins claim that there was a general tendency towards 
vertical integration, "both backwards into the production of 
raw materials and forwards into the finishing stages."24 This 
suggests an integrated system where there was room for a 
complexity of business functions ranging from integrated steel 
producers to firms who relied on outside supplies of the basic 
raw material. The small-scale nature of the cutlery sector is 
also evident in Table 2:2, but can we be more precise in our 
size categories?
Turning to this question, RV ’ s are utilised as a proxy of 
size, following the procedures adopted by Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 
in their study of the Manchester economy.^5 indeed, Timmins in 
his analysis of crucible steel refers to large-scale firms with 
a RV of £800 plus and medium firms which appear to fall
? fcibetween £150-£500. ° Unfortunately correlating data for
employment, or valuations, for Sheffield is not available; 
nevertheless, it is possible to determine cut off points, 
defining size categories from raw RV data, by plotting clusters 
of firms and determining the break off points. These are shown 
in Appendix A, Table 2, and produce the size categories
displayed in Table 2:3.
Table 2:3: Firm Size Categories by RV, 1880-1901. _____
Size category (RV) Description
(£)1-150 Small
151-500 Medium
501-1,500 LargeJ
1,500-+ Giant^
Notes: a. Large firms are designated RV £501-1,500 which was arrived
at by following the procedure adopted by P. Sargent Florence, 
Post War Investment, Location and Size of Plant (1962), p.60,
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who defined size categories by a multiplication process, the 
multiplier being 3.b. A further category "Giant” was introduced to capture the 
large producers at RV £1,500 plus.
Utilising the RV data as size categories, the 1880
industrial structure is reconstructed and presented in Table
2:4. The data shows that small firms formed a significant
proportion of the industrial structure, especially in G where
72% of all firms were small. This suggests an industry
dominated by small private competing firms which would in turn
affect the strategies adopted by firms. According to Utton,
"the number and size distribution of firms in individual
industries are evidently closely bound up with their behaviour
and performance." Thus, the more concentrated an industry, the
less likely is it to conform to the assumptions predicted for
? 7perfectly competitive industries. ' Here the emphasis is on
market concentration, and RV data provides a proxy for
concentration, given the caveat that the tentative nature of
this estimate is kept at the forefront of the analysis.
Table 2:4: Size of 319 Sheffield firms by Industry Type in 1880.
Industrial Size Categories
Type Small Medium Large Giant Total
No % No % No % No % No %
B 28 46.7 21 35.0 8 13.3 3 5.0 60 100.0
G 70 72.2 21 21.6 5 5.2 1 1.0 97 100.0
TE 77 52.0 43 29.1 16 10.8 12 8.1 148 100.0
CT 7 50.0 7 50.0 0 - 0 - 14 100.0
Source: Rate Books, 1880.
In terms of concentration, the usual practice is to make a
distinction between concentrated, medium concentrated and
unconcentrated industries, based on the three or four largest
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firms in the industry.^ Table 2:5 shows the estimates offered
by the most detailed UK and US studies, and Table 2:6 provides
an estimate of concentration, for each industry type, based on
the proportion of the RV of the three and four largest firms to
total RV. Industry G is clearly unconcentrated under both
schemes of measurement, while industry B is on the borderline
of unconcentrated and moderately concentrated. However TE is
moderately concentrated under both schemes. Industry GT is
highly concentrated on both counts, but this is distorted
because they performed in both industries TE and G, and as one
would suspect, dual process firms tended to be larger.
Table 2:5: A Guideline to Industrial Concentration Ratios.__________
Industry Type Estimates of Estimates of
Everly & Little Kayser & Turner
(3 largest firms)3 (4 largest firms)^% %Concentrated 67 50+
Moderately concentrated 33-66 25-49
Unconcentrated -33 -25
Notes: a. Everly and Little utilise the contribution of the largest
three firms to total output and employment.
b. Kayser and Turner utilise the contribution of the four 
largest firms to total output.
Source: R. Everly and I.M.D. Little, Concentration in British Industry
(1960), p.51; G. Kayser and D.F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An 
Economic and Legal Interpretation (1959), pp. 295-7. See also 
R. Lloyd-Jones and M.J. Lewis, Manchester and the Age of the 
Factory (1988), p. 164, who also utilise these categories.
Table 2:6: Concentration of the Three and Four Largest firms in Sheffield,1880a   __
Industry Type % of 3 largest firms % of 4 largest firms
to total RV to total RV
B 35.2 29.8
G 28.8 24.5
TE 44.9 38.4
GT 51.9 41.3
Note: See Appendix A, Table 3 for a list of these firms.
Source: Rate Books, 1880.
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This clearly represents an highly competitive structure, 
although the dominance of large firms such as John Browns and 
Vickers in industry TE, companies which expanded rapidly on the 
basis of armaments production, would suggest a larger degree of 
power by these firms in this sector. Nevertheless, an industry 
based on small-scale firms would have the following 
characteristics. Firstly, as Sargent Florence claims, "the 
smaller the scale of operation and the fewer the total number 
of persons dividing and diffusing their labour, the less chance 
there is for all of them being made use of as s p e c i a l i s t s . " ^  
Thus we would expect a highly diverse division of labour, and 
as shown in Chapter 4, an intense sub-division of labour was a 
major feature of the light Sheffield trades, which shaped the 
human resource response of the firm in terms of the 
introduction of mechanisation and in wage negotiations. 
Furthermore, we would expect little collusion of business 
activities, in terms of wage and price fixing, in an industry 
composed of large numbers of small-scale units. This view is 
supported in Chapter 4, although the competitive pressures of 
large Sheffield producers in the area of marketing, especially 
in the sale of high quality tools, is emphasised in Chapters 5 
and 6.
Secondly, we would expect an high failure rate of small 
firms given the growing competitive pressures and periods of 
severe depression which affected the industry prior to 1914.^ 
G.I.H. Lloyd, in an excellent account of the cutlery industry,
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written in 1913, refers to the historical incidence of small- 
scale firms in this industry "and under such conditions it is 
unusual to find any great degree of permanence in the case of 
an individual firm." However, he noted that amongst the largest 
cutlery firms in 1913 there were several who could trace their 
origins, from small family beginnings, over a continuous period 
of one and two centuries.^ Amongst these were the large firms 
of Joseph Rodgers, James Dixon & Sons, and George 
Wostenholmes.^2 Similarly, firms producing steel and tools 
could trace their history back a number of generations. For 
example Marsh Bros, could trace its history to 1761, and Daniel 
Doncaster’s to 1829 and a number of large firms such as Brown's 
and Cammell's had started from small beginnings.^
Appendix A, Table 5 provides a biographical profile of 
the 319 firms constituting the 1880 population. Of these firms, 
212 or 66.5% of the 1880 population survived to 1901. However, 
what is remarkable is the high percentage of small firms which 
survive; 59% of all small firms in 1880 surviving to 1901. Even 
in cutlery, an industry dominated by small-scale producers, 62% 
of all small firms survived. This holds out the possibility 
that small firms provided a resource pool for future growth and 
development in the industry.^ According to Steindle, there is 
a negative correlation between mortality rates and the size of 
the firm; in many cases the small firm fails and never grows to 
maturity due to the high degree of business r i s k . 35 This 
proposition is not supported by the Sheffield evidence and as
Penrose points out, Steindle's analysis is a static or cross- 
section approach which does not allow for dynamic growth. As 
she states,
It would seem that at any given time a fair number of 
small firms would be in existence simply because they were 
young, and that at a later date the same fipns would have 
developed into medium-sized or large firms. D
This mirrors Alfred Marshall's trees of the forest
analogy, whereby small firms are assumed to follow a path of
continuous growth, supplanting new large firms to replace those
that stagnate or decay.^ It is worth recounting that Marshall
referred to only a small number of "young trees growing up to
maturity" and warned that "many succumb on the way."^
Certainly the growth performance of small firms in industries C
and TE appear to confirm Marshall, as shown in Table 2:7.
Taking all small firms together a total mobility rate of 17% or
one in four is evident from the data. Furthermore, as Lloyd-
Jones and Lewis show, it was upward mobility and not entry
which sustained the large size category. Overall, industrial
structure remained stable with no significant trend towards
. ^ Qspecific size categories.'"7
Table 2:7: Rates of Upward Mobility of Small Sheffield firms 
1380-1901 "
Industry Type % of small firms
3 14.3
C 15.7
TE 20.8
CT 14.3
Table 2:8 compares industrial structure in 1880 to 1901. 
What is significant is the retention of large numbers of small 
producers. The reasons behind this are of course difficult to
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assess, given the lack of business records on the smaller
business unit. However, we can make a number of reasoned points
which are supported in following chapters. Firstly, small-scale
production allowed flexibility in producing high quality
products to meet demands for order. Thus smaller firms could
more easily switch production processes to meet changes in
demand. As W. Lockwood Marsh, the managing director of Marsh
Bros.^ remarked in 1954,
The outstanding impression one gets is of the 
extraordinary resilience and adaptability of a small
private firm ... when demands for one particular product 
... disappeared, those in charge for th^ moment always 
seemed capable of striking out a new line.^1
Table 2:8: Shifts in Industrial Startups ty Industry T/pe 18801901
Size
Category Industry Type
B
1880 1901
C
1880 1901
IE
1880 1901
cr
1880 1901
No % NO % No % NO % No j/o No % No % No %Snail 28 46.7 31 48.4 70 72.2 69 66.4 77 52.0 80 47.3 7 50.0 13 50.0
Madiun 21 35.0 21 32.8 21 21.6 25 24.0 43 29.1 56 33.1 7 50.0 11 42.3
Large 8 13.3 9 14.1 5 5.2 10 9.6 16 10.8 17 10.1 0 0.0 2 7.7
Giant 3 5.0 3 4.7 1 1.0 0 0.0 12 8.1 16 9.5 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 60 100.0 64 100.0 97 100.0 104 100.0 148 100.0 169 100.0 14 100.0 26 100.0
Source: RateBooks 1880., 1901.
An example of diversification is illustrated by the growth of 
combined CT firms by 1901 (Table 2:8); firms could thus shift 
production processes to meet changing market requirements. 
Indeed, as the London agent of the Large steel and tool firm of 
Joseph Beardshaw & Co. noted in 1903, the flexibility of the 
small firm could be a considerable asset. For example, the firm 
found difficulty in procuring orders from London wholesale 
houses because they dealt with small firms who could produce
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equal quality, remedy mistakes and "are more willing to work to 
... instructions ... he knows their customers requirements 
better than they do."^
Secondly, the use of outwork as the mainstay of the light 
trades fostered a business system that was conducive to small- 
scale production. Outwork was particularly common in smaller 
firms who could rely on sub-contracting to reduce the fixed 
capital costs of operation. However, larger manufacturers 
combined inwork with outwork due to the more "intricate11 nature 
of the plant and e q u i p m e n t . A s  will be argued later, this 
partly accounts for the slow adoption of mechanisation and mass 
production techniques in the cutlery and tool trades, and the 
use of outwork was a key element in an industry producing low 
volume, high quality produce. Thirdly, as Pollard argues, the 
capital costs of setting up business were in all probability 
low, and credit formed the basis of the smaller firm.^ Indeed, 
the high entry rate of small firms between 1880 and 19014  ^
would support the view that in an industry with a heavy labour 
intensity the capital costs of starting business were low.^
Furthermore, in all probability firms were directly routed 
into the circuit of exchange via a specific merchanting 
function. Most firms producing steel and cutlery and tool 
products were also listed in the directory as merchants, and 
most were recorded in the rate books as operating warehouses.4  ^
This would suggest that small firms were as much merchants as 
manufacturers which reinforces the notion that credit was a key
40
element in the chain of production. The merchanting function of 
the Sheffield trades requires more extensive examination. 
However, evidence to the 1893 Select Committee on the Sweating 
System noted the existence of numerous ’’factors or merchants” 
in the cutlery trades who operated from a central warehouse, 
they did "not employ workmen direct, but they obtain orders and 
give them out to the little master, who is himself a 
w o r k m a n . T h a t  firms could expand their exchange and 
manufacturing functions is emphasised by the firm of T.A 
Ashton, who in 1880 operated a small cutlery workshop and 
warehouse in Norfolk Street, Sheffield, RV £48, and were 
described as cutlery manufacturers and merchants. By 1901, the 
firm had expanded to RV £198, largely by adding warehouses and 
retail shops to its workshops.
Finally, the rentier base of Sheffield’s business system 
needs to be considered. The renting of space and power by
larger manufacturers, in the light trades, to workers and small
SOmasters is well known. w However, firms themselves were
directly linked into a rentier system which encompassed the
majority of Sheffield’s trades. Appendix A, Table 6, provides a
breakdown of the 1880 population of firms by renting or owner- 
S1occupancy.^-1- All industries display a high degree of renting 
with 41.1% of the 1880 population of firms renting property. 
However, it is clear from the data that the typical medium and 
large firm was an owner-occupier and as one would expect no 
firms in the Giant category rented property. However, the
small-scale category showed a marked tendency towards renting, 
accounting for 56.6% of all small firms.
Thus, a characteristic of small firms was the very fact 
they were rentiers which provided an easy route to circumvent 
the capital costs of entering the industry and held out 
opportunities for small capitalists. Furthermore, the lower 
fixed costs attached to renting may well have provided the firm 
with a buffer against the risks attached to business. Indeed, 
the numerous advertisements in the Sheffield newspapers for 
rented business premises are suggestive that there was an ample 
supply of space for small business as the following examples 
illustrate:
To let. Large shop ... with engine power, smith’s hearth 
with blast, hardening furnace and office, suitable for a 
saw hardener or machinist.
To let. Shoreham Electro-Plate Works ... recently built at 
great cost ... fitted with plant and machinery of the most 
modern construction. ^
To let. 10 hole melting furnace, with steel warehouse and offices, in centre of town. ^
The emphasis which has been placed on the small firm 
should not however detract from the considerable expansion of 
the heavy sector of the industry, especially firms in armaments 
which found a growing domestic demand for its output after 
1880.^° Appendix A, Table 7, shows the expansion of the RV of 
the giant firms of 1880, and those large firms which were 
mobile upwards between 1880 and 1901. Of the 20 firms in this 
sample, 14 firms show an increase in RV, and overall there was 
a 64.7% increase in the total RV of these firms between 1880 
and 1901. In particular, the firms of Charles Cammell’s and
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Vickers expanded rapidly as they moved into the production of 
bulk steel for ship-plate and armaments; the RV of the former 
increasing by 120% and the latter by 354%; by 1901, Vickers was 
the largest firm in the City. That a large firm such as Vickers 
could exert a considerable influence in relations with 
Government contractors was emphasised by the agent of 
Beardshaw’s in 1900 who complained that government contracts 
were excluded from the firm by the '’favour” given to the 
representatives of Vickers and by price undercutting.-^
The structural features of Sheffield’s iron and steel 
sector in this period would however suggest the retention of a 
thick undergrowth of small-scale and medium firms which 
together accounted for 85.9% and 84.3% of the total population 
of firms in 1880 and 1901 respectively. This would suggest 
certain properties in relation to the organisational structure 
of the firm. For example, the Bolton Committee on Small firms 
in 1971 defined an essential characteristic of small firms as 
management by owners or part owners, and the firm was managed 
and owned by the same people. They further noted the heavy 
influence of family control within the smaller business unit.^ 
however, even with large public formations, as in the 
conversion of a number of Sheffield steel firms to public 
liability status in the 1860's and 1870's, the retention of 
family control was all too obvious. For example, J.W. Dixon, an 
electro-plate manufacturer, informed the 1886 Select Committee 
that the effect of limited liabilities in Sheffield had not
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"disarranged" trade as "the management remains the same, the 
capital is only owned by a large body of men instead of by one 
or two."-^
As Lloyd-Jones claims, the example of Sheffield tends to 
fit in with comparative studies of business in the USA and 
Germany which characterises British business structure in terms 
of the slow pace of mergers, the failure of family firms to 
assume public limited status, "and the consequent resilience of 
family control in the affairs of the firm."^ Certainly the 
evidence from the rate books for 1880, which listed those who 
paid the rate, would indicate a high degree of family 
involvement in the management of the firm.^ This is supported 
by the available business evidence from company records. The 
records surveyed and their business activities are shown in 
Appendix A, Table 8, which clearly indicates that apart from 
the firm of Burgon & Ball, which converted to a public limited 
in 1 8 9 8 , ^  the firms retained their individual status through
r othe adoption of private limited status.0-3 Thus firms could 
adopt limited liability without altering the existing 
managerial structure of the business. As the management of 
Spear & Jackson remarked in 1905, "this company was converted 
into a private limited company, the partnership practically 
remaining as before.
One feature of this was the use of retained profits and 
family capital in the process of business expansion. The 
existing owners of the firm financed expansion by issuing new
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share capital to the existing members. For example, the share 
capital of the firm of Spear & Jackson was largely held by J.K. 
Wilson, the managing director and executor of the will of J.F. 
Jackson, a founding partner in the concern. In 1907, the share 
capital of the firm was increased by the creation of 10,000 new 
ordinary shares of £1 each, raising capital from £75,000 to
£85,000. Furthermore, mortgage debentures were issued to 
directors as a form of capital investment, this liability
increasing from £20,000 in 1906 to £30,000 by 1909. Indeed, for 
a firm clearly orientated to the retention of the existing
managerial structure, the Companies Act of 1907, provided an 
opportunity to restrict outside capital, limiting share holders 
to 50 and prohibiting the subscription of the public for share 
or debenture stock.^ The importance of family capital was 
clearly evident in the case of Edgar Allen & Co. As the major 
shareholder, William Edgar Allen, remarked in 1907,
my Co-Directors ... considered my first duty was to 
invest my money in Edgar Allen & Co. Ltd. preference
shares because they wanted more working capital for plant 
etc. , and I have locked up thousands of pound^s the firm
was owing me by leaving it to Edgar Allen & Co.
Similar procedures were adopted by the other firms for
which adequate records survive. For example, Beardshaw’s in
1908 reported that a considerable sum had been spent on
developing new markets, financed from revenue, and altered
their articles of association in 1908 to encompass the
restriction of private liability in the 1907 Act and
prohibiting share subscriptions from the public. The use of
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debenture shares was further evident with the company 
mortgaging its plant to the total of £25,000 on its 
incorporation in 1893, and borrowing at 5% interest on the 
capital. ^  Indeed the firm of Cooper Bros & Co. had from its 
incorporation excluded the use of outside capital, including in 
its articles of association in 1895 the power to raise capital 
by issuing debenture stock, preference, or guaranteed shares. 
However, no shares were to be transferred by any member of the
c ocompany other than the family directors, T. & J.W. Cooper. ° 
This evidence supports the general proposition of Thomas, that 
prior to 1914 the demand for external funds was small, and even
in boom periods not more than 10% of real home investment was
a qfinanced by market borrowing. 7
The evidence for company mergers would also tend to 
support the view that they were usually lose combinations and 
could be restricted by the influence of the family to retain 
some degree of control. For example, the take over of the 
Effingham Steel & Rolling Mills Co., facing financial troubles, 
by Marsh Bros, in 1896, was complicated by the insistence of 
the majority shareholder, R.B. Maltby that he should retain a 
seat on the board. Although this was resisted, the company was 
controlled as a loose subsidiary, the majority shareholders 
being the Marsh family, who provided injections of share 
capital at various stages. The firm was to "be continued in the 
same name ... in reality there is only a change in the 
directorate."^ Similarly, the take over of Drabble &
Sanderson, saw manufacturers, by Spear & Jackson in 1908, saw
the retention of the existing managerial structure, the firm
being run as a loose subsidiary, Spear & Jackson controlling
71the marketing end of operations. ' x
The recruitment of family members within the managerial 
structure of the firm is further emphasised in these case 
studies. For example, even in a firm such as Spear & Jackson, 
which was managed by a board of director executors, the role 
for family members was important. Thus, in 1911, D. Jackson 
Haggie, the grandson of J.B. Jackson, was appointed as manager
of the sales department, having been trained in the various
7 ?departments of the works.' * Similar examples of family 
recruitment, especially in the marketing end of the business, 
are evident in the example of Wostenholme1s, Beardshaw's, and 
Burgon & Ball. Indeed, the resistance of the family to the 
recruitment of professional managers to directorships may well 
have reduced the quality of entrepreneurship. For example, R. 
Woodward, the resident Managing Director of Edgar Allen’s, 
informed William Edgar that our ’’business is now a big one and 
requires watching more than ever”, thus they should appoint 
departmental managers to directorships as a means of
transferring responsibility and experience to ’’junior”
directors. However, this was firmly resisted by William who 
claimed that they had no responsibility to departmental
managers who had been trained at the firm's expense, and the 
transfer of shares to new directors would close the
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opportunities for directors to be replaced by family members.
The matter was resolved by appointing four "special11
departmental directors, attaining no share holdings and acting
in a purely advisory capacity.^3
In the case of this firm, a continued reliance on internal
share capital acted as a constraint on development. The 1907
Companies Act restricted shareholders in private companies to
50,^ forcing the company to consider the possibility of
selling shares publicly, as they had 29 ordinary and 135
preference holders. This factor, together with the need for a
large investment of £10,000 for expansion, prompted William to
argue that this could not be provided from "personal and
private funds" and the use of retained profits would severely
reduce profits. Thus the company should sell shares to the
public but also ensure that the existing directors retained
control by holding the bulk of the original shares.'7-* However,
reorganisation was obstructed as they could not establish a
price for the company’s shares on the open market. As William
argued, they could not seek a quotation in London because
"Our shares have no market even in Sheffield. An odd sale 
now and then does not make a market price, which is very 
much against planning our preferences ... the Stock 
Exchange is ... a business concern got together for their own mutual and individual profit . not to oblige you and 
me how to help us to buy and sell. °
The basic constraint to the firm’s ambitions thus revolved
around the problems of selling shares on the open market
without losing control over operations. This was further
complicated by the rules of the Stock Exchange which stipulated
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that 2/3 of new shares should be offered to the public.^ Thus
an alternative strategy of issuing new ordinary shares to raise
capital would not conform to market requirements where shares
were freely transferable, when the articles of the company
7 8prohibited transfers without the consent of the directors. 
The solution here was to remove the prohibition on transfers, 
sell ordinary shares in the market, and follow the lead of 
companies such as Vickers, Son & Maxim, who kept dividends high 
in order to induce market confidence. Shares were finally
quoted to the public in March 1910.^
The example of this company illustrates the difficulties 
of raising capital by family controlled firms and the problems 
of conversion from private to public liability. Indeed, the 
failure of the shares to find a ready market led the company in 
1913 to create £75,000 £1 preference shares which were issued 
to the Sheffield & Hallamshire Bank in return for loan capital
O Afor the construction of a new cogging and rolling plant.ow 
Furthermore, it fits in with general notions of the divorce of 
financial and industrial capital in the UK, especially when
compared to the growth of investment banks and company
O  -Ipromotions in Germany before 1914.OJ- Indeed, the management of 
Edgar Allen's looked to Germany as a model, noting the 
expansion of the large Deutsch and Dresdner Banks, the 
"flexibility" of the system in providing capital at rates of 
interest minimally above the "official bank rate of interest", 
and the employment of experts to provide financial advice to
business on new projects and the mechanisms of raising
q nfinance.
This chapter has explored the structural features of the 
iron and steel industry before 1914. The emphasis on the small- 
scale nature of capitalism is related to the structural 
characteristics of the industry which are explored in following 
chapters in relation to the business strategy of the firm. The 
retention of family control may well have been detrimental to 
the growth and development of larger business units. 
Furthermore, the notion of business structure brings forth the 
ideas of a business system which fostered a defence of the 
economic interests of the industry at a political level. 
Sheffield firms were to face increasing competitive constraints 
from the 1880's, which required an effective response at both 
the economic and political level. The next chapter begins to 
explore these constraints in relation to the great depression 
and the economic crisis of the 1880's.
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3Economic Change, the Constraints to Growth, and the Crisis of Sheffield in the 1880's.
This chapter firstly analyses the constraints on British 
business development in the wider context of general studies of 
the performance of the overall economy in the period 1870-1914. 
It will then be argued that these constraints became apparent 
to Sheffield businessmen in the 1870's and 1880's, the first 
two decades of the so called great depression era. In the 
context of Moss's theory of business strategy, outlined in 
chapter 1, what were the competitive pressures facing Sheffield 
firms in this period and what were the constraints on growth 
and development? Furthermore, it will be argued that Sheffield 
producers, during the 1880's, perceived a growing economic 
crisis at the local level related to a changing economic 
environment and problems of overproduction. As a starting 
point, a brief summary of the so called great depression era 
is provided, emphasising the key role of the staple iron and 
steel industry to Britain's overall industrial performance.
Floud has remarked that it was an era when, it is claimed, 
"Britain lost the unchallenged position it had gained as the 
first industrial nation."^ This is reinforced by Lloyd-Jones 
who claims that the "period witnessed the so called Great 
Depression and the British climacteric, and was an era too when 
Britain faced fierce international competition both 
economically and politically." Issues such as the Great 
Depression and the British climacteric have brought forth a
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barrage of quantitative data both for and against,  ^ and indeed 
the period leading up to 1914 has now "become as popular as the 
classical industrial revolution as a field of scholarly 
study.
At the macroeconomic level, the economy was prone to 
violent short-run fluctuations^, and problems on the demand 
side of the economy led to the possibility of overproduction. 
The whole concept of a Great Depression relates to the alleged 
slowing down of the British economy in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. For example, Crouzet, using data for 
G.N.P., indicates "a long phase of deceleration and distinctly 
slower growth than before from the early 1870's, with some 
recovery in the 1890's, but renewed slowing down at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.^ The most recent 
quantitative analysis by Greasley partially supports Crouzet's 
contention. He concludes that, "the traditional Great 
Depression years, 1873-1896, while not marking the climacteric, 
do represent a phase of significant lower growth and "Saul's 
... banishment of the Great Depression from the literature may 
have been hasty", although the claims of a post-1899 
climacteric is "misleading since growth appears strong" during 
the 1907-1913 cycle."8
Greasley's estimates for real compromise GDP show a marked 
slow down in growth rates after 1873; from 2.55% per annum 
cl865-73, to 1.53% and 1.70% cl873-82 and 1882-9.  ^ This slower 
overall growth is also related to the claim of slower
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productivity growth in this period. Indeed, not only did output 
per head slow down in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century but it "began to lag relative to latter day 
industrialising contries."-^ This was particularly the case in 
the growth of industrial production and productivity as shown 
by the comparative estimates in Table 3:1.
Table 3:1: Average annual Growth Rates in Industry 1860-1913 
Country Industrial Production Industrial Productivity(%) (%)UK 2.1 0.6
Germany 4.7 1.5USA 4.1 2.6
France 3.1 N/A
Source: S. Pollard, Britain’s Prime and Britain's Decline: The British
Economy 1370-1914 (1989), p.12.
As one would expect, there was a dramatic fall in 
Britain's share of world manufacturing output as a consequence 
of slower industrial productivity.-^ However, although 
Britain's relative decline is unmistakable she was still the 
worlds largest industrial producer in 1913 and "what was 
significant for Britain was her position as an exporter in a 
competitive environment." Of more concern was the fact that 
Britain’s share of exported capital goods, "possibly containing 
the products of the more advanced or progressive industries 
showed an even more dramatic fall",-^ as shown it Table 3:2. 
Nevertheless one could interpret the data in a more optimistic 
fashion and Pollard claims that for a country with a smaller 
population Britain still held the largest share of manufactured 
exports and this in itself "was a not inconsiderable 
achievement."-^ According to Pollard, the macroeconomic
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evidence for industrial growth is in itself not sufficient to 
determine the exact turning points in economic performance, and 
he advocates a closer examination of sectorial changes in the 
economy.^4 In particular, Britain's staple industries have 
undergone far reaching examination by economic historians and, 
according to Elbaum and Lazonick, structural change to fast 
growing new sectors of industry was slow to develop and in any 
case in "the pre-World War 1 years the staple industries 
remained economically preponderant."-^
x
Table 3:2: Share of World Exports of Capital Goods 1800-1913.
Country % Share of Exports1800 1899 1913
UK 63.1 44.4 31.3USA 5.7 22.2 20.8Germany 19.0 17.2 30.1Rest of World 12.2 16.1 17.8
Source: Pollard, Britain's Prime, p. 14
The performance of Britain's staple industries is 
therefore crucial to the debate on Britain's pre-1914 economic 
performance, and particular attention has been drawn to the 
iron and steel industry and its related branches. The 
performance of this industry has been a focal point for studies 
which have emphasised industrial d e c l i n e - ^  and its role as a 
dynamic agent of expansion in the mid-Victorian period, its 
position "as a status at home and abroad, and its significant 
contribution to Britain's export performance"-^ have all 
received considerable attention. Thus as McCloskey informs us,
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the British iron and steel industry "has to a special degree 
encouraged generalisations concerning the economy as a 
whole". What then was the overall economic performance of 
this sector and what were the constraint changes it faced 
c.1870-1914?
The evidence for growth rates in the iron and steel 
industry clearly indicates a marked slowing down after 1870, 
which fits the evidence for a retardation of overall British 
growth rates. After making "regular" but "unspectacular" 
progress in the 1850fs and 1860's the industry witnessed boom 
conditions between 1869 and 1873, which was largely due to the 
enormous increase in exports. At this date, the industries 
share of national product reached its peak, and thereafter 
there was a serious slowing down in the growth trend "during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth, and beginning of the 
twentieth century." The contribution of the iron and steel 
industries gross production to UK GNP fell from a peak of 12% 
in 1871 to 5.4 % by 1907.19
In terms of production trends, the new dynamic after 1870 
was the rapid substitution of steel for wrought iron.^0 
Nevertheless, the problem was again one of relative decline in 
the face of growing competitive pressures from US and German 
producers. Elbaum, surveying the pre-1914 British steel 
industry, claims that it had "surrendered world leadership and 
entered a spiral of competitive decline from which it has never 
fully recovered.Britain's share of world tonnage output in
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1870-4 was 47.6% for pig iron and 43.9% for steel, however, by 
1910-14, despite rising domestic production, this had fallen to 
14.9% and 10.8% respectively. Britain was overtaken by the USA
in 1886 and by Germany in 1893; by 1900, both were producing
9 9three times the steel tonnage of Britain.  ^ Furthermore, 
Britain, by 1913, had become a major importer of steel 
products. In 1913, 41.0% of British production was still
exported, thus the industry was still firmly locked into the 
international economy, but now stagnating exports was 
accompanied by rising imports and Britain was importing over 2 
million tons of iron and steel products compared to just over 
0.2 million tons in the 1880's. By 1913, imports accounted for
approximately 29.0% of Britain's domestic consumption of
9 3wrought iron and steel. J
As Harley and McCloskey note, by 1900, foreign steel 
imports were becoming increasingly evident in Britain, and was 
a source of major concern to businessmen who felt that "Surely 
something had gone w r o n g . T h a t  something fundamental had 
gone wrong was evidently the concern of those businessmen who
sat on the unofficial Tariff Commission of 1904. In terms of
the iron and steel industry they concluded with a note of 
warning that,
The evidence shows that we are only at the beginning of 
the era of foreign competition, that that competition is 
certain to become more and more severe, and that to
maintain the British iron and steel industry in a state of
efficiency, strenuous efforts are absolutely necessary.
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Competition thus placed a clear constraint on business
development which called for the formulation of a decisive 
strategy by businessmen.
A whole plethora of explanations have been put forward to 
explain the failings of the British iron and steel industry;
these range from inferior entrepreneurship and lack of
9 9 7technical training, ° chaotic industrial relations, ' to demand
9 8and supply constraints^ , and institutional factors such as the 
government’s retention of free trade in a market prone to
dumping and exclusion from traditional markets by high
tariffs.29 These factors relate to Moss's constraints outlined 
in the last chapter, the development of the industry was
constrained by both resource and market factors. In terms of 
the development of the industry's physical technical resources, 
it has been claimed that the steel industry had a high
innovatory potential but lagged in the introduction of new 
techniques by 1900. w According to one estimate, German and US 
steel producers were 15.0% more efficient in productivity by
1905-09 than their British counterparts.^ In particular, the
failure to rapidly introduce new mass production techniques 
placed the industry in an inferior competitive position by
o 91914. As Coleman and Macleod claim, the "unenthusiastic 
attitudes” shown by a majority of UK businessmen towards new 
technology ”had long and tenacious historical roots.
Of course these views have not gone unchallenged. For 
example, Sandberg argues that the causal links between
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entrepreneurial failure, technological backwardness and the 
weak performance of the economy is problematic.^^ Similarly, 
McCloskey claims that late Victorian Britain did not fail 
because the expansion of output depended upon how productively 
the available resources in the economy were utilised. Thus, 
British entrepreneurs are redeemed on the grounds that they 
performed well given the test of cost minimisation subject to 
prevailing constraints.^^ There is of course a compelling logic 
to these arguments, however, it ignores the underlying dynamic 
of capitalism, in particular the ability of entrepreneurs to 
adequately respond to the prevailing constraints. Thus, for 
example, Elbaum and Lazonick turn McCloskey's argument around; 
the British "problem was that economic decision makers, lacking 
the individual or collective means to alter existing 
constraints, in effect took them as given." Although aware of 
the constraints facing them, "British businessmen failed to 
confront institutional constraints innovatively, in 
particular the retention of small-scale business structures in 
a political economy of free trade which protected faster
o 7growing foreign markets. '
These constraining factors form the basis for exploring 
developments in Sheffield's iron and steel sector and are 
analysed in detail in future chapters. However, for Sheffield 
businessmen the 1880's was a decade when they began to perceive 
that, indeed, something had gone wrong, and the trade witnessed 
a growing economic crisis which was to shape their economic and
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political response in the following years. At the heart of this 
crisis was the declining competitiveness of Sheffield industry. 
Changes in the external environment thus focussed business
attention on the cost and structural problems of the industry,
and demanded a positive response to constraints related to the 
resources of the firm, and the changing political environment 
which saw the industry develop in an age of rising protective 
barriers.
In January 1880, The Engineer presented a gloomy account 
of the present and future prospects of the metal trades of 
Great Britain. The "depression hung like a black cloud over the 
country ... Hope and with it speculation were alike dead." This
crisis, it was argued, was directly related to Britain’s
declining export performance, where "Foreign competition in our 
principle and best markets seemed to have gained an hold which 
would never r e l a x . T h e s e  views were echoed by the Sheffield 
trade where, in the severe recession of 1879, there were "loud 
complaints" by heavy steel and engineering producers "as to the 
depression in b u s i n e s s . T h e  short-term cyclical nature of 
the depression, which affected different sectors of Sheffield 
industry periodically, was evidently recognised by the business 
community. For example, The Engineer reported, in January 1880, 
that heavy rail producers in Sheffield were "well employed" and 
had substantial contracts for Indian, Australian and UK 
markets. The demand for heavy engineering products, although 
still low, showed sufficient improvement to indicate that
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British producers "still hold the chief command in those 
foreign markets which are not supplied by native sources", 
particularly colonial markets. On the other hand, however, 
competition in the lighter staple trades of Sheffield was 
intense and cutlery and small tool producers had little demand 
for their products.^
The "partial nature" of the trade revival, largely 
confined to the heavier trades, and stimulated by a large 
upturn in demand from the USA for Bessemer steel and rails, was 
also commented upon by The Sheffield Independent. The demand 
stimulus to the heavy sector, it was argued, would in turn 
engender a revival of demand for cutlery and other fabricated 
products.^ The major factor in this revival was US demand,^ 
and replying to comments in the USA, that Britain no longer 
"had a permanent footing in the American market", the 
Independent optimistically remarked that Sheffield still held 
its competitive advantage: "prices are cheaper here and America 
will buy iron, rails and steels ... as they have done in the 
past." However, they also registered a note of concern to the 
fact that US steel producers had now resumed operations at an 
"increased capacity.!|Z^
That US competition had seriously affected Sheffield’s 
competitive position in the depression of the 1870's is 
illustrated by the Independent1s attack on the US practice of 
dumping:
Another result from American activity and high rates will
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be that we shall hear far less of their competition in 
foreign and neutral markets, than during the period of 
stagnation, they no longer having any inducement to clear 
out stocks at ridiculously low prices. ^
This clearly indicated, that US producers were already
encroaching on Sheffield’s traditional foreign markets in the
1870's, responding to the depression by maintaining output,
stockpiling and then flooding the market at marked down prices,
thus further depressing prices. Certainly, the depression from
the mid-1870's was reflected in falling prices for iron and
steel products.^ For example, prices for steel products fell
sharply during the 1870's by as much as 60%. The major factors
responsible for this was intense competition amongst steel
producers for new markets, falling costs as economies of scale
and improvement innovations began to work themselves out, and
the locational shift of steelworks to cheaper coastal sites to
reap the advantages of low cost foreign ore imports.
According to the Independent, the trend of falling prices 
had restricted trade and led firms to pursue a strategy of 
output contraction and the running down of accumulated 
inventories.^ However, although the revival in US trade had 
brought a rise in prices,4  ^ the Independent warned against 
"reckless speculation" as trade revival had been induced by the 
very fact that prices had fallen to a minimum point which was 
exceptionally low.^ That such a warning was not heeded by iron 
and steel producers was exemplified by a survey of the 
industry’s trading performance in the Economist of December 
1880. Towards the close of 1879, trade suddenly emerged from "a
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prolonged depression ... into a condition of feverish 
activity", with a large increase in demand from the USA, and 
the increase in production has "exceeded anything known in 
trade." However, the Economist noted that a great proportion of 
this increased business was purely "speculative" which created 
serious losses for producers when US trade fell off from May 
1880.50
The transitory nature of the US trade revival thus 
dictated that business should pursue a cautious approach to 
capacity expansion. Therefore, in terms of Moss's concept of 
business strategy, market uncertainty may well have created a 
cautious business response to the upturn of the trade cycle in 
1880. Indeed the initial response by Sheffield's heavy steel 
and engineering producers was fairly conservative. For example, 
the price of steel rails increased from £4..12s..6d in October 
1879 to £8..10s..0d by January 1880, however the precarious and 
uncertain business environment convinced many firms to decline 
committing themselves to large contracts.^
This caution may well have been justified, given that by 
mid-1880 the heavy trades were again reported as depressed, the 
engineering trades were short of orders "and workmen have again 
been placed on half t i m e . " - ^  por example, the large foundry and 
engineering firm of Davey Bros. Ltd., reported to its 
shareholders in July 1880 that they were operating at 
"undercapacity" due to falling orders and "unremunerative 
prices". ^  The 1880 rate book provides an estimate of
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underutilised capacity, with 5 firms recorded as wholly empty 
and 24 as partly empty, with a total RV of £5,890, or 4.4% of 
the total RV for 1880. However, large firms such as Vickers and 
Firth’s were operating below full capacity, the former with 24% 
of the total RV empty, and the latter with 5%.^ Trade remained 
’’dull" until August 1880 when the engineering trades reported 
an upturn in trade largely from domestic sources as the 
shipbuilding trade revived leading to an increased demand for 
ship-plate. Furthermore, by October 1880 the cutlery trades 
were finally responding to the stimulus, given by the heavy 
sector, resulting in a large increase in foreign orders mainly 
from the Australian market.
The precarious and uncertain nature of the trading 
environment is evident from the above analysis of the upturn in 
the trade cycle in 1880. In particular the vagaries of the US 
market created considerable fluctuations in demand. This was 
certainly evident in the 1870's as emphasised by the example of 
the large Sheffield steel and tool firm of Samual Osborne & Co. 
This firm rapidly developed Mushet’s special tool steel after 
1868, gaining a reputation in the US market by 1872. However, 
the Company soon found, as did other Sheffield producers, that 
the US market had its dangers, and financial fluctuations in 
the US in 1874 brought the company to the brink of bankruptcy 
in 1 8 7 4 . ^  In 1886, Samual Osborne advocated an expansion into 
new markets, to relieve Sheffield firms of the "capricious" 
nature of the US trade, in which upturns in demand placed
immense pressures on the productive resources of the firm, 
while downturns resulted in the complete stoppage of 
production. As he succinctly put it: "Once when American trade 
is bad the whole of Sheffield is distressed.
The "mild boom" of 1880 to 1883 collapsed in Sheffield at 
the end of 1883 leading to a severe depression in 1885 and 
1886.-^ Again, economic recession in the USA towards the end of 
1882 marked the end of the upturn in the short cycle. The
persistence of these cycles was emphasised by Fredrick
f) 0Brittain, a steel manufacturer and fair trader, in 1886, u who
argued that "eight years ago we were told that the depression
was only temporary ... I pointed out at the time that the
depression in other countries was produced by different causes
and that it had varied in intensity." The overwhelming cause of
the depression, according to Brittain, was "foreign competition
assisted by protective t a r i f f s . T h e  link between foreign
competition and depression was also prominent in the evidence
of Sir Lowthian Bell, the President of the Iron trade
Association, to the 1886 Royal Commission:
foreign countries have largely increased their powers of 
production in late years, more largely than has been the 
case with ourselves, and they are in consequence 
formidable competitors with us not only in their own territory, but in neutral markets.
The realisation of increased foreign production and 
competition was prominent in the evidence presented to the 
Commission by Sheffield businessmen connected with a wide range 
of the cities iron and steel trades. For example, James W.
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Dixon, an electro-plate and Brittania metal producer, claimed 
that his own business was "in a very depressed state" and 
generally he "had never known trade so bad in Sheffield. 
Another witness, Charles Belk, giving evidence relating to the 
cutlery trades, laid the blame for the decline in the output of 
table cutlery squarely on "foreigners taking the business. 
However, the depression was not only prevalent in the lighter 
trades, but also in heavy engineering. J.D. Ellis, the chairman 
of John Browns, complained of a general depression in the heavy 
engineering trades, the loss of "nearly all our old foreign 
markets", in consequence of the larger production methods and 
improved processes "which have been fostered by the tariffs 
which have been put on."^
That tariffs were a central cause of the depression was 
reinforced by T.E. Vickers, who, referring to the once 
lucrative trade with the USA, complained that high US import 
duties^0 had virtually decimated their trade in bar and sheet 
steel, and railway materials, the firm’s exports declining from 
£83,000 to £,4000, cl864-85, and £100,000 to £1,000, cl873-85 
respectively. According to Vickers, the crucial factor in 
eliminating Sheffield from this market was the prevailing US 
tariff structure which induced US producers to increase the 
scale of operations as "The Americans could make a very large 
profit when we could just sell with a bare profit, or at cost 
price, and, therefore, they extended their works." Thus tariffs 
acted as a constraint on investment decisions relating to the
c 7expansion of business activity. '
Similar arguments abounded amongst businessmen in the 
lighter Sheffield trades. Dixon complained of high tariff
barriers in the USA, Canada, France, Spain, and Russia which
was hampering the development of new lines of trade; and 
Osborne claimed that the once lucrative file trade with the US 
had been severely impaired by the US tariff, making the cost of
C Qfiles in New York double the selling price at Sheffield. °
Clearly, in terms of cutlery exports there was a dramatic
reduction in Sheffield’s trade with the USA in the 1870's and
1880's which, after a brief revival in the late 1880's,
continued apace up to 1910 (Appendix B, Table 1). A similar 
collapse of Sheffield's export trade in files to the USA is
also apparent, declining from £121,000 in 1868 to £11,000 by 
1879, to a mere £180 in 1902.^9 Furthermore, as shown in Table 
3:3, by 1900 Germany had surpassed Britain as the world's
leading cutlery exporter.
Table 3:3: Cutlery Exports by Country (Millions of Marks).
1900 1906 1913
Germany 16.1 24.1 38.3UK 12.8 14.1 16.7
France 4.2 5.4 6.3a
USA 1.2 2.3 4.6
Notes: a. Data for 1912.
Source: Pollard, Britain's Prime, p.45.
That adverse changes in tariffs could create business 
uncertainty is illustrated by the response of the management of 
the large cutlery firm of George Wostenholme's to the
imposition of the Mckinley Tariff in 1890. The management
70
claimed that the capital value of the Sheffield works depended 
on the maintenance of the US trade and in view of "growing 
tariff agitation" it was prudent, in addition to annual
capital depreciation, to meet the probable depreciation from 
the decrease of the US trade by increasing the depreciation 
fund by 20%.^ This evidence would seem to support the 
contention that Sheffield producers were constrained by the 
limitation of export demand in the face of the high tariff 
policies of her major competitors, Germany and the USA. Indeed, 
as Edward Beckett, the US agent for Wostenholme1s, informed the
directors in 1893, if there was a substantial reduction in the
US tariff, American importers "will do all they can to push our 
goods" and "we shall sell more goods than ever." High US
tariffs, claimed Beckett, deterred US importers ordering
cutlery in bulk batches thus reducing the company's ability to 
enter the market on a large enough scale.^ However, the 
problems facing Sheffield producers in the 1880's went deeper 
than this and was rooted in a fundamental crisis of 
overproduction.
In terms of the problems faced by individual business
firms, Sweezey has claimed that "Each capitalist produces for a 
market the size of which he can only estimate on the basis of 
very incomplete knowledge, with the result that now too little, 
now too much is p r o d u c e d . T h u s ,  it is possible for supply 
to exceed demand and "because the aim of production is to
expand value, production will be held back as the value
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embodied in the commodities cannot be realised on the 
m a r k e t . T h i s  therefore postulates the possibility of a 
realisation crisis whereby a decline in profitability, which 
sets the crisis in motion, results from the inability of 
capitalists to realise the full value of the commodities they 
produce.
Can such a perception of crisis be related to the 1880’s?
If we accept the viewpoint of McCloskey then the answer is no.
McCioskey firmly rejects the possibility of problems of
overproduction at the national level in the late Victorian
period clinging steadfastly to the undying virtues of Say’s
law.^ However, even if we accept this at the macro level, and
it is still a problematic issue, it denies the possibility of a
crisis at the local level and within industrial sectors of the
economy. Furthermore, McCloskey's theoretical base, located
within the static parameters of neo-classical economics, denies
the dynamic environment in which firms operate, an environment
which, as argued in chapter 1, was subject to constant
fluctuation and change.
Lowthian Bell located the causes of the depression in a
combination of both excess production, relating to capacity
expansion, and a diminuation in demand:
It has sometimes been due to the one and sometimes due to 
the other; but at the present moment there has been a 
diminuation in the make of iron in this country of 
something like a million tons a year: but the falling off 
in the demand as been more than that. ^
He further argued that the depression was more than simply a 
downturn of prices after a short period of inflation, in 1872- 
3, because the cost of production also increased substantially. 
Given the high labour intensity of iron production, the price 
of labour rose with the price of iron in the inflationary boom 
of the early 1970's "to such an extent that ... the cost of pig 
... and all kinds of iron rose, to double what it was in former 
years." However, when prices fell workers rejected wage cuts, 
and in consequence capitalists continued to pay high prices for 
labour, "long after the period when we could no longer afford 
it." The constraint of rising wages and falling prices thus 
adversely affected the competitive position of the British
7 rindustry vis-a-vis her major competitors. °
That overproduction had affected the Sheffield trades was 
referred to by the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce. Claiming it 
was a natural reaction following a period of inflation, the 
Chamber pointed to the fact that businessmen were now faced 
with falling prices, falling demand and keen competition for 
limited orders.^ Belk, referring to the cutlery trades, argued 
that insufficient demand and intense competition had made trade 
"unremunerative ... and were capital not already so largely and 
immovably fixed in the permanent appliances of the trade much 
would be withdrawn, and other channels sought for its 
profitable employment." Thus, according to Belk, the depression
was the consequence of "a general failure of demand" which had
7 8extended throughout the whole country. °
Overproduction was thus related to a problem of demand, 
but was the problem supply orientated as well as demand 
orientated? In other words, was overproduction also related to 
capacity expansion during the boom of the late 1860's and early 
1870's? The 1860's was a period of abnormally rapid capital 
accumulation and witnessed a substantial increase in the 
productive powers of industry particularly in the capital goods 
sector. For example, the world output of pig iron increased by 
60% c.1866-1872 and Britain accounted for nearly half of this 
increase. Capital investment in iron works is estimated to have 
trebled and in mines doubled between 1867 and 1875.^
In Sheffield, the production of crucible steel expanded 
rapidly in the late 1860's and early 1870's. The leading 
producers, Vickers, J.A. Andrews, Firth's, Sanderson's, and 
Jessop's increased their melting capacity substantially and by 
the early 1870's these five firms accounted for approximately 
half of Sheffield's crucible steel ou tpu t.I n de e d,  this 
marked the peak of Sheffield's crucible steel production, 
output being approximately 100,000 tons per annum.^ As Pollard 
point out, "The years 1870 to 1873 saw the greatest boom of the 
century among the heavy industries." In 1871 Brown, Bailey & 
Dixon established new works to employ over 1,000 workers, 
Cammell's expanded their Cyclops works to employ an additional 
800 and the Atlas works of John Browns were expanded employing 
a further 1,000. In addition, J.H. Andrews erected a new steel 
works and Vickers invested substantially in a new rolling mill.
However, this expansion in capacity was not limited to the 
larger concerns and there were "many additions to smaller 
firms.
This expansion of capacity led to serious problems of 
overproduction when demand fell after 1873. Trade generally 
improved after late 1879 with a mild boom to 1883 leading to 
the severe depression of 1885 and 1886.^ The world-wide 
overproduction of iron and steel, due to the rapid expansion of 
these sectors in the 1860's and early 1870's, led to 
fundamental problems in the 1880's. For example, the Engineer 
in January 1880, referring to the increased demand for railway 
material in the Sheffield district, urged caution because 
"despite the increase in prices ... it is possible that if 
advances continue to be made with such rapidity ... production 
may again be stimulated to overproduction from which the United 
Kingdom has severely suffered.
Similar problems were encountered in the lighter sectors. 
Pollard claims that "The depression of 1874-9 was of a severity 
unknown for a generation", conditions improved between 1880 and 
1883 but the revival did not witness "the full use of 
resources, the high profits, or the strong trade-union 
bargaining position of previous b o o m s . T h i s  would suggest 
that each successive recovery phase was conditioned by lower 
levels of economic activity and unutilised production 
resources. However, in the 1880's the productive capacity of 
the light trades was increased by the introduction of labour
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saving techniques beyond even the high output of the 1870-1873 
boom. As Belk informed the 1886 Commission, ’’The introduction 
of machinery has largely increased the productive powers of 
some of our staple trades"^ Thus in the slump of 1883-1886, 
although output did not fall to the levels of previous 
recessions, excess capacity caused prices, profits and wages to 
drop dramatically. Trade revived towards the end of 1886 and 
continued on the upgrade until the beginning of 1892 when a new
o orecession set in.°°
The crucial point here is that although production could
O Qbe increased through mechanisation and labour displaced07 the 
increased output still had to be realised. As Belk argued, the 
depression had stimulated the invention of labour saving 
machinery, allowing them to maintain the gross volume of trade, 
but there had been a marked decrease in the money value as 
intense competition, especially in the foreign introduction of 
low quality machine produced goods, "had driven down prices and 
seriously reduced profit margins.Therefore, the problem for 
the light trades was perceived as a general lack of "vitality 
in demand"*^ leading to overproduction and a realisation crisis 
for Sheffield producers highlighted by falling profit margins.
Market fluctuations could thus create financial 
difficulties and lead to business uncertainty. This can be 
illustrated by the experience of two prominent Sheffield firms 
in the heavy sector, the Yorkshire Engine Co. Ltd. and Brown, 
Bailey & Dixon Ltd. In the first case, the Company (RV £750)
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was promoted as a new venture by the Manchester based 
accounting firm of Chadwick, Adamson & Collier in 1864, with a
nominal capital of £200,000., reduced in 1867 to £163,000. In
July 1880 the firm was wound up after potential investors had 
provided only £7,000 of an expected £40,000 injection of new 
capital. The misfortunes of the company were directly 
attributable to large investments in plant and equipment for 
the production of locomotives which had proved largely 
unremunerative. In the late 1870’s, the firm faced ’severe
competition in the locomotive trade, for which most of its
plant is laid, and labouring under private burdens and 
insufficient capital it ... led eventually to its winding up.” 
The company was dissolved in 1880 by which time the nominal 
capital of £163,000 had depreciated by £153,000, leaving only 
£10,000 of original capital.^
The financial problems of Brown, Bailey & Dixon are even 
more striking given the large size of this concern. The firm 
was converted to a private limited liability company in 1873 
and produced Bessemer steel, railway equipment, steel forgings 
and light tools. In 1880, the firm occupied the extensive 
’’Sheffield Steel Works” in Attercliffe rated at £6,893 and had 
expanded rapidly in the 1870-1873 boom employing an additional
1,000 workers in this new plant. However, in March 1880 the 
company’s annual report disclosed a loss of £10,000 on the 
years operations and by early 1881 the firm’s liabilities were 
£263,802 compared to assets of only £120,246, leading to the
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’’shocking news” of the firms voluntary liquidation. The 
company’s declining fortunes were linked to a physical resource 
constraint related to the increasing price of pig iron in 1880, 
which the firm largely purchased from outside. This in turn 
adversely affected the cost structure of rail production 
entailing a considerable loss on the manufacture of steel rails 
’’although a profit had been made in other branches.
However, this was interwoven with a declining market for 
Sheffield rail products. In November 1880, Engineering reported 
that Sheffield rail producers had been severely hit by 
increased competition from the Continent, manufacturers 
subscribing ”to any conditions of delivery which local 
producers are not.” The essence of this argument was that 
Continental manufacturers were undercutting Sheffield rail 
producers in their own market and the journal concluded that 
the rail trade "is passing through a crisis in which the 
workmen are suffering. Clearly, however, from this example 
it was not only workers who suffered from the competitive 
environment facing the rail trade in this period.
That iron and steel firms suffered a squeeze on profits is 
also evident on a more general level. Profits for ironworks in 
the UK fell from a peak of £7.3 million in 1875 to a low of 
£1.7 million in 1880 and recovered only slowly up to 1884 
(Appendix B, Table 2). In the case of Sheffield firms, share 
values of publicly quoted companies provide some evidence to 
substantiate a general decline in profitability and also
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indicates the fluctuating nature of the investment market. 
Between 1875-78, the market value of shares of local firms, on 
which £7.5 million had been paid, had depreciated to 
£5million.^ The revival of trade in 1880 brought about a more 
bouyant investment market leading to an increase of £2 million 
in the share value of Sheffield limited companies. Furthermore, 
the nominal capital value of 16 leading Sheffield limited 
companies increased from £3,971,541 in August 1879 to 
£6,242,603 by January 1880 and this indicated an encouraging 
trend "especially as investments are so largely connected with 
the industries of the town ... commercial men have a knowledge
Hof what is the course of trade. John Browns, for example, 
reported that owing to intensified depression during the last 
six months no interim dividend was to be paid, but "profits are 
now revived and we hope for better in the second half of the 
financial year."^
This optimism, however, was short lived, share values 
again collapsed with the downturn of trade after 1883. A survey 
of 44 limited companies by the Sheffield Telegraph in 1885 
showed a net depreciation of £750,000 on the market value of 
shares during 1883. During 1884, 13 quoted companies showed an 
increased value above paid up capital of £1,603,056 while 31 
companies showed a depreciation of £3,654,318. and during 1885 
alone, the share value of Sheffield limited's fell by some £2 
million. ^  It was possible to identify 18 of these firms as 
being engaged in iron and steel operations in Sheffield and
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market valuation data for 1886 and the companies RV in 1880 is
given in Appendix B, Table 3. With the exception of four
companies, there was a marked depreciation in the market share
values of 13 companies, one remaining constant.
These data suggest a general squeeze on profits and as
the Telegraph noted in December 1885,
Three leading features mark the local trade for the year 
which, for all commercial purposes, has now practically 
expired ... a fair volume of trade generally, narrow 
margin of profit, and increasing severity of competition 
both at home and abroad. Prices have ruled very low and 
the revival which was anticipated ... has not taken 
place. °
Profit figures for individual Sheffield firms are of course 
difficult to come by, however, the data in Appendix B, Tables 
4-5 provides profit and loss figures for three firms over 
various time periods. The data for Wostenholme's show a severe 
dip in profits in 1885 but the data for Coopers do not cover 
the 1880's. However, the profit figures for Ibbotson's are more 
wide ranging and show clearly a marked downward trend in net 
profits from the mid-1870's to 1881, an upturn to 1886 though 
profits remain below the level of 1872.
This chapter has argued that Sheffield producers faced a 
growing crisis in the 1880's related to growing foreign 
competition, and problems of overproduction which were, in 
turn, related to the constraint of limited market demand in a 
changing competitive environment. These problems were again to 
manifest themselves in the severe recession of 1892 as 
indicated by the profit data in Appendix B. However, the rise
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of Germany and the USA in the 1880's suggested to Sheffield 
businessmen that something indeed had gone wrong. As Pollard 
argues, by 1900 the problems facing British industry were far 
more serious than the 1880's, more industries suffered from 
foreign competition and "economic growth in general and 
industrial growth in particular, far from accelerating, came to 
a virtual stands till".^  These problems were all too clear to 
Sheffield businessmen by 1900, and we now turn to the response 
of Sheffield businessmen to the changing economic environment 
cl880-1914.
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4
Businessmen and Change: The Resource Response of Sheffield
Firms, 1880-1914.
The theory of business strategy, developed in Chapter 1,
provides the framework for an examination of how the firm 
responds to competitive constraints. This chapter will 
concentrate on the resource response, which involved the 
restructuring of the firm’s physical and human resources, in 
particular the introduction of mechanisation to the 
manufacturing process. In other words, investment strategies 
are determined by the existing resource mix of the firm and 
imbalances in the production process may well focus managerial 
attention upon particular objectives which entail the 
elimination of these imbalances. Furthermore, competitive
pressures facing the industry provide an example of Moss's 
inducement effect, whereby external factors focus managerial
attention on new methods and techniques of production. But how 
successful were firms in meeting the challenge of competition? 
Particular reference is made to cutlery, where it is argued 
that labour resisted mechanisation and attempts to increase 
productivity, and the structure of the industry militated 
against the successful introduction of new techniques and work 
practice.
In January 1880, the Engineer, referring to intense foreign 
competition, criticised British engineers for a lack of 
ingenuity and called for a more efficient use of human
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resources in the production process: "At this moment more than 
ever is the employment of machinery to take the place of hand 
labour a necessity."^ This statement had particular reference 
to Sheffield’s cutlery and tool trades. Indeed, according to 
Charles Belk, in 1886, depression and competition provided an 
inducement to the introduction of new techniques, "as it keeps 
us alive to the progress that others are making, and prevents 
us ... resting content with the appliances that were sufficient 
in years gone by."^ Similarly, in 1902, W.F. Beardshaw, 
referring to the severe downturn of trade from mid-1901, argued 
that with "renewed vigour and with a wise adaptation to our 
methods of modern discoveries and ideas, the period of partial 
depression which at present exists will in time, as heretofore, 
be succeeded by a return of ... prosperity."^ Indeed, 
Beardshaw’s from the early 1900's expanded the scale of their 
operations, boosted by increasing demand for special steels. 
For example, the company’s annual report in November 1902 
referred to a "fair years trading" but this had only been 
achieved by "considerably increasing the tonnage of material 
manufactured and sold showing that competition is exceedingly 
keen.
The question of the intensification of production, in 
response to the changing competitive environment, thus became 
an issue of major concern to Sheffield producers from the 
1880's. Pollard refers to the fact that mechanisation was much 
more rapidly introduced into the cutlery and tool trades in
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Germany and the USA, "But even in Sheffield, where progress was
slower, the machine had become indispensable by the 1880's."-^
In cutlery, producers became acutely aware of comparatively
lower productivity levels, thus J.W. Dixon referred to the
competitive advantages of the Germans in terms of lower wages,
longer hours worked, and higher labour productivity compared to
their British counterparts.° However, labour resistance to
mechanisation was a fundamental problem, emphasised by the
speech of Lord James of Hereford to the Chamber of Commerce in
1902. The position of labour was now claimed to be untenable,
and to the general approval of the Chamber he concluded that
"if we don’t use the best machines you can be sure others
will." Indeed, the question of a more rapid adoption of
mechanisation was now not simply a trade related issue but had
become a question of "national" concern which although not
requiring government intervention nevertheless invoked the need
for mechanisms of effective conciliation between employer and
employees.^ AS the Webb's argued in 1902,
public opinion has become uneasy about the capacity of 
English manufacturers to hold their own against foreign 
competition and ... resents ... any attempt to restrict 
output or obstruct machinery . . . And thus we have a 
growing public opinion in favour of some authoritative 
tribunal of conciliation or arbitration.
Attempts to develop arbitration structures in Sheffield's 
trades from the 1860's had largely proven unsuccessful, due 
largely to employer resistance. For example, the town council, 
in 1893, proposed the development of "a chamber of arbitration" 
encompassing the Chamber of Commerce, Cutlers Company and the
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Sheffield Federated Trades Council, but ’’although arbitrators 
were appointed in 1894 and 1895 no appointments were made in 
1896 and "The scheme was still born."^ Indeed, the employers 
were split on the issue. Steel manufacturers such as W.H. 
Brittain argued that it would provide the basis for "a much 
wider and more extended scale before which all trade disputes 
might be brought and settled." However, Alderman William Smith 
countered that a chamber of arbitration would not succeed, 
given the peculiar nature of Sheffield's industrial system, 
compared to "commercial" centres such as London and Liverpool. 
The structure of Sheffield's economic base depended on 
manufacturing not commerce and thus they "did not particularly 
want to consult their trade rivals ... businessmen were able 
quietly ... to settle any differences they might have."10
This clearly brought to the fore the relationship between 
capitalists and labour within the business organisation. 
Although mechanisation might provide increased production the 
question of wages in relation to relative unit costs became of 
major concern to Sheffield businessmen faced with competitive 
pressures and falling profit margins.H Thus W.F. Beardshaw 
responded to an article in the Times, advocating that US 
businessmen would never allow the introduction of "the British 
ca-canny or restricted production system", by warning the 
Sheffield unions that they could only maintain their 
competitive position by enhancing the productive powers of 
industry. This required that "the British working man would
have to work hard for the days work. The wage may become more, 
but the man would have to do more in the time in which he was 
working.
In particular, the question of wage control and the 
bargaining position between capital and labour was crucial to 
businessmen faced by periodic recessions and changing 
competitive circumstances. In other words, the changing 
external environment, in relation to the firm’s resource base, 
produced an inducement effect which focussed managerial 
attention on the need to effectively restrain wage demands in 
the downturn of the trade cycle. For example, the evidence for 
money and real earnings in the Sheffield trades supports the 
notion of increased wages in the prosperous years of the early 
1870’s, falling after 1873, reviving with the upturn of trade 
in 1880-1883, falling again from 1883-7, reviving between 1887- 
95, and falling in the severe depression up to 1895 (Appendix 
C, Table 1). Pollard claims that ’’boom years” were usually 
reflected by substantial increases in earnings as trade unions 
became more active, forcing on employers new price lists or a 
shorter working week. However, in periods of recession union 
power particularly in the strategically important skilled 
unions was blunted.Thus, in the severe recession of 1885, 
J.W. Dixon could claim that wages for the majority of skilled 
workers had been substantially reduced, and Stuart Uttley noted
in 1889 that wages for both inworkers and outworkers had fallen
1 /considerably during the years of depression. 4
It would seem, therefore, that Sheffield capitalists could 
resist wage pressures on costs and profits during the downturn 
of the trade cycle. As Belk claimed, if there was "a shrinkage 
in business returns” and no corresponding fall in the return to 
labour the largest part of the decline falls on capital. 
These arguments were put in more technical terms by the 
Sheffield Chamber in 1894 in relation to the recession of 1893 
and the bitter dispute in the coal industry of that year. 
Responding to the miner's argument that "wages should regulate 
prices” they claimed that "your Council feel bound to put on 
record their belief that this contention embodies an economical 
heresy ... a tendency to ignore the law of supply and demand, 
which must regulate trade in all its b r a n c h e s . T h e  essence 
of the argument was that prices should regulate wages and thus 
in turn profits. This of course was based on Ricardian 
principles where profits were directly dependant on real wages, 
wages being "a function of the labour time required to produce 
wage goods
The above arguments in relation to wages posed two general 
issues in relation to the firm's resource development. Firstly, 
coal as a crucial raw material input to the manufacturing 
process should be kept as low as possible to compete with the 
cheaper raw material inputs of foreign producers. For example, 
Alderman Batty Langley, the Liberal M.P. for Sheffield 
Attercliffe, informed the Chamber in 1901 that the major cause 
of the recession was the enormous increase in the cost of
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manufacturing coal in the last two to three years-^ and the
Chamber concluded that the high price of fuel placed Sheffield
1 9at a considerable cost disadvantage compared to the USA. 
Indeed, the question of the high cost of coal to Sheffield 
steel producers could provoke bitter confrontation with the 
coal owners. For example, Sir Fredrick Thorpe Mappin, managing 
director of Thomas Turton & Sons, attacked the coal owners in 
1893 complaining of the high price of coal although the market 
was "glutted" and the miners had only resumed work a short 
time.20
The response of Sheffield manufacturers to the question of 
high coal prices was developments in coal saving techniques and 
new forms of fuel energy such as gas and electricity with the 
introduction of the electric arc furnace immediately prior to 
1914.21 por example, the firm of Edgar Allen's was from the 
1890's at the forefront of developing special steels in 
Sheffield. In 1892, they licensed from Tropenus of France a 
patent for smelting steel which from 1899 they attempted to 
license to a number of British and US producers. The advantages 
of this process over open hearth production were to be gained 
in higher quality output, less "wasters", easier carrying 
facilities in the production process and the use of scrap
metal. However, the main advantage was a lower blast
9 9requirement which would substantially reduce fuel costs.^ For 
large Sheffield producers, particularly those firms producing 
basic steel and armaments, the strategy was to integrate
backward into mining operations.23 Thus imbalances in the
firm’s physical resources, in terms of coal inputs, focussed
managerial attention on the need to develop strategies to
overcome these constraints.
Secondly, the issue of wages in the coal sector and the
relation between prices and wage regulation was taken up by the
Sheffield Chamber as a principle to be applied to all sectors
of industry. This in itself carried political overtones as
portrayed by Stuart Wortley, the Conservative M.P. for
Sheffield Hallam, who claimed that
"He represented ... labour ... and if this doctrine that 
wages were to regulate prices was to be applied he did not 
see why it should not be applied to the man who earned his 
wages in other industries ... cutlery, steel, 
engineering.
The basics of his argument was that the use of wages as a 
regulating agent would lead to reductions in the real wages of 
the working class by forcing up commodity prices. Furthermore, 
this was an appeal for the development of an effective 
framework of wage negotiation in the Sheffield trades. That 
businessmen could constrain wages during the downturn of the 
trade cycle would seem to suggest that wages were responsive to 
price changes, however the business strategy relating to wage 
control.was far from straight forward.
Indeed, wage negotiation could be a highly complex affair 
given the diversity of the Sheffield trades and a structure 
composed of numerous competing private firms. Thus 
collaboration amongst producers was a highly tentative business
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and this was particularly true of the cutlery and tool trades. 
An illustration of the complex structure of Sheffield’s light 
trades was provided by the representatives of the Sheffield 
Trades Council, a body representing 10,000 skilled workers, to 
the 1886 Commission. The Council represented "the skilled 
trades ... the old staple trades of Sheffield", but they could 
give no exact numbers as "the trade is so cut up and so 
diversified ... that it would be impossible to say how many 
really skilled workers there are."^
The process of labour control was further complicated by 
the highly complex system of outwork and sub-contracting which 
characterised Sheffield’s light trades.^6 Even in the 1900's 
larger Sheffield firms still employed numerous outworkers "and 
others were on a semi-public system, having first call on the 
workmen’s labour but permitting the men to seek orders from 
outside firms in slack times." The use of "team-work, whereby a 
team master employed on his own machines teams of youths or 
semi-trained workers each producing a narrow range of work,
usually at piece rates, was still a growing practice by
7 7Sheffield firms up to 1914. Furthermore, the sub-occupancy of 
tenement factories by small masters was a common characteristic 
of the industry and the 1907 Census of Production noted the 
considerable contribution of this form of production to the 
cutlery and tool trades^ (Appendix C, Table 2). In fact, even 
more progressive firms, in the specialist steel and tool 
sector, continued to utilise outworkers as exemplified by the
firm of Spear & Jackson who, in 1907, reported that they were 
to incorporate their "numerous1’ outworkers and contractors "to 
cover all risks" under the workmens compensation insurance.^
This of course suggests the uneven development of 
Sheffield's light trades and although there was a rapid 
introduction of machinery in a number of trades, notably files, 
after 1900 outwork based on the utilisation of a skilled labour 
resource base was still prominent amongst Sheffield firms. Such 
a fragmented work system was clearly reflected in the loss of 
control over the work process and in an anachronistic and 
complex wage bargaining structure. For example, a delegation 
from the spring knife trades visiting Germany in 1914 remarked 
on the more advanced introduction of machinery; the less common 
practice of outwork; the greater precision in production 
techniques, particularly in the design and preparation of 
blanks; superior technical training; less restrictive trade 
union practices; longer hours of work and lower wages, allowing 
the Germans a strong competitive advantage.^0 However, the 
complex nature of these trades which had been long established 
were deeply entrenched in the economic and social relations 
between capital and labour. Indeed, far from bargaining on 
wages and work conditions being conducive to mechanisms of 
arbitration and conciliation, the competitive nature of the 
business system and the diversified nature of Sheffield's trade 
unions could throw the whole process into disarray.
This structure could be a drawback to the Sheffield trade
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unions when attempting to maintain piece rates. For example, in 
February 1883 the File Forgers Union accepted the maintenance 
of a 10% discount on the standard piece rate, which had been in 
existence since May 1882, on the grounds that they could not 
get the various branches of the union "to make a stand for the 
full statement price." An earlier union meeting in March 1880 
had noted with "dismay" the difficulty of getting its members 
"all to work at the one price. This depicted the
multifarious and diversified nature of trade union organisation 
in Sheffield*s lighter trades, where combination was based on 
craft unions which attempted to maintain their rules of 
demarcation and power over the apprenticeship system. For 
example, in 1861 there were 60 different Sheffield unions and 
in the grinding trade alone there were 10 different union 
groupings demarcated by product. ^ 2 Even in 1910 some 4,667 
workers were divided between 31 different societies in the 
lighter trades making the unions weak both in terms of 
financial resources and industrial muscle. Furthermore, union 
organisation reflected the uneven pattern of development 
between mechanisation and hand production. An example of this
was the various unions in the file trades; by 1893 there were
two separate organisations for file cutters and file forgers,
one for machine labour the other for hand labour.^
Certainly, between 1890 and 1914 there were attempts at 
amalgamation which had partial success at least in the silver 
and Brittania metal trades before 1914, however large scale
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amalgamation waited for the war years.^ Turning to the heavy 
trades, union organisation was slow to develop and employers 
were relatively untroubled by unions before the 1890's.^
However, as Smith argues, the rapid development of the heavy 
steel industry in the 1860's and 1870's weakened the influence
of traditional craft unions to resist mechanisation. In the
"intermediate sector of Sheffield industry which combined heavy 
steel work with the production of tools", the development of 
heavy steel production altered the power structure, allowing 
"employers ... to adopt a more aggressive approach to the craft 
unions.
But how did employers view the relationship with labour in 
this period? In terms of wage bargaining, manufacturers 
associations, when formed, tended to be rather temporary
affairs providing little common ground or agreement. J.W. 
Dixon even claimed that "we have not combined ... we each 
paddle our own canoe, and we fix the prices as we like."^ 
However, even when there was combination, as in the case of the 
File Manufacturers Association, across the board wage 
agreements could be difficult to enforce. The file 
manufacturers in the dispute of 1883 were unwilling to concede 
the restoration of the "full price list", however the 
Association was in total disarray because some manufacturers 
were making local works agreements with the men, allowing the 
full standard rate to be paid. Nevertheless, negotiation and 
agreement could be reached and in the depressed economic
climate of 1883, 1886 and 1893 the file unions and employers 
negotiated a 10% discount on the full list price for piece 
rates, whilst they were restored in the more prosperous years 
of 1889 and 1896.^9 As Belk put it in 1886, "these matters 
regulate themselves ... the depression in trade has really 
brought about its own cure in that respect.
As one would suspect, given the complexity of the 
industry’s structure, wage reductions during times of 
depression tended to vary from trade to trade in Sheffield, and 
as Belk argued, "in some trades the workers have accepted wage 
reductions, but in others there has been no material 
d e c r e a s e . M o r e  importantly, wage differentials could exist 
between firms competing in the same product areas, and wage 
reductions could be used as a competitive weapon to undercut 
prices. Thus J.C. Wing, the Managing Director of Wostenholme’s, 
complained bitterly in 1895 of the large price discount on 
razors being offered by their Sheffield competitors W. & S. 
Butcher. The reason this company was able to undercut 
Wostenholme’s, argued Wing, was that they had secured an 
independent reduction of wages from their men and now they are 
"apparently sacrificing the best part of their profits. a 
structure of independent wage bargaining thus characterised 
Sheffield's light trades. This required that businessmen had 
information relating to the wage strategy of competing firms, 
and were keenly aware of the need to monitor wage changes.
Indeed, the independent action of firms could allow
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unions to force through wage increases to the detriment of the
rest of the trade. The organisation of manufacturers to
regulate wages was usually induced as a response to union
agitation for increased wages. Thus the directors of
Wostenholme1s reported in June 1890, concerning the action of
the Spring Knife Union, that
the master cutlers and men are out on strike. We query a 
combination of masters. The question of a combination of 
masters was discussed because it appears that the Spring
Knife Trade Unions are operating. The matter may be
discussed hereafter. ^
However, rivalry between competing firms militated against
effective cooperation on wage structuring. For example J.C.
Wing, referred to the attempts by W. & S. Butcher "to
manufacture a razor something like your patent safety razor and
they are trying to persuade our men away with promises of
abundant work and higher wages.
The complex nature of wage bargaining in the light trades
was typified by the experience of the large cutlery firm of
Needham, Veale & Tyzack. In March 1889, the Spring Knife
Cutlers Union demanded that a 7%% discount off list prices be
restored to them on the basis that all other firms in Sheffield
"are doing the same." In reply, the company proposed to set the
discount at 2 %% which they argued put severe pressures on
production costs. Thus by December 1889 the company notified
the trade of a 5% advance in cutlery prices "owing to repeated
wage advances and increases in material c o s t s . T h i s
illustrates that wage increases could be passed onto the
consumer in higher prices which was clearly a viable strategy 
during periods of prosperity such as 1889. However, in the 
depressed climate of 1893, and faced with intense competition, 
such an option was clearly not open to the firm. Announcing a 
5% reduction in wage rates the management of Needham's claimed 
that "We regret that the great falling off of business and the 
keen competition causes us to take this step."^
This reduction was accepted by the Pen and Pocket Blade 
Grinders, however it was firmly resisted by the other union 
workers employed by the company. For example, the Table Blade 
Grinders Union objected on the grounds that wages were already 
the lowest paid by Sheffield firms "and ... trough rates are 
the highest in the town," and the Spring Knife Cutlers 
complained that Needham's was the only firm demanding the 5% 
reduction; firms such as Kenwoods, Turners, and Wingfield 
still operating a 10% advance on wage rates and demanding lower 
rents for wheels and sides.^ This example illustrates the 
question of who should control wage rates in the downturn of 
the trade cycle and posed clear problems for management who had 
to negotiate with diverse union groupings in a business 
environment which operated against collective action by 
employers.
The solution for the management of Needham's, faced with 
the problem of union resistance and a slack market for their 
products, was to renegotiate the company's terms of employment, 
instituting a shorter working week and reducing production
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time. For example, in May 1893 the company reverted to a three
day week, workers paying half rent, and the daily operating
hours of the companies engines were reduced. By April 1894 the 
company had forced the various unions to accept new terms of 
re-engagement which stated that "in future we be permitted to 
run short-time by giving ... a weeks notice.
Operating at reduced capacity seems to have been a common 
strategy employed by Sheffield firms in the face of slack
demand. This related to the type of labour utilised by the 
firm, particularly the reliance on a skilled workforce. As Belk 
claimed in 1886, the wages in trades using large numbers of 
unskilled workers had shown substantial reductions due to the 
"want of employment." Elaborating on this point Samual Osborne 
claimed that overall wages had been modified but given the 
limits on the availability of men in the skilled trades the
piece rate had not been reduced. Thus, skilled workers could 
find work "at normal conditions of wages but it was "a question 
whether they get three, four or five days a week. However, as 
Osborne pointed out, workers paid on day rates, "to a certain 
extent the work of unskilled labour" had suffered considerable 
reductions in wages. Therefore, underemployment, defined as a 
reduction in working hours, was seen as a key problem of the 
Sheffield trades has it had devalued the total wage for piece 
workers although the standard piece rate remained the same.^
In turn this related to business calculations concerning 
the profitable operation of the firm. As Belk put it, the fixed
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capital costs of operations remained constant "whatever the 
state of trade." However, when manufacturers suffered from 
competition and "diminished returns" the burden of fixed 
charges seriously affected the profitability of the firm. Thus, 
given these cost constraints and the fact that the prime motive 
of the firm is survival, it was often to the advantage of the 
firm, as Belk argued, "to work at or under cost than to close 
the factory, for, apart from the rapid deterioration of unused 
machinery, it is most difficult to get together again a staff 
of employees once dispersed.Similarly in 1908 A.J. Hobson 
argued that although the employer had no obligation to 
outworkers, it was to their advantage to provide work for 
inworkers and they would stock goods in times of depression, 
and accept orders at "a price that does not in many cases cover 
his standing charges - simply for the purpose of keeping his 
men together."-^
Clearly this represented a more flexible system for 
employers in the downturn of the trade cycle and indeed the 
employment of outworkers was central to this structure. The 
management of Needham1s could claim in 1893 that as regards 
outworkers they had "no control over the hiring of these men, 
but there shall be no undue preference given to them in the way 
of work. "-*2 However, the light trades operated under a dual 
system of employment, and Hobson claimed that nearly all firms 
in the cutlery trade employ both inworkers and outworkers and 
"if there were any exceptions it would be that there were a few
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firms who employ only outworkers rather than the other way."-^ 
Hobson was giving evidence to the 1908 Truck Committee, whose 
terms of reference was to investigate the use of deductions for 
rent and power by Sheffield firms and the wage structure of the 
industry. Outworkers were not subjected to deductions but 
received lower average wages due to the fact that they payed 
the capital costs of accommodation and tools. As Hobson put it, 
outworkers were "employed at will’1 being found work at the 
employer’s convenience. Thus, outworkers were generally less 
well paid than inworkers though "there are some special
operations where no one firm can find the men enough of that
particular class of work, and there the outworkers are as well
off as the inworkers, for the reason that they are 
specialists.
Indeed, Hobson argued that it was more profitable to 
employ outworkers than inworkers and referred to the fact that 
only two companies, Harrison 3ros. & Howson, and Joseph Rodgers 
had built new factories in Sheffield since 1902. In the case of 
the former, the factory was designed on modern principles
incorporating electrical driving and the most modern machinery 
but had operated at a loss. The management of the firm informed 
Hobson that they would have been better off employing 
outworkers and "The only inducement to build it was the 
convenience of having the men on the spot."^
In terms of work discipline, Hobson observed that 
inworkers were prone to irregular attendance and very little
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discipline was applied to these workers: "a pieceworker does as
he likes, and he often keeps Mondays, and comes at very
irregular hours." The response of firms to this problem was to
organise operating procedures to accommodate the inconsistency
of piece workers, thus the firm adopted no time keeping
procedures, operating the engines for certain hours a day
affording a wide margin for work.^ Related to the process of
work routine was the question of the form of wage system
adopted, whether fixed hourly rates should be introduced or
piece rate systems maintained. In particular, union agitation
for a standard rate of pay was growing in the early years of
the twentieth century.^ 7 Thus Alfred Fretwell, the Secretary of
the Sheffield Operative Spring Knife Cutlers Society, informed
the management of Wostenholme1s, that
It has long been felt necessary, both by employers and 
workmen in the cutlery trade, that there should be 
established one uniform price through the trade. The 
Spring Knife Cutlers (Pocket Knife Branch) ... now ask for 
the co-operation of their employers. °
The Union thus demanded the recognition of a uniform wage
structure throughout the trade which covered in detail the
various articles produced by the firm. Thus the Spring Knife
Cutlers, advocating an advance in piece rates, presented
Wos tenholme1 s with a detailed item by item list of pay rates
which effectively demarcated products to specific wage rates.
According to the Union, this would "have the effect of putting
the cutlery trade on a workable basis and lead to a fair
working arrangement between masters and men."^
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Similar arguments were put forward by other unions. Thus, 
Tom Newton of the Spring Knife Grinders and Finishers Union 
argued that uniformity in pricing would bring these workers to 
parity with other skilled trades, and with improved trade 
conditions in 1902, "better terms ... is ... what we are fully 
entitled to ... improved conditions are being spread throughout 
the trade ... the deductions from their earnings, the increased 
rents etc I think is quite sufficient grounds ... to ask for 
increased prices. Uniformity in piece rates, however, was 
restricted given the staggering range of commodities itemised 
in the price list. Thus wage bargaining was complicated by the 
wide commodity resource base of the firm. For example, the 
agreed price list negotiated between Wostenholme1s and the 
Blade Forgers listed piece rates for an array of different 
sized articles, ranging from 3% inches and under to 6 inches, 
and prices for forging ranging from 5s to 6s per dozen, with 
"extras" is on the above. Furthermore, the price lists 
demarcated products by criterion of quality, thus prices for 
"common pocket knives", forged from common steel, were lower 
than higher quality steel implements. Rates for outwork was 
further demarcated, being paid an extra Is in the pound for 
"tool money.
How did this wage structure affect the business strategy 
of the firm? Attempts to introduce new product lines met with 
resistance from organised labour due to the very fact that this 
required a new price agreement with the unions. An example is
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provided by Wostenholme1s who, in 1902, attempted to introduce 
to their product range lower quality penknives. The managerial 
argument was that this required a lower piece rate than for
higher quality products, given the lower selling price of this 
commodity. However, the union’s response was immediate, and 
Fretwell pointed out that ’’The present advance was to be all
C Oround and no mention of common work was named. It was thus 
to the advantage of workers to resist the introduction of cheap 
low quality products which would reduce piece rates.
The latter point relates to the human and physical
properties of the firm, which placed a premium on quality and 
skill. As More claims, ’’technology is partly a product of skill 
... the prior existence of skilled workers determine the price 
of skill; technology adapts itself to the skill on offer.' 
However, this ignores the strategic implications of skill 
within the production process. The labour resources of the firm 
include both unskilled and skilled workers and the plant and 
equipment of the firm need to be operated by labour. Thus, in 
terms of business strategy, "the resources of the firm must 
include workers with skills and .. . temperaments which are 
appropriate to the utilisation of that plant and equipment. ”^4 
Therefore, skill is a resource owned by the firm and the issue 
of the control of this input was crucial to firms developing
product lines based on quality.^ The utilisation of a 
workforce possessing a skilled knowledge of the production
process was a major factor in the strategy of the firm. As late
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as 1913, the competitive power of Sheffield's industries 
depended on
The reputation of ... articles, particularly Sheffield 
steel and the product of machine tool companies and other 
engineering works, (which) has extended to all parts of 
the world and is largely due to the fact that the present 
product represents accumulated experience extending over 
years and even generations of application. °
In turn, quality control required effective supervision of
the work process. Writing in 1929, Chapman referred to the
problems of piece rate systems in maintaining a uniform
standard of quality in production:
The defect of the time rate is that the workman is not
induced to do his best, and of the simple piece rate that 
he is induced to rush, perhaps to the detriment of his
health, and perhaps to the deterioration of his work. '
The slack control of work routine has been referred to and this
rebounded on the work process itself. For example J.C. Wing
noted in 1895 that poor workmanship on a new series of knives
sent by Wostenholme's to the USA had "injured our reputation"^
and similar complaints were made by other Sheffield
manufacturers.^  Clearly then manufacturers had to reconcile
the piece rate system with the desire for quality in
production.
However, the problems for management went deeper than
this. The growth of the "systematic management movement” in the
USA in the 1880's and 1890*s gave expression to the principles
of Taylorism and according to one commentator,
Taylorism involves systematic analysis of the labour 
process and the division of labour, followed by their 
decomposition in accordance with several principles. The 
systematic analysis of work ... was in order to develop a 
science of work, and this ... analysis forms the basis for106
the calculation of production costs, the establishment of 
standard times for every task and the associated payment 
system.
This has obvious implications for analysing Sheffield's light 
trades. Firstly, a fundamental principle of Taylorism involved 
"maximum fragmentation" of the work process limiting individual 
jobs to single tasks.^ That Sheffield's light trades were 
based on a division of labour is not in doubt. For example B. 
Fletcher, a cutlery manufacturer, referring to outwork in the 
file and cutlery trades, argued "that each workman was a 
miniature manufacturer" and the management of the firm that 
employed him "had nothing to do with him until he returned the 
work to the factory. "^ 2
This extensive sub-division of labour was referred to by a 
workers' deputation from the Spring Knife and Butchers Blade 
Amalgamated Union to Germany in 1914. However, they noted that 
the Germans operated "a greater sub-division of labour, and 
some of the work done by cutlers here is done by grinders in 
Solingen, such as the grinding and polishing of springs, and 
all bright parts of the k n i f e . T h u s  the division of labour 
had progressed further in the German trades which aided the 
application of mechanical techniques to the manufacturing 
process. The reasons behind this development in Germany was 
emphasised by Hobson who claimed that the German system was 
similar to that operated in Sheffield, however the fundamental 
difference lay in the emergence of specialist firms supplying 
component parts for the whole trade, "in enormous quantities",
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which were then assembled in factories. This, according to 
Hobson, facilitated the rapid introduction of machinery."7^
However the system of cutlery assembly was similar to
Sheffield, piece rates forming the basis of the German system, 
and "earnings generally depend on the quickness, skill and
i, 7 crdexterity of the worker.
This brings us to a second idea associated with Taylorism, 
namely the relationship between wages and effort. Littler
argues that it is possible for a number of different payment 
systems to operate in the same factory "depending on
circumstances."^ Clearly, this was the case in Sheffield where 
it has already been argued that the dual system of outworkers 
and inworkers required management to mediate between two 
distinct sets of workers. The basis of the wage bargaining 
point was the piece rate which thus set the informal standard 
of effort. As Pollard points out, "payment by the piece, with 
rates laid down in a price list, remained predominant, though a 
growing number of team workers and some inworkers were paid a 
datal wage."^ However, according to Littler, the question of 
payment systems does not simply involve the debate over whether 
piece rates or time wages are introduced, since primarily they 
both include a wage rate bargain and an effort bargain. Indeed, 
the key issue revolves around the determination of effort, how 
does the worker perceive his contribution to the work process? 
Littler identifies three broad criterion in relation to this 
question: custom and practice; formal standards; a conflictual
tendency between the two.^ Of course, the Sheffield system did 
not fit the Taylor scheme where standards of effort were 
unilaterally determined, nevertheless, the development of 
standard price lists bilaterally negotiated between management 
and workers set the formal criterion for effort in the work 
process.
However, the relationship between wages and effort was 
blurred in the Sheffield trades. The lack of discipline in the 
system militated against managerial attempts to intensify the 
work process and to develop more formal payment systems related 
to an effort standard. Essentially, workers and capitalists 
viewed the work system as conflicting, that is there was a 
conflict between long standing customs and practice and the 
introduction of more formal standards in the production 
process.^ Indeed, management saw the long standing tradition
o r\of piece rates and related deductions for power and rentow as 
conducive to the resource base of the firm. Thus Hobson argued 
that deductions persisted because of the "handicraft" nature of 
the Sheffield trades and although mechanisation had progressed 
in various sections of the industry "the question of the 
cutlery trade is largely one of the slow transference of a 
handicraft trade on to machinery.
He further referred to workers’ demands for a basic net 
wage, removing deductions and subjecting the worker to regular 
factory discipline. However, attempts to introduce this system 
had been unsuccessful and
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We have several times considered at my own place trying to 
bring our men into the engineering discipline. For two 
years the pocket knife cutlers working on the navy knife, 
a large, steady order, agreed to charge 54 hours a week 
... At the end of the two years the men complained ... and 
instead of fixed wages, plus a bonus, they pressed me to 
revert to the piece work system as before. ^
Similar problems were encountered by Wostenholme1s who in a
dispute with the Spring Knife Cutlers in 1901 refused an
advancement on piece rates for certain knives, offering instead
a bonus scheme for extra work. However, the company complained
that workers were not meeting the bonus target and frequently
they were prone "to losing time."^ Therefore, the link between
wage rates and effort in Sheffield’s lighter trades before 1914
was clearly a tenuous one.
The question of meeting competition was now at the
forefront of business debate, and Hobson argued that "the
salvation of the trade is dependent on ... machinery" and this
would naturally tend towards a net wage payment system and the
imposition of deductions would "die a natural death.
However, this was a slow process as the reliance on quality
worked against the rapid introduction of machinery. Indeed, the
use of skilled labour to produce tailor-made quality items had
obvious advantages in a system composed of numerous small
firms.^ However, the "more economical" methods of German
firms in producing low priced medium quality products,
utilising superior machinery, was by the 1900'S a stark
reality. For Hobson, this was attributable to "The
extraordinary conservatism both of masters and men in
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Sheffield.” Although admitting that the German worker did not 
produce the quality of his Sheffield counterpart, nevertheless, 
they had cheaper labour in the finishing process and the
reliance on lower quality was more conducive to mechanisation 
and longer production runs. Thus the physical commodity 
resource of Sheffield firms constrained the rapid introduction 
of machinery as "It is easier to work up from common goods than 
to work down from the best Sheffield goods.
The question of labour relations in the firm, however, 
went beyond the issue of payment systems into debates
concerning the ability of organized labour to control the 
supply of skilled workers and the hours and conditions of work. 
As Pollard points out, mechanisation reduced the supply of 
labour to the light Sheffield trades and thus the question of 
limiting the number of apprentices "ceased to be a major 
issue.Nevertheless, as apprenticeship declined the question 
of a quality workforce, and the need for technical training, 
became a major concern of Sheffield businessmen. In otherwords, 
modern manufacturing techniques required a shift in the 
resource base towards more technically trained manpower. This 
was particularly true in the engineering trades as witnessed by 
a debate in the Chamber in 1906, where 5 large Sheffield
producers cooperated in the naming of apprentices to receive 
formal technical training.^ That this was a response to
educational trends, especially in Germany, was emphasised by 
the steel manufacturer, Joseph Jonas, who argued that to
successfully compete they must supply "complete and efficient 
instruction" in the technical processes of manufacture.^
On a more general level, the failure of businessmen to 
develop an effective response to labour issues were to rebound 
on them in the years leading up to 1914. This was particularly 
the case in the heavy trades, where in 1913 there was 
considerable agitation over a variety of industrial issues, 
including wage and demarcation disputes, which reflected the 
growing influence of semi and unskilled labour in these 
trades.^ On the political front, Middlemass argues that 
employers were keenly aware of political developments in 
relation to the labour issue and their "anti-union propaganda 
conveyed the message that in future they expected governments 
to stand clear of industrial politics.Certainly, Sheffield 
businessmen were antagonistic to government efforts to control 
industrial relations which interfered with the rights of 
individual employers or combined action by manufacturing 
associations, attacking the 1906 Trades Disputes Act and the 
1911 National Insurance Act as infringements of individual
Q 9rights. 37 ^
Ironically, it was in the heavy trades that capitalist- 
labour relations were to culminate in open conflict and it was 
this crisis which forged a united front by Sheffield 
businessmen. The cumulative nature of union action, outside the 
realm of the individual firm, led Arthur Balfour during a 
strike by steel converters in 1913 to claim that the employers
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had lacked "cohesion” and an effective organised policy unlike
"the highly organised system of the workers." This led the
Chamber to endorse closer cooperation by employers’
Q ?organisations in combatting strike action. J The light trades, 
however, which still clung steadfast to the employment of 
skilled operatives, remained relatively aloof from these 
problems.
This chapter has argued that in the light trades, prior 
to 1914, mechanisation was slow to develop especially when 
compared to the techniques of German manufacture. Sheffield 
firms were constrained by the peculiar structure of the 
industry, and by an archaic relationship between labour and 
capital. This delayed the rapid introduction of new techniques, 
and militated against a more progressive division of labour, 
and the introduction of payments systems that reflected the 
link between effort and wages. This is not to deny changes in 
the trade, particularly in the years leading up to 1914, but it 
in part reflects the uneven pattern of development and the 
gradual transformation of an handicraft trade to mechanisation. 
The emphasis on quality in the production process was a maior 
characteristic of the light trades, and indeed was a common 
feature of steel production, especially in special steels. Thus 
the successful marketing of this product would be a maior 
factor in assessing business response, and this forms the basis 
of the next chapter.
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5
Products and Markets: The Response of Sheffield Firms 1880-1914
In 1916 F.A. Warlow, the Lord Mayor and managing director of
Edgar Allen’s, proudly boasted of the superior reputation of
Sheffield steel:
Sheffield steel stands at the top for general quality in
the markets of the world ... Measured by quantity,
Sheffield may well be outclassed, for in many centres of
the world's steel industry enormous quantities of the
cheaper mild makes are turned out, but for quality the
city stands alone.-1-
As argued earlier, the firm's resource development was based on
the use of skilled labour in the production of high quality
products and this was true of cutlery and tool firms as well as
firms involved in the specialist steel making trades. The aim
of this chapter is to explore the marketing response of firms
in an environment of growing competition after 1880 and relate
this to the reliance of producers on quality production as a
formula for business success. In other words the resource
structure of the firm shaped their marketing response and their
competitive strategy. Furthermore, the marketing mechanisms
adopted by firms in turn had fundamental implications for
business organisation and structural change.
In 1886, J.D. Ellis, the managing director of John
Browns, argued that Sheffield could hold its own in "things
that are made of steel, especially those in which a good deal
of skill is required in proportion to the quantity of
omaterial." As Samual Osborne claimed, it was the technical 
ability to produce a uniformly consistent product which was the
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key factor in the maintenance of Sheffield’s competitive lead 
over the USA, and "in the main we have been able to meet the 
Americans in many of our foreign markets ... I think the 
manufacturers of today are very much more alive (to the need 
for quality) than they have ever been.^ As Tweedale argues, 
referring to the cutlery trades, the reliance of Sheffield on 
its specialist knowledge in production was a major asset, 
allowing the industry "to adapt rapidly to changing fashions 
and demands." Indeed, Sheffield continued to sell to the USA 
best quality cutlery in the 1890’s and 1900's due to its 
ability to conform to a uniform pattern of quality production.^ 
Similarly in the production of tools and specialist 
steels, produced by the crucible process, the name of Sheffield 
was renowned for quality. Indeed Tweedale’s excellent work on 
the technological links between Sheffield and the USA shows 
clearly that Sheffield was a major centre of innovation in 
these steels before 1914, transferring technical knowledge 
across the Atlantic.-' The introduction of high speed steel 
revitalised Sheffield's tool steel trade with the USA, although 
only small quantities were produced; by 1914 the total
rSheffield production was only 6-7,000 tons.3 As Pollard points 
out, the position for the British steel industry "was not 
uniformly gloomy" and Sheffield continued to supply the US with 
special steels despite the tariff.'7 In 1907, Sheffield supplied 
the USA with about half its annual consumption of 4,000 tons of 
high speed steel and up to 1914 the industry gained a short
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terra comparative advantage in the higher quality brands. By
1907, the firm of Samual Osborne & Go. found it was no longer
Qprofitable to sell the less special of the special steels. 
Furthermore, on the eve of the First World War Harry Brearley 
of Sheffield discovered a process of manufacturing stainless
steel which was to have major implications for the cutlery 
trades.^
Thus technical developments in special steels, based on
quality, was a major factor in the revival of Sheffield's
business fortunes prior to 1914 and this needs to be explored
in terms of the business strategy of the firm. Again, however,
the uneven development of Sheffield's industrial system is
evident and the cutlery trades suffered from intense
competition and as argued earlier a decline in markets
particularly the US market for lower quality products.
Furthermore, an obvious strategy open to business firms faced
with growing competition in traditional markets was to switch
into less restrictive world markets. In terms of developing new
trade areas, W.H. Brittain, the President of the Sheffield
Chamber of Commerce, had little doubt that this was vital to
the city's economic progress:
In this time of high tariffs, when walls were built up 
against us in certain markets ... we should do our best to 
hold our own in these markets and seek fresh outlets in
every direction we could possibly extend our commerce.
This clearly indicated that faced with growing competition
behind high tariff walls that firms should diversify their
areas of influence into new market areas.
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But what new markets should Sheffield firms enter? The
obvious area of market expansion was Colonial markets and this 
first found expression in evidence given by various Sheffield 
businessmen to the 1886 Commission. ^  Indeed, the notion of 
Colonial expansion was to become a political platform for the 
Sheffield trades in the debate over tariff reform and as Howard 
Vincent, the Tory MP for Sheffield Central claimed in 1894, the 
expansion into Colonial markets was "the most valuable and most 
likely to be advantageous to the British goods trade - the most 
likely to remove us from the slough of depression.Thus, it 
can be argued that Sheffield firms saw their route to survival 
has being linked to a strategy of diversification into Colonial 
markets. Saul, for example, claims that in the 1880’s the iron
and steel industry continued to rely heavily on US demand and 
in consequence of high tariff barriers continued to suffer from 
it. However, the reduction of exports to this market was "much 
modified by the growth of trade with South Africa, India, 
Australia, China and Japan under the stimulus of capital 
construction projects of all kinds." Nevertheless, he does 
claim that the decline in the export of iron and steel after 
1883 was more severe and prolonged than in any other export 
Indus try.
The shift into Colonial centres of trade has often been
regarded as an example of British businessmen taking the soft
option. For example, Hobsbaum has claimed that faced with 
competitive pressures British businessmen adopted a
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conservative response and ''retreated into a satellite world of
formal and informal colonies", and Kirby emphasises that
"Britain sought the least line of resistance in the imperial
markets and the underdeveloped parts of the world, not yet
penetrated by foreign competition."^ Such claims, however,
have recently been questioned by Nicholas, who argues that
statistical tests support Saul's contention that British export
shares to the Empire and Europe were constant cl880-1913,
1 salthough there was a falling off in exports to the USA.
Given this argument, Nicholas claims that since export 
shares by market were stable this implies that if British 
businessmen failed in their marketing strategies they failed in 
all export markets since overall Britain's share of trade in 
manufactured goods declined from 41.4% in 1880 to 31% in 1913. 
The damnation of British businessmen abroad is related to two 
overlapping arguments: selling techniques were inefficient and
they adopted the wrong institutional framework for selling 
commodities. However, as Nicholas points out, "neither 
proposition has been supported by detailed study of British
i t  1 f)business practices or institutional arrangements abroad. x 
Given this evidence, the obvious conclusion is that there was 
nothing particularly soft about entering Colonial markets, 
indeed firms had to develop effective mechanisms of exchange 
and resist competition in what was regarded by British 
businessmen as prime markets. As will be shown in relation to 
Sheffield, firms had to develop their marketing structures to
meet the particular requirements of Colonial demand. British 
businessmen might well agree with J.S. Jeans, who in 1885, 
claimed that "trade follows the flag";^ however, a switch to 
Colonial markets required a dynamic response by firms faced by 
competition in traditional and neutral markets.
In terms of the marketing response, Nicholas concludes 
that the view of "British industrialists employing amateurish 
marketing techniques and outdated selling institutions is 
misleading." For standardized products, British firms developed 
interlocking links with merchant houses which reduced 
uncertainty, provided credit and created "a common selling 
market." These intermediaries "overcame the high information 
costs of transacting, allowing small manufacturers to compete 
in the international market." Firms developed vertically 
integrated distribution systems, whereby merchants took on the 
function of sole agents for the manufacturing firm, and 
eventually direct representation. Thus, the major innovation in 
selling abroad after 1870 was the control of the channels of 
distribution by manufacturers. In its most sophisticated form, 
British firms developed sales branches overseas giving them 
greater control over marketing operations and information 
flows. "-0 In this sense, the marketing response of the firm was 
directly linked to structural changes in business organisation.
But why were these innovations undertaken? Following the
1 Qlead of Williamson,±y Nicholas claims that the choice of 
institutional machinery adopted by the firm depended solely on
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the type and frequency of transactions and the cost of
investment in durable market structures. Thus the firm
pursued a particular kind of economic rational geared towards
reducing transaction costs. Without denying the importance of
transaction costs in the decision making process, there is
surely a need to consider the technological parameters which
shape and limit the coordination of markets. In other words,
the resource development of the firm, and the type of product
it produces may shape and indeed be determined by the marketing
strategy adopted. Therefore, the marketing response of the firm
cannot be divorced from the development of the firm’s physical
and human resources.
We have already emphasised that the firm’s resource base
was based on the manufacture of a quality product which in turn
required a skilled labour force. This reflected the competitive
position of the firm which came under increasing pressure with
the growing introduction of mechanised techniques and bulk
steel making from the 1880's. The debate over hand techniques
and its association with quality became a major issue between
capitalists and labour in this period. For example, the
Sheffield Trades Council informed the 1886 Commission that,
We are not here to oppose the introduction of machinery 
... we have seen too much and are cognizant with the 
progress and development of intelligence and skill in the 
production of labour saving machinery . . . but we are of 
the opinion that it is due to the workmen that there 
should be protection for them, and if it succeeds let it 
do so upon its own merits and not upon the strength of the 
name which the workmen themselves have earned.
124
The basis of the workers’ arguments was that the 
development of mass produced steel, especially Bessemer steel, 
was undermining the competitive position of Sheffield as a 
centre of quality, and "poor quality" was losing valuable 
markets, particularly in the USA. In fact they claimed that 
bulk steel producers were manipulating the Sheffield trades, 
and "at the very foundation of our manufactures there lies a 
system of imposition which ... will very speedily destroy all 
confidence in Sheffield steel and render abortive the 
enterprise of our manufacturers and the skill of our workmen." 
Referring to the production of Bessemer steel, they complained 
bitterly that this "has ... brought into the market a cheap 
class of steel, useful for purposes where a keen cutting edge 
is not required." However, for high quality cutlery products it 
was unsuitable though they recognized the price differential in
o ofavour of Bessemer steel in relation to crucible steel. ^
Furthermore, they attacked the large steel producers and 
fabricators for flooding the market with low quality machine 
produced goods. Referring to the production of table knives, 
they argued that machine forged blades "are very inferior in 
shape and finish, and, not receiving the care which is bestowed 
upon those forged by hand, cannot possibly be as good."^ 
Furthermore, firms were selling steel products, manufactured by 
machines, labelled as high quality cast steel, which was 
further undermining Sheffield’s competitive edge.^ This also 
found expression amongst smaller manufacturers. Thus J.T
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Deakin, a partner in the cutlery firm of James Deakin & Sons 
Ltd., claimed that he had been engaged in the Brazillian trade 
for 25 years as a "small manufacturer" and general merchant and 
had "not the slightest fear of German competition." However, he 
complained of the deterioration in the quality of Sheffield 
cutlery, and referred to the unfair practices of the larger
producers: "their great fear was not with regard to the German, 
but with the unprincipled scoundrels, my own fellow 
manufacturers and merchants ... he had to suffer as much from 
the unprincipled doings of Sheffield men as most men there.
The impact of mechanisation, however, was to affect
Sheffield’s comparative advantage abroad, and this was true of 
Colonial trade as well as in the USA. A report by the 
Australian agent of the cutlery firm of I.E. Bingham and Co., 
in 1897, referred to intense competition by US and German
producers in this market and concluded that they had captured 
90% of the the Australian scissors trade. The reason behind 
this state of affairs was the lower prices offered by foreign 
producers, in particular machine produced German scissors which 
were ousting the US product from the market due to its higher 
quality. This price advantage over Sheffield firms was
maintained by the fact that the German product was cast in 
large batches, while the Sheffield commodity was hand forged.^ 
In conclusion, it was argued that the Germans had a superior 
advantage not only in terms of price but also in marketing 
technique:
You can only purchase Sheffield scissors through London
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merchants while the Germans go directly to the firms that 
supply the users, drawing upon them direct at 90 to 120 
days, documents on acceptance. There is no doubt that they 
will knock out the English article, because firstly the 
price, secondly the easier trade terms and thirdly the 
Germans are represented and the English are not. /
Competitive pressures in neutral markets, for a number of
Sheffield products, was also evident from a report by the
Foreign Office on Argentinian trade in 1897:
Germany and Belgium have almost destroyed our trade in 
iron fencing, wire and iron girders. In cutlery, locks, 
hinges, tools and other branches of the hardware trade 
England holds her own as regards quality, but other 
nations supply inferior articles at lower prices. °
This dismal report on Sheffield’s competitive position prompted
the Chamber to call for greater efforts to introduce machinery
in response to the German and US practices. Reductions in cost
were now imperative "if the competition of foreign nations is
to be met and overcome."^ However, the seeming contradiction
between high value quality production and low value quantity
production still remained. This paradox was emphasised by
William Beckett, a partner in the firm of Alfred Beckett &
sons, steel and tool producers, ^  in evidence to the 1907
Committee on the Truck Acts. Asked whether the Sheffield system
of production was as cost efficient has the German methods, he
replied that "We do not want to produce cheaply; we want to
produce good quality." For Beckett, the resource base of the
firm was the key factor in explaining the type of product
produced and sold by the firm. Sheffield could match Germany
and the USA in manufacturing high quality goods at comparative
costs, but could not compete in low quality items because of
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the higher wages and lower productivity of Sheffield workers in 
producing inferior brands. However, "In high class stuff we 
cannot be touched, because it will stand the money, and we have 
the skilled men who can do it who are worth the money."31
Such arguments were particularly related to the specialist 
steel market. The American Machinist claimed in 1905 that "A 
brisk business is being done in crucible steel, especially with 
the higher b r a n d s . "32 Furthermore, in 1912 the journal 
highlighted the exceptional demand for tool, alloy and high 
speed steels and despite the keen competition from the USA, 
"Tool steel makers are full of work ... largely due to the 
gradual ousting of foreign tools by British producers."33 The 
American market, it was noted, "is again taking a fair weight 
of Sheffield products." The reasons behind these changing 
fortunes were clear to H.H. Bedford, the President of the 
Chamber in 1906^, who claimed that Sheffield had witnessed a 
considerable improvement in trade especially in steel and 
tools. This had induced a number of firms to increase the scale 
of operations and he referred to the example of the large firm 
of Jonas & Colver (RV 1901, £1,302), who were about to double 
the size of their works. The revival of trade was partly due to 
the fact that "Sheffield manufacturers for some time past had 
made the excellence of quality their first c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " 3 3  
Thus as Elbaum and Lazonick argue, British firms retreated from 
competition "with mass production methods (and) sought refuge 
in higher quality and more specialised product lines, where
traditional craftsmanship and organisation could still command
ua competitive edge. JO
This has obvious implications for the selling methods
adopted by Sheffield firms and the direction of trade. In other
words, the market response of the firm was identified with
attempts to sell in a competitive market based on quality not
quantity. Thus it was quality not price which was the key
factor in explaining the marketing strategy adopted by the
firm. This was true of Colonial markets as well as the
traditional US market. For example, Christopher Johnson & Co.
informed their Australian agent J.W. Bundy in 1886 that
"undoubtedly our sale of uniformity, which is well known to all
our clients, is the safest and best for us, and most likely to
give general satisfaction."^ They further added that,
We consider that we have gone quite far enough in making 
cheap table cutlery to meet the growing competition and if 
we go much further our friends will have the impression 
that we are merging into common makers, which would not 
only damage our good name, but we should seek to rank as
first class cutlers, which position we have always held in
the Colonies.
An emphasis on quality selling is also provided by the 
example of Wostenholme’s. This firm mainly sold high quality 
cutlery in the USA, but from the 1880’s pursued a policy of 
diversifying its market area. A description of the firm’s 
sphere of influence in 1893 claimed that the company carried on 
an enormous business, exporting to the Continent, Australia, 
Canada, USA, India, China "and almost all foreign markets.
In 1887, following the advice of their resident New York
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director T. Ward, the management argued that "we should turn
to new markets. We can use more work ... and we cannot keep
them (the men) on without new markets.” In relation to this,
the management had opened negotiations with agents in India and
Australia with a view to developing new market contacts. ^  To
penetrate the Australian market, the Company negotiated terms
with the Melbourne importing house of Christies which went into
bankruptcy in 1888.^ The problem of this market, was the
influx of cheap low quality cutlery which accordingly brought
forth discussions on the possibility of introducing cheaper
lines. However, the plan was shelved on the grounds that
"nothing must be done to diminish the reputation of Wostenholme
cutlery." It seems likely that prevailing market conditions
determined this decision and the management argued that "the
present general high prices are not favourable for an
experiment in cheaper goods.
A similar reliance on the medium of quality in the
mechanisms of market exchange is evident in firms producing
steel and tools. For example, H.M. Howe, the representative of
the firm of Spear & Jackson in the Transvai in 1906, informed
the management that the market demand for steel shovels
dictated the production of a lower quality article at a cheaper
price. However the management responded that this did not meet
the prevailing cost-revenue calculations of production and
To supply shovels at this price would leave no margin for 
profit and we do not profess to be cut-out for supplying 
cheap quality goods as it is only when a decent article is
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required that we lay ourselves out to produce and to sell, 
and have no desire to follow every cheap line.
Indeed, the company went so far as to argue that the quality of
the product was the crucial factor in the customers preference
to purchase. Referring to samples of saws sent to the Transval,
the management claimed that "we desire to sell" and informed
Howe that the improvement in the quality of this product must
be emphasised and "fully explained to buyers.
Having defined this broad base for identifying the
marketing policy, how did Sheffield firms pursue a strategy of
expansion in the face of growing competitive pressures? To
explore this question we need to define the product composition
of the firm. In other words what were the physical
characteristics of Sheffield steel products and how did this
effect the marketing strategy of the firm? Moss claims that the
physical characteristics of a commodity, ie. compactness,
durability and standardisation, favours market intermediation
and the producing for stock rather than order.45 But did
Sheffield firms produce a standardised product which allowed
the employment of intermediaries and the development of a
technical base designed to produce large production lines for
stock?
Moss argues that cognizability is the key to understanding 
the process of exchange. If a product is not recognizable in 
the market then it has no basis in the system of exchange. Thus 
the physical characteristics of the commodity must be 
specifically recognizable by prospective buyers and "If a
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particular type of commodity is cognizable, then every unit 
produced will conform to known specifications." Therefore, 
standardisation will render products cognizable; in other words 
"cognizability is an economic property which follows from the 
physical property of standardisation."^ it would therefore 
follow that a strategy of exchange based on selling a 
standardised product would be geared towards developing a 
recognizable market profile for the commodity.
In the Sheffield cutlery trade, standardisation was not by 
product but rather by brand. Sheffield firms marketed by 
developing established brand names which linked to a strategy 
of advertising through intermediaries and protected by trade 
mark legislation. For example, Wostenholmes sold under the 
brand names of "IXL" cutlery and the "Famous Pipe razors."^ 
Essentially then standardization was forced on buyers by the 
recognition of the branded product in the market. As Moss 
points out, "in some cases the properties of a commodity will 
be understood because the commodity is b r a n d e d . I n  the case 
of Sheffield firms, the properties of the commodity were 
embodied in the emphasis on quality production. Thus trade 
marks identified the product with quality, which in turn 
focussed managerial attention on the need to maintain high 
standards in the production process.
This was clearly evident in the response of cutlery firms 
to advertisement. W.H. Fraser argues that by the 1880's the use 
of advertising as a competitive weapon "had become essential
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for any firm seeking to break into a market ... or, in many 
cases, to hold on to existing m a r k e t s . T h e  simple economic 
rational of advertisement is to provide market signals to 
consumers on prevailing prices and the variety of products on 
offer; to expand the flow of information between producer and 
consumer.^ However, the function of advertising is not merely 
to inform but also to persuade. Thus the advantages of 
advertisement are contained in providing selective information 
and emphasising the superiority of the product over potential 
substitutes. The potential benefits are realised in increased 
demand at a given price, reducing the elasticity of demand, and 
allowing the firm not only to increase the volume of sales but
c 1also set a higher price. A
This has obvious implications for firms in the higher end 
of the cutlery market. For example, in 1886, Wostenholme1s 
registered its trade marks with the Cutlers Company with the 
intention of selling in the Australian market. ^ 2 Xo promote the 
product, and overcome initial sales resistance, the firm 
published an extended sales catalogue advertising a new range 
of cutlery products and informed its representatives to 
circulate it widely to the trade. The selling point to get 
across was the superior quality of the article, ^3 an(^  this was 
viewed as a long- term strategy which, although entailing high 
short-run costs, would ultimately produce considerable 
benefits:
The work has been well done and should be a great 
advantage to the company - if it is not then any further
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catalogue may be regarded as useless. This is not a cost 
to be written off out of the profits of any one year. ^
In the production of tool steel a similar market ploy was
adopted. For example, the firm of Jonas & Colver was described
as producing a number of different qualities of tool steel
"which are sold by them and their agents under particular trade
n a m e s . H o w e v e r ,  in a dispute with the US State Department
over the marking of steel the company claimed that they did
not label the steel to indicate different grades, or the temper
and proportion of carbon in the steel, but rather argued that
the major market requirement was to identify the functional use
of the steel. Referring to their New York importers, Hirman
Boker & Go. , the management claimed that this firm insisted on
specifying the different grades of steel and the various use of
cold rolled steel which was largely imported for the
manufacture of springs. This was deemed satisfactory to both
parties and the management argued that they should not be
forced to reveal the composition of the steel either to buyers
or the US custom house, as "Our experience has been gained by
long years of costly experiments enabling us to ascertain the
most suitable quality and temper of steel for special purposes
and we consider this experience a trade secret.
In terms of pricing the commodity, this reflected the 
customer's requirements and as Jonas & Colver argued, the price 
of steel did not depend on carbon content and different grades 
and tempers of steel were used for the same purposes. The price 
was governed by reference to "quality, sizes and finish.
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Thus, firms produced to meet the specific requirements of
consumers and this in turn dictated the price of the commodity.
For example, in a letter to J.B. Caryesfora, the London agent
of Spear & Jackson in 1909, the management informed him that
producing a quality steel to meet particular requirements was
the key to success and
It is a fact that in many lines we do not see our way to
accept orders at the prices of our competitors and we have 
not therefore been able to advise you we could do so. We 
endeavour to make an article that will sell at above the
price of the bottom figure. °
This clearly reflected the emphasis on producing to order and
the reliance on quality as the determinant of the pricing of
s teei.
Meeting the specification of the market was clearly
emphasised by the firm of Joseph Beardshaw & Co. The firm from
the early 1890's decided "to push the sale" of specialist steel 
for saws, drills and machine tools under the brand name 
"Profile Steel", and successfully introduced processes for 
manufacturing cold metal saws made of high speed steel for
metal cutting. The importance of meeting specifications was 
portrayed by H. Spear, the firm’s London agent in 1900.
Referring to an account for tool steel with Alfred Herbert &
Co. of London, Spear argued that "their recommendation of your
steel to the users of their machine tools, is of immense 
importance." The requirements of the customer dictated that 
special chrome steel should be of a uniform temper, which the 
firm had failed to achieve. This was now a maior priority in
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developing specialist markets, given the increasing technical
requirements of customers. As Spear claimed,
It is the all important question in all makes of best tool 
steel, but it has become of far greater importance in 
connection with the introduction of automatic machine 
tools ... the steel maker who succeeds in meeting this 
requirement will secure a speciality of immense commercial 
value.
Furthermore, the changing specifications of the market required 
management to be aware of product design. Thus Spear argued 
that a considerable part of the London retail market, for saws, 
had been penetrated by US patterns, and the firm could capture 
a share if they would be willing to design products on American 
lines.
The need to meet customer specifications was again
clearly demonstrated by P.R. Kuennrik, the managing director of 
Marsh Bros., who had little doubt that such a policy was 
crucial to his firm's future market success. In a report on a 
planned project for constructing a plant for producing cold 
rolled steel, he argued that firms such as Jonas & Colver had 
successfully introduced this technique and were expanding their 
operations. The success of this project lay in the 
establishment of a direct link with the consumer, because of 
the ''peculiar” nature of this trade which demanded that "the 
material is turned out just as the customer wants it." This in 
turn required a detailed survey of the production process and
the comments of particular customers concerning the quality of
A 9the steel for various manufacturing processes. For example, 
Kuehnrik referred to the Rotherham firm of J.J. Habershon &
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Sons, who were making little profit on cold rolled steel 
because they failed to conform to the specialist instructions 
of their customers; they provided no record of customer 
comments, or instructions to foremen, they believing that ’'what 
is good for the one is good for the other." Thus the advantages 
accruing from a new plant would be to gain a competitive edge 
on older works, and given their expertise in producing a 
higher quality product they could conform to the specialist
r ndemands of customers.0-3 This clearly represents an example of 
Moss’s inducement effect where changes in the market 
specification of commodities focussed managerial attention on 
the need to develop new product areas and carefully monitor 
customer demand.
The demand for uniformity in quality led to a response by 
more progressive firms in the area of scientific methods of 
testing and research and development. According to Tweedale, 
"rule of thumb methods predominated" in the nineteenth century, 
the links between science and industry were tenuous. This 
proved a considerable drawback to entrepreneurs who found that 
"The channels for systemising and formulating knowledge and for 
replicating results were lacking." However, the technical 
requirements of specialist steel production saw the development 
of research labs which provided a "seedbed of technological 
development."^ The American Machinist in 1912 noted the 
tendency towards scientific investigation of the mechanical and 
chemical properties of steel and provided a description of
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developments in the works of Spear & Jackson where,
A special section . . . has lately been equipped with 
complete plant for the mechanical, chemical, and 
microscopic examination of materials used, so that they 
can be checked from the ingot to the complete tool ... 
The whole system, when complete, will probably form as 
elaborate an organisation as will readily be found in a 
works of this kind.03
The above examination in relation to the business firm 
would suggest a market response based on producing for order 
rather than stock. In other words, the specialist requirements 
of the market reduced the ability of firms to instigate a 
system of operations geared towards large production runs. This 
was further reinforced by the wide range of products produced 
by Sheffield firms, which was particularly true of cutlery. The 
emphasis on quality in the marketing strategy, it has been 
argued, was an attempt to differentiate products. According to 
Moss, Ma differentiated product is one which as a more or less 
loyal group of buyers ... who give preference to the firm 
producing that product over the similar products of other 
firms."00 Indeed, if commodities are physically identifiable in 
the market it is difficult to perceive of an undifferentiated 
product. Thus every seller is exchanging a differentiated 
product, even if the actual commodity sold is physically 
identical.
In cutlery, it was the quality and design of the product 
that was the focus of selling and differentiated it in the 
market. But as argued earlier, standardisation was introduced 
not by product but by brand. Indeed, Sheffield cutlery firms
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produced a staggering range of cutlery products and a wide
diversification of similar product lines, differentiated by
pattern, quality and price. For example, Pollard, describing
the Sheffield light trades in the 1850’s has claimed that "each
narrow trade, in turn produced goods of innumerable patterns
f i 7and qualities, few of which had a mass market. 07 Thus, 
Sheffield’s structural base did not lend itself easily to 
product standardisation. A study of various pattern books lends 
support to this view. For example, Christopher Johnson’s 
displayed a staggering range of branded cutlery goods for sale, 
their list of general table cutlery alone offering 53 different 
types of knives differentiated by quality and price. 
Similarly, the large firm of Southern & Richardson, as late as 
the 1920's, produced numerous articles ranging from knives, 
forks and scissors to table ware; one of the firm’s pattern 
books displaying 105 different kinds of table cutlery.^
This of course relates back to the arguments concerning 
the development of Sheffield’s resource base and the uneven 
pattern of mechanisation. G.I.H. Lloyd claims that prior to 
1914 a number of large cutlery firms had introduced auxiliary 
mechanical aids for facilitating the latter stages of cutlery 
manufacture, such as used in Germany, and by 1911 a number of 
specialised firms supplying machine forged and flied parts for 
cutlery manufacture, "organised on modern large-scale factory 
lines", had emerged.^ In fact, the larger business units had 
increasingly integrated their production processes by excluding
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outside specialist producers of components such as blades,
71handles, blanks etc. x Thus, process specialisation is 
centralised within the firm itself and this would seem to 
reinforce the tendency towards product specialisation. However, 
the process of development did not follow this trajectory.
In an account of Sheffield's cutlery trades, written in 
the 1950's, H. Townsend noted the continuation of process 
specialisation. Taking the example of specialised forging by 
firms, he argued that the main advantage accruing from 
specialisation was in the sphere of organisation. The existence 
of specialist forgers led to "the centralisation of the 
industry's stocks of blanks." Thus specialist forging firms 
carry numerous stocks of blanks which imparts a greater 
flexibility on the later stages of production which would be 
costly to achieve directly. However, specialisation by process 
encouraged the creation and perpetuation of product distinction 
"and precludes spontaneous experiment in s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n . " ^  of  
course, if firms were developing integrated operations we would 
expect that this should encourage product specialisation. 
However, as Townsend argues, even in integrated firms the 
development of a standardised product was limited as it is only 
"possible where large orders for single patterns are available, 
chiefly amongst the lowest priced lines.
The . market, therefore, determined the process and 
organisation of production in the cutlery trades. This 
relationship also affected the size structure of the industry.
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The emergence of economies of scale in relation to market size
is well known in economic theory. As Bagwell and Mingay claim,
The size of the productive unit was influenced primarily 
by the size of the market, the nature of the product and 
of the productive process itself, and how far these lent 
themselves to production methods offering economies of 
scale with consequent reductions in unit costs. ^
According to these authors, the early acceptance of
standardisation and mass production methods in the USA,
together with a rapid growth in the size of the market and its
homogeneous character, largely accounts for the larger size of
US firms over their British counterparts. The reliance of
3ritain on overseas markets which were "various and changing”
offered less opportunity for developing standardised production,
and the reliance of firms on selling through individual
middlemen "reduced the possibility of mass-producing a more
limited range of goods.
These characteristics are clearly evident in the cutlery
trades. Sheffield producers manufactured a great variety of
cutlery products often going to unnecessary lengths to meet
specialist demands. Firms produced to order which limited the
procurement of stock, and longer production runs. We have
already noted the wide range of products produced and this was
in marked contrast to the practice of US cutlery firms. For
example, as early as 1871, the Sheffield Independent noted that
US producers were forging into cheap standardised products:
The Americans choose a few good popular styles, they 
invent and use machinery for every process possible, they 
put in a good blade, neatly ground, splendidly marked, and
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turn out every knife the precise duplicate of every other. 
Hence the uniformity, reliability, and general style which 
is in ,no Sheffield goods except those of standard 
makers.7 °
Thus, the trend was towards the manufacture of cheap 
standardised cutlery and as the American Cutler claimed in 
1909, the "demand for all kinds of merchandise is for cheap 
goods."7^
Sheffield firms, however, were slow to respond to these 
trends. Even in 1931, the question of standardised sales and 
the use of intermediaries in the US market was a matter of 
considerable concern to the management of Wostenholme’s. In a 
report from their New York agent, George W. Davis, the 
directors were advised that they should develop "factory 
representation under experienced men" and exclude the use of 
"jobbers, who divide their efforts on various lines." The basis 
of the argument was that the use of the sales jobber reinforced 
the tendency to sell "too many lines", and as Davis argued 
there was a limit to what the market could bear. This left 
little scope for marketing economies and Davis advised that the 
company should reduce its product range by 25% and increase the 
sales of the remaining items. For example, he referred to the 
"IXL" brand which should be condensed by concentrating on a 
number of specified items in each product line and "revamped" 
to the specification of the most popular design. This would 
bring the "items up to date with what is known as the American 
standard" which reflected both the tastes of consumers and the 
product knowledge of producers. According to Davis this was now
142
essential as the market for cutlery was divided between a
demand for "the very cheapest and the very best."^
The essential point, therefore, is that Sheffield cutlery 
firms moved only slowly to the standardisation of product lines 
and the realisation that markets were being conditioned by 
cheapness as well as quality was lust as true of the pre-war 
period as the 1930’s. From the 1880's Sheffield cutlery firms 
faced growing competition from cheaper standardised producers 
both in the USA and Germany. The problems of introducing
standardisation was also an issue which faced firms in the 
steel and tool and heavy engineering sectors. Landes, for 
example, argues that in engineering the British were slow to 
adopt uniform shapes and sizes and the peculiar institution of 
the consulting engineer meant that they "tended to design every 
project as though the manufacturer was a custom tailor working 
in metal.
This question of designing a product to meet national
norms was recognised by the Sheffield Chamber in 1903. 
Increasing competition and lagging sales had led to the 
formation of the Engineering Standards Committee, under the
Q 0guidance of the leading engineering associations in 1901. 
According to a representative of Charles Cammell's^ the
industry would have to meet increasing competition by complying 
with accepted standardised norms. This implied an agreement 
between users and producers of material "as to a certain number 
of types or articles in respect of dimensions or sections, and
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also to the quality of the material and the tests to be applied
to ascertain it."®^ This therefore called for a more rational
and scientific approach by management to the question of
product standardisation which according to Cammell's would
increase the competitive position of Sheffield's steel sector:
There was no doubt that such an agreement would have a
tremendous influence on trade by cheapening production, 
enabling the manufacturer to arrange his work for the
current production of these standard types, and preventing 
delay by facilitating the work of the designer, the 
manufacturer, the inspector and the user. ^
However, standardisation was difficult to enforce, particularly
given the organisation of production where the design engineer
was divorced from the shop floor. Thus, the American Machinist
noted, in 1913, that this was common in UK firms and militated
against quality control and product uniformity.^3
However, this is not to suggest that there was no movement
towards standardisation, especially in engineering.^ Indeed,
standardisation was an obvious strategy for firms in the steel
and tool trades faced with market and resource constraints. An
example is provided by John Kenyon & Go. Founded in 1710 and
effectively managed by an owner manager, William Waterfall
since 1596, the firm became a private limited company in 1909
and in 1910 bought out the firm of W.A Colley Ltd., steel
manufacturers and merchants, with the desired aim of providing
"further assistance in the management and to develop business
}| o cin new markets. A maior factor in this purchase was the 
acquisition of additional melting capacity for crucible and 
high speed steel production which previously had been
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contracted to the firm of Whitley, Whitham & Go. This now
allowed the integration of specialist steel production with
tool fabrication. in 1910-11, it was noted that the company
had increased its employment threefold since 1896 and had made
every effort towards the ’’modern tendency” of specialisation,
its products now covering "a somewhat narrower range than in
previous years.”®'7
The reasons behind the managerial decision to expand
output and reduce commodity lines was emphasised by the
management in 1910. Attention was focussed on efforts to
reduce imbalances on the production side of operations. Since
1906, the expansion of the sales side of the business,
particularly the increasing demand for high speed steel saws,
had outrun the productive capacity of the firm’s plant and
equipment. Increasing capacity was essential to the firm in an
highly competitive environment where they "found that
customers only gave ... large orders partly so that they could
depend on a portion being delivered in time for their
requirements.” Thus success in meeting increased competition
from local manufacturers and Germany dictated an increased
intensity of production and this was achieved by changes in the
physical and human resource mix of the firm.®® In announcing a
record yearly net profit of £13,888 in August 1910, the
Chairman William Waterfall argued that this had been
principally brought about by the high prices obtained . . . 
increased turnover and increased machinery, more efficient 
management, also where possible piece work has been put in
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force ... The whole works are now in a very good condition 
for turning out goods quickly. y
However, this increase in the resource base of the firm could
also induce a managerial response to the need to carefully
monitor market demand. For example, a fall in demand in the
second half of 1910, coupled with the fact that customers were
over-stocked, meant the firm was operating at over-capacity and
prompted management to call for an intensified sales drive.^0
Similar problems were encountered by Spear & Jackson who
found difficulty in penetrating the Canadian and Australian
markets because of the irregularity of supply and the inability
of the works to meet the increase in demand for steel tools.
For example, they informed their Australian agents that they
had largely increased the manufacture of saws but "our
increased production has not enabled us to keep pace with our
orders as promptly as we would wish."^ In response to this
imbalance, the firm acquired the saw manufacturing firm of
Drabble & Sanderson in 1907 to augment the output of this
a r t i c l e .  " 2  Also, in the case of files the firm had difficulty
combatting US competition in Canada, and although they had
installed a new machine shop, they found difficulty in meeting
orders promptly, which was a severe competitive disadvantage.®®
The imbalance here was clearly related to the fabricating side
of operations as they had ample capacity to supply quality
steel for tools, having "overestimated" requirements in a new
melting furnace costing £1,000 in 1904 and which was now only
half u tilised.This again emphasises that the reliance on
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quality and producing to order could create coordination 
problems, given the cyclical nature of the market facing firms.
This chapter has identified the links between market 
strategy and resource development within Sheffield firms. The 
reliance on quality in the production process, and the market 
strategy surrounding this, has been identified. Sheffield 
firms, particularly in cutlery, were slow to adapt to the 
requirements of cheapness and product standardisation. In steel 
and engineering, the need to develop a more rational strategy 
in relation to the requirements of the market was a fact which 
was all to obvious to businessmen by the early years of the 
twentieth century, but even here the reliance on quality and 
tailor made products could be a serious drawback. To explore 
these factors further, an examination of the pricing and 
marketing strategies of three Sheffield firms is undertaken. 
This further highlights the difficulties faced by Sheffield 
producers in overcoming the competitive constraints of selling 
in a changing commodity market.
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6
The Marketing Strategy of the Firm: Three Sheffield Case
Studies.
The previous chapter has identified the competitive constraints 
facing the firm and the strategies adopted in marketing and 
resource development. This chapter will explore more closely 
the competitive strategy adopted by firms in international 
markets by examining the surviving business records of three 
Sheffield firms, engaged in the cutlery and tool sectors of the 
industry. The usefulness of this case study approach-*- is that 
it provides an analysis of managerial development within a 
variety of business enterprises, and relates this to the wider 
constraints facing producers in this period. Furthermore, in 
the case of the last two studies, we can explore the marketing 
problems of firms entering Colonial markets. We start however 
with an analysis of the marketing strategy of the large cutlery 
firm of Wostenholme's in the USA, which will indicate that the 
company faced increasing problems in developing an effective 
marketing policy in this area before 1914. In other words, how 
did the firm respond to the changing conditions of this market, 
and what were the obstacles they encountered?
The organisation of the sales side of Wostenholme1s 
business was based on a managerial division of responsibility. 
In 1885, J.C. Ward, a director of the firm, was appointed as 
resident head of the New York sales office having sole 
responsibility for the marketing side of the business,^ leaving
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the Sheffield side of the business under the direct control of
J.C. Wing, the managing director of the company. This
emphasises the human resource development of the firm with
reference to marketing structures. That management realised the
need to expand the human resources devoted to marketing is
illustrated by an advert for the post of assistant in the New
York office in 1887:
A manufacturing company in Sheffield with large trade in the USA is in want of an English gentleman to be their agent for the USA and to reside in ... New York - The agent would be introduced to an establishment which is in the sale business - for a few years he would be asked to take the second seat in the office with the view of going forward to the upper seat. A sole agent is not necessary ... should be of the age of about 30 to 45 years.
The post was filled by Edward Beckett, who eventually took sole
responsibility for the New York operations. As James Nixon, a
director of the company argued, the quality of the person
appointed was a key factor, and a sales manager required not
only an understanding and "diligence11 in accounting and book
keeping but also "a mechanical training in the shops." Thus
Beckett was initially trained in the razor department of the
works, before being sent to the New York office.^
The function of the New York agency was to mediate with US
import houses, the main form of sale employed by the company,
to provide the Sheffield management with information on prices
and orders, and to coordinate the financial side of the
business with regard to sales. The use of overseas agencies in
providing information on market trends was a key function in
the process of exchange among Sheffield firms. A number of
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Sheffield firms in various branches of the steel industry 
developed overseas agencies from the 1870's . A m o n g  them was 
the firm of Spear & Jackson who informed their South African 
agent, H.M. Howe, that "We are accustomed to receive statements 
regarding bad trade and depression, and to learn at times that 
orders are reduced in number and size."^ However, control over 
prices and orders could be a tenuous affair given the vagaries 
of market demand. Thus Spear & Jackson informed a potential 
Canadian customer in 1906 that, "In the present fluctuating 
state of the metal market ... we are unable to keep this offer 
open indefinitely ... as we cannot say as to whether prices 
will rise or fall at the next change.
For Wostenholme's in the USA, problems of coordinating 
markets were particularly acute, especially given the ability 
of large US merchants to dictate the market. The company's 
competitive strategy revolved around discount pricing as a 
market weapon. The use of discounts was, in turn, related to 
the perception of quality as the maior factor in the decision 
to buy. As Casson points out, in a market orientated to 
quality, the area of controversy is defined by the quality of 
rival products and how customers perceive product quality. 
Thus, "whichever product is perceived as inferior must be sold 
at a discount if its producer is to maintain his market share." 
In this case it is the perception of quality which governs the 
price rather than prices which govern the perception of 
quality.^
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Discounting was extensively used by Wostenholme1s in the
US market, where favoured discounts off invoice prices were
offered in return for quantity purchases and quick payment in
cash. However, this type of policy was fraught with problems
given the powerful competitive position of the larger US import
merchants. For example, in 1895, the Baltimore importing house
of W.H. Cole & Sons, was accused by Wostenholme1 s of
underselling the New York and Philadelphia houses. Cole's had
assured the company that an agreed price should not be
undercut; however, although the goods sold to Cole's were not
subiect to a discount, they had reduced the net cost price by
as much as 20-30%. This, according to management, distorted the
market and was detrimental to the firm's efforts to provide
"uniformity" in market pricing. Thus the managing director,
J.C. Wing, complained bitterly that
"you have sold under cost price - and we are accused by our friends of giving you special terms - you should charge in every case a good profit on tire cost price and in no case should this be less than 10
Wing concluded that it was "Better to make no sales than these
at such low p r i c e s . T h i s  illustrates the problems of
circumventing the market mechanism given the powerful position
of the large merchant houses.^
This problem focussed managerial attention towards the
possibility of establishing structures of direct exchange in
the US market. As J.C. Wing argued in 1896, "The tendency of
the present day is ... towards reducing the distance between
manufacturer and consumer ... we are somewhat behind the times
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in not planning facilities in the way of bringing this 
a b o u t . A t  first sight such a policy, involving as it does 
the integration of the firm forward into direct exchange, may 
seem irrational. Porter and Livesay, for example, in a study of 
the development of markets, demonstrate that producers often 
sell to a few jobbing wholesalers rather than to retailers in 
order to reduce credit losses and other market hazards. The 
advantages of selling to the wholesaler rather than to the 
retailer minimised the producer!s risks of bad debt and reduced 
costs in exchange because he was dealing with a limited number 
of customers, who were well known and reliable.0 Indeed, 
Sheffield firms were becoming increasingly aware of the need to 
gain access to information concerning the reliability of the 
wholesaler. This led to the development of specialist firms 
which provided information to manufacturers on a service basis. 
For example, a number of Sheffield firms used the services of 
the Mercantile Agency for the Promotion and Protection of 
Trade, a Manchester based concern run by R.G. Dunn & Go. This 
agency provided a graded list of the financial strength and 
general credit worthiness of a number of Canadian and US 
wholesalers, and a business history of the concern. The 
information was "strictly private" and "for the exclusive use 
of the subscribers."-^
However, the advantages of using the wholesaler in the USA 
were increasingly being undermined, inducing the management of 
Wostenholme1s to move towards methods of direct sales. In other
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words, the development of a sales organisation based on direct 
exchange offered the firm a larger market return. The rationale 
behind this strategy was put forward by Beckett in 1893, who 
informed the management that the company's products were being 
excluded from the US retail market "by the determination on the 
part of the jobbers of IXL to curtail the sale of our goods as 
much as possible." The solution to this was to develop direct 
links with the small jobbers and retail outlets. As he 
succinctly put it, "we should look after the little streams and 
the rivers will take care of t h e m s e l v e s . T h e  company should 
thus instigate an active advertisement campaign, circulating 
pamphlets-^ which informed the small retailer of the company's 
main product lines and major suppliers.^
Such a policy, however, required the consent of the large 
wholesale houses, and the root cause of the problem was the 
ability of these large buyers to influence the type of 
commodity that the retailer purchased. Thus, according to 
Beckett, the company should actively pursue a direct link with 
the retailer: "we seem to have friends all over the United
States and we ought to study their wants." He warned the 
management that if they knew of the number of persons who had 
gone into cutlery stores, enquiring about "IXL" cutlery, only 
to be told that "they cost too much we cannot keep them (they) 
would be greatly astonished." The large wholesalers were 
"educating the retailer to ignore our goods, and in selling 
other cutlery by which they can make more money.
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The direction of managerial policy was thus focussed on 
the power of the large merchant houses to manipulate the market 
in favour of cheap, low quality lines. For example, Beckett 
reported to the directors in June 1893 that the importing 
merchant house of Stauffer, Esheman & Co. had joined a US 
syndicate to purchase cheap cutlery and as a consequence had 
sold less of Wostenholme's goods. He further noted that the 
question of profit is their sole motive and they were "selling 
cutlery on prices alone, quality not being c o n s i d e r e d . T h u s  
they faced increasing competitive pressures in a market which 
was being manipulated towards lower priced products. As 
Tweedale argues, US demand was conducive to the introduction of 
cheap, medium quality cutlery, produced to standardised 
patterns, and this virtually extinguished Sheffield competition 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the 
vast expansion of the US market saw the emergence of wholesale 
hardware trade associations and department stores selling 
advertised branded products, often through controlled retail 
outlets, which led to fierce price competition and pressure on 
Sheffield's traditional marketing t e c h n i q u e s .
In turn, these issues were related to the use of 
discounting and the need for uniformity in pricing policy. 21- 
Prior to 1895, Wostenholme's had adopted quantity and cash 
discounting^ as a means of increasing sales in the US market. 
Discounts were thus offered to firms who could guarantee large 
orders which tended to alienate the small jobber. In a letter
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to the large New York importing house of F.B. Gurney, Wing 
outlined the problems attached to a policy of offering special 
terms. He claimed that the use of discounting reduced the 
number of direct customers, compelling them to buy cutlery via 
the large importer "who offered them better terms than the 
arrangement we bound ourselves by." The result was a drift of 
the trade towards the large importer, which led to cut throat 
competition. The large houses "competed with each other so 
severely that profits were reduced to a minimum, and one house 
now buys nothing from us and the other simply uses us for their 
own purpose.
Thus the use of quantity discounting militated against a 
strategy of developing a wider market base, which the 
management argued reduced the risks of selling, and it was now 
impracticable to continue quantity discounting "when the 
conditions are radically altered." It was clearly to the 
company's advantage to encourage direct contacts as "the more 
direct importers we secure, the more generally will our goods 
be used , the more demand there will be for small orders from 
stock in New York." The aim behind this was to create a uniform 
basis for "a satisfactory and stable t r a d e . T h e  policy was 
no longer geared towards fixing import prices and "bolstering 
up" a few large merchants by extra quantity discounts but now 
to persevere in extending the direct lines of exchange.^
This was clearly viewed as a response to economic 
depression and the financial difficulties of the firm. The
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stagnation of US sales and an increase in stock levels had
reduced working capital to the point where "we are horribly
short of money." Thus, given the downturn in trade of 1895,
special discounts were inappropriate as even with the discount
"it is not expected that there will be a very large business at
present, as I do not think that orders can be had at any
p r i c e . A s  the management informed Herman Bocker & Co. of New
York, in reply to a request for special cash terms, such
discounts had been offered on the grounds of encouraging an
increased business while orders from the company had actually
declined, and the management demanded that future remittances
should be within 30 days as "We are ... very short of money at
present, and it is inconvenient to have cash locked up."^
However, a strategy of direct exchange and the removal of
special terms, as a means of enforcing uniform competition,
was difficult to impose on the trade for two reasons. Firstly,
the large importers resisted attempts to bypass the recognised
channels of trade. For example, F.B. Gurney bitterly denounced
the policy of Wostenholme1s agent selling directly to his
retail customers on the same terms they offered him, and
claimed that this was poor business practice:
I am a customer of yours and am entitled to good usage ... and for your man to go to any customer of mine and offer the goods at the same price I buy at is not good usage .•. As I understand it is new trade that IXL want and not to kill that they already have. °
The reaction to Wostenholme*s tactics could be hostile; the
7 qSimons Hardware Co. , for example, reduced their prices to
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retailers by 5% in 1896 and, as Wing warned, this was
detrimental to the trade, leading to claims of unfair
competition from other leading merchants, and a general 
demoralistion of prices and p r o f i t s . F o r  example, Baker & 
Hamilton of San Francisco complained of price undercutting by 
the New York trade and condemned Wostenholme's for "favouring 
that class of customer." These large importers "feel as though 
they owned the entire cutlery trade of the United States" and
they are "responsible for the introduction of so much German
trash, made in imitation of your patterns, which the American 
market has for years been flooded.
Secondly, uniformity in pricing was undermined by 
Sheffield firms offering higher discounts in an effort to 
compete with the higher quality of the company*s products. In 
1895, H. Wolf & Co. of Chicago informed the directors that W. &
S. Butcher and several other firms had offered an extra 2%% 
discount off the invoice price and extended the credit terms to 
six months. In reply, they argued that such action worked 
against the general interests of the trade "and we are strongly 
wedded to the principle of treating all our customers alike.
A previous 5% reduction by Butcher's, in an attempt to increase 
market shares, had forced Wostenholme's to follow suit, but now 
the directors argued that the extra discount meant a 
considerable reduction in profit margins. Such a policy was 
"unsound" as Butcher's were badly off for orders, had 
accumulated immense stocks, and when trade revived
Wostenholme*s would be able to raise their prices and compete
o oon the basis of superior quality. J
This provides an example of Moss's inducement effect 
whereby competitition between firms focusses managerial 
attention on new markets and methods of producing commodities 
for existing markets. In the case of Wostenholme's the 
managerial response was to emphasize the higher quality of 
their product and to offer to modify their price discount 
structure to special customers in the USA.^ As Wing argued, 
Butcher's could not produce the same high quality goods "as 
cheap as we can do. No more can anybody else. Needham's are 
trying to, but they have had to come down to flied blades. 
Thus they argued that uniformity in market pricing in turn 
favoured the maintenance of quality standards. Thus Sheffield 
firms were willing to dump goods in depressed years to maintain 
trade in the US market, using discounts as a market weapon. 
However, for high quality producers, such as Wostenholme's, 
this restricted their efforts to maintain prices and to create 
uniformity in sale.
The above study of Wostenholme's marketing strategy in the 
USA illustrates the gradual movement to establishing direct 
links; however, the restrictions of the market constrained the 
efforts of firms in this direction. The power of the large 
wholesale houses, and the problems of uniformity in a market 
geared towards the introduction of cheaper brands, limited the 
company's aims to establish lines of vertical integration
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backwards into direct exchange. Furthermore, it restricted 
attempts to accumulate large stocks in the US market, which was 
to allow US manufacturers a clear advantage in producing mass 
produced, ready to order cutlery.^ Similar strategy problems 
were to face the firm of Christopher Johnson’s in the 
Australian market, especially in terms of product 
diversification. In contrast to Wostenholme1s, this firm 
provides an example of the business strategy of firms at the 
medium size end of the market.
This firm was founded in 1836, and produced a variety of 
table cutlery as well as tools and files. ^  The firm sold 
largely in Australia and New Zealand but from the mid-1880's 
extended links into the Far Eastern market.^ Like 
Wostenholme1s, they sold through intermediaries which reduced 
the risks of market transactions. For example, in a letter to 
T.O. Allamby, an Indian merchant, the management claimed that 
to compete, prices were arranged to secure a narrow profit 
margin and therefore "we can only trade with merchants and 
wholesale buyers" who could guarantee both large assignments 
and prompt orders.^ Again, discounting was extensively used to 
provide incentives for bulk p u r c h a s e ,  ^  and as a means of 
introducing quality into the market at the cheapest price. The 
policy of the company, claimed the managing director J. 
Marshal, was "to charge our goods that they should be laid down 
abroad at the cheapest possible figure.
However, the use of discounting again undermined the
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management's attempts to create uniformity in competition. In 
1886, Marshal informed William Gowlinshaw, the company's 
Australian traveller, of the satisfactory nature of this trade 
but warned against merchants who were continually demanding 
special terms for cash discounts which undermined the rules of 
uniformity. The solution to this was to move towards a policy 
of direct sales, through the Australian agency, to large
retailers:
Depend upon it our plan is the right one for the large retailer, and therefore it must be right for us, for it is quite certain that the middleman is being extinguished everywhere, quietly it may be, but none the less surely... the time' will come ... when he will be but sparinglypatronised. ^
The advantages of direct trading were to reduce the commission 
costs of transactions and to install a rule of uniformity in 
pricing which would create business confidence when trade 
conditions revived. This would require, however, "a more
energetic marketing policy" to attract new business in this 
market.^
The strategy of this firm in the 1880's provides an 
example of the diversity of the smaller business unit. The 
company was an integrated concern producing not only cutlery 
but also tools and steel.^ From the 1880'S the firm developed 
a strategy of joint exchange by promoting the steel and tool 
side of the business. Furthermore, they utilised their 
marketing expertise and knowledge to sell other firms' steel, 
taking on a specialist merchanting function in conjunction with 
manufacturing operations.^  For example, they sold bar iron for
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the Sheffield firm of S.H. Burrows & C o . ^  in New Zealand and 
mediated for this firm in exchange transactions.^ Johnson's 
sold a wide selection of small size intermediary steel products 
ranging from spring steel to common rounds and squares, special 
Bessemer steel and bars, mild steel sheets and strips, octagon 
steel and plough plates. The firm's steel plant was thus 
planned to produce "made to order" steel products for the 
specialist Australian m a r k e t . B u t  how did the company promote 
this secondary side of the business?
Similar to cutlery, the question of quality in steel sales 
was at the forefront of market calculations. The price standard 
set by the firm was based on notions of quality and "If we 
reduce quality and price they would only come down in 
proportion." For example, octagon steel, in Australia^ was 
being sold by large importers at £44 per ton and Cowlinshaw 
advised that the company should sell at a lower quality 
standard of £30. This was firmly rejected by management who 
advised Cowlinshaw not to commit them to this standard "as we 
already have two large orders at £36." The standard should be 
maintained at £36 per ton and quantity discounts of 7% to 10 % 
offered for orders over 10 tons, smaller purchases being 
charged as usual. Thus discounts were used to segregate the 
market between large and small buyers, allowing the large 
importer a sufficient margin of profit and the competitive 
power to undercut small importers.^
However, the demand for lower quality steel in this market
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brought to the attention of management the possibility of 
segregating markets geographically. A study of price cutting 
tactics by Millman has suggested that "Among the reasons why 
companies are attracted to exporting ... is price 
discrimination through geographical and market segregation."-^® 
This was clearly an option adopted by Johnson’s who introduced 
a policy of "second quality selling" at £30 per ton, 
undercutting their standard price of £36 for octagon cast 
steel. This was based on the premise that the Australian and 
New Zealand markets could absorb a lower quality product; 
however, the firm was careful to defend its reputation and 
although admitting that "a lower quality could be supplied ... 
we could not put our flag on it, neither should we warrant 
anything below £30."-^
The example of a medium size firm, such as Johnson's, 
diversifying its sales lines suggests that the smaller firm 
could alternate its productive resources to meet market 
changes. A characteristic of small firms is therefore their 
flexibility, their ability to adapt to changing market 
demand. The ability to switch into new product lines is 
however dependent upon the technological parameters of the 
firm. The technology and skill embodied in producing cutlery 
was similar to that required for tool production and thus the 
possibility of switching was open to firms utilising less 
expensive production methods. For example, in the 1880's 
Johnson's attempted to promote the sale of tools, especially
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files, in coniunction with their cutlery b u s i n e s s . ^3 However, 
although the firm could switch production resources easily the 
company faced considerable resistance to their tools in the 
Australian market. As Penrose has argued, it is possible that 
the opportunities open to smaller firms are severely limited, 
not by the quality of their resource use, "but by impassible 
barriers existing in the environment." In particular, the 
competitive power of large firms restricts the expanding 
opportunities open to the smaller business unit.-^
The attempts by Johnson's to promote the sales of files in 
the Australian market was restricted by the competitive 
advantages of large scale producers. The use of discounts on 
files was a weapon used by large Sheffield firms to undercut
smaller competitors. Thus the management referred to the
extreme discounts on files being offered by Thomas Firth &
Sons-^ and complained that they "sold more millsaw files in New 
Zealand than all other Sheffield houses put together .... why
should we with an equally good article have to go so much above 
them?"-*® This in turn was affected by the logistical problems 
of using discounts as a means of increasing market shares. As 
Millman claims, discounting represents the easiest way of 
administering prices but requires "the sales manager to keep a 
sharp eye on the arithmetic of money and proportional 
discounts, and monitoring the behaviour of buyers prone to 
changing their order pattern and delaying payment to the last 
possible m o m e n t . L a r g e  firms, with greater financial and
market resources at their disposal, could monitor the market
more effectively and in times of slack demand could bear the
financial risk of large discounts to maintain market shares.
In the depression of 1886, the management complained that
"Business ... continues very, very bad ... we have no orders at
all for files'1-^ and wrote to their New Zealand agent on the
question of competitive discounting:
We feel there will be little chance for us so long as our discount is so much below that of some of our competitors, unless indeed you can influence buyers in our favour, which we can hardly expect. But what are we to do? With 60% & 3% delivered f.o.b. London ... there is certainly some profit, but to go beyond that would in very many lines lead us into actual loss, andQthis would be the case in every description of saw files.
Similar to Wostenholme1s, competition jeopordised the firm's
attempts to introduce uniform pricing, which in cutlery "is
well known to all our clients."60 However, in the case of files
the firm was forced, due to competitive pressures, to offer
higher quantity discounts, for orders over £200, of 61%% for
ordinary files and 60% for saw files. This, argued the
management, was the optimum discount, allowing a return on
outlay, and providing a short-run response as "the high
discounts ... will very soon come down with the first rush of
good trade."®®
The question of discounting was again related to the issue 
of quality. As the management argued, the use of extreme 
discounts of up to 65% and 5% on files must necessarily reduce 
quality in order to maintain profits. This damaged the 
reputation of the product in the eyes of wholesalers, allowing
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them to compete effectively with best quality producers who 
were attempting to sell directly to retailers. The management 
concluded that "in the long run and especially in good times, 
quality should win the day."®-*- However, from the 1880's the
(L Ofile trade was subiected to mechanisation,  ^ and files were
used as loss leaders by the larger Sheffield firms. The 
Sheffield Trades Association, for example, giving evidence to 
the 1886 Select Committee, referred to the depression in the 
file trade and linked this to firms forcing the article into 
the market "at a cheaper rate than what otherwise it would have 
been sold for." Larger firms were using files as "leading 
articles" in an attempt to induce orders for higher value
products. The development of cheap machine produced files 
facilitated this process and "hence the efforts to produce 
files cheap have been most strenuous."®-^
The example of Johnson's illustrates the market problems 
of smaller firms in competition in the Australian market. 
Indeed, given the problems encountered by this firm in 
promoting the file side of its business, we would expect
potential new entrants to face severe market resistance. In a
recent text book on sales methods, Gannon and Willis claim that 
"Many of the most exciting challenges to business come from 
expansion and growth." In particular, entering new export 
markets offers a route to growth; however, this carries with it 
a risk element and "requires a gathering of all the available 
information on the growth options open to the firm and then^ , on
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the basis of this information, a reasoned discussion on the way 
fo r w a r d . T h e r e f o r e ,  expansion into new markets involves the 
development of a chain of relevant business information on the 
potential of new markets and a coordinated strategy of market 
penetration. As an example of these problems, the opening up of 
trade by the Sheffield firm of Burgon & Ball provides an ideal 
case in point.
The firm was founded in 1860 as a co-partnership between 
W. Ball and W. Burgon, to produce sheep shears, edge tools, 
crucible steel and cutlery. In 1894, the company went public
(L Cand in 1898 purchased the firm of William Wilkinson Ltd. J 
Operating from the La Plata works, Malin Bridge, the company 
from its formation was geared to expand the production and sale 
of shears, particularly in Colonial markets, although they also 
established sales agencies in South America and the USA. In the 
company's early years, they had to overcome the competition of 
established Sheffield firms and the preiudice against their 
product by Colonial buyers. For example, in a letter from 
Dalgety & Blackwood, a Melbourne wholesale house, the company 
was informed in 1872 that "we cannot dispose of any large 
quantities (of sheep shears) as this demand is principally for 
Ward and Payne's make."^ The maior area of sales resistance 
centred on the established reputation of Ward & Payne's make, 
and "we hear of conflicting accounts of the quality of your 
make though they are fairly well liked."^7 Indeed, such was the 
initial resistance to the product, that the firm was forced to
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sell by public auction.00
The openings in the market were to be established by 
developing effective lines of exchange and by producing a
superior quality article. In 1868, W. Burgon had established 
links with the London exporting firm of Mclean Bros. & Rigg, 
who operated in Melbourne, and forged a number of sole agency 
agreements with foreign based export firms.^ According to 
Mclean Bros., the penetration of the market depended on
producing the right kind of quality article and "steel of good 
temper."^ The market was thus to be secured through resource 
development in producing a superior quality product and as John 
Swine & Co. of Liverpool informed them "there is room for 
another brand now that Sorby's are not in such good
r e p u t a t i o n . T h u s  market constraints focussed managerial
attention on improving the quality of the product. For example, 
between 1865 and 1873 the company introduced a number of 
improved production methods for manufacturing sheep shears 
under various patent rights.^
In terms of distribution, the shears were placed in the 
hands of large ironmongers who dispatched samples to the 
shearing stations with their regular orders. This method of 
promotion had been successfully used by Ward & Payne^ and was 
a common technique used by Sheffield firms. Samples were sent 
free to potential customers and were then checked for quality 
and durability before an order was offered. The use of samples 
to promote trade was crucial in a market where seasonal
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fluctuations in demand obliged management to promote goods 
during the off season.^ However, this could put increasing 
pressure on the production side of business and thus required 
management to carefully monitor potential demand.
The early experience of this company thus focussed 
managerial attention on the need to maintain quality, produce 
regularly to order, and promote trade through merchanting
houses. A need for close managerial supervision of the market 
was demonstrated in 1887 by the appointment of William Burgon1s 
son, Fredrick, as a travelling salesman in the Australian 
market. ^  The aim of this move was to promote the company's 
traditional markets for sheep shears and to diversify into new 
product markets for crucible tool steel, edge tools, and
cutlery, which required an effective flow of information.^ 
Furthermore, Fredrick was now actively engaged in negotiations 
for patent rights for sheep shearing machines, which were to be 
an important future business for the firm. However, the
promotion of new business was restricted by the prejudice in 
favour of US steel and as Fredrick argued, "I do not see at 
present much business as no one will attempt to look at
anything but American steel, even when it is cheaper. 
Clearly then the restraint on the firm related to the
competitive advantages obtained by established US firms in the 
market. This was also evident in attempts to promote the sale
of steel shovels, where producers such as Ward & Payne of
Sheffield and A. & E. Parkes of Birmingham^ had copied the
cheaper US patterns and were underselling the higher cost 
Burgon & Ball designs by 6s per item, and selling all patterns 
at a uniform price.^
In particular the company's efforts to enter the tool 
steel market encountered fierce resistance, and although 
Fredrick could argue that in the long-run, steel of a high 
quality "will advertise itself by its superiority", he remarked 
on the fact that "the Colonies are inundated with 
representatives from Sheffield and other parts of England and 
America and what with bad trade and keen competition it is most 
difficult to get in at all." Indeed, the company had developed 
close links with the Sheffield steel firm of Daniel Doncaster's 
and was simultaneously promoting this company's steel, using 
their reputation to sell their own surplus stocks of 50,000 
tons of blister steel. This, however, had its drawbacks,, buyers 
being inclined to misconceive the firm's position as an 
exclusive producer of their own steel.^ Nevertheless, the 
ability of the firm to push sales and to provide high quality 
steel led to considerable success in penetrating the Australian 
market by the end of 1887, although difficulties were 
encountered in securing repeat orders.
Steel, however, was not to be the major product area of 
this firm. After 1888 they developed extensive sales
connections in the Australian, New Zealand and South American✓
markets for the marketing of patent shear machines and edge 
tools. By 1898, the ability of the firm to develop its
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technical skills, to invest in new capacity after its flotation
as a public company in 1894, and to produce quality machine
shears, which had first been patented in Australia in 1887, had
o ovirtually captured the Australian market for this product. A 
Thus the success of the firm was linked to product 
specialisation and the ability of management to perceive fast 
growing areas of demand. As early as 1888 Fredrick had urged 
the introduction of mechanised shears as "sheep shear
i t  8  8manufacturing in 5 years will be a thing of the past.
Equally important in the development of this firm was the
expansion of a specific mercnanting function. In 1888, Fredrick
had perceived that the sale of steel could only be effected
through the development of links with large import houses.
However, specialising in shears and garden tools opened the
possibility of circumventing the middleman, buying for import
houses and trading direct with retail outlets in Australia. As
he urged William Burgon, "you must go past the merchant and be
a merchant yourself." This of course meant an increased risk of
bad debts, and the alienation of large import houses, but would
hold out the opportunities of expanding the market and selling
other firms1 steel and fabricated products, which would allow
the company to acquire information on the prices of foreign
commodities.84 Furthermore, direct sales of garden tools would
allow the firm to break down the monopoly of larger producers
who had created an indentured trade in their relations with
8 5large i m p o r t e r s . T h e  development of the merchanting side of
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the business was to have two advantages. Firstly, it allowed 
the firm to develop a market quickly for the sale of mechanised 
shears which expanded rapidly after 1 8 9 8 , ^  and secondly to use 
this expertise to secure revenue by selling other firms’ 
products. In the 1890's, the firm set up a number of sole 
agency agreements with Australian houses and in 1903 purchased 
the firm of J.H. Young & Co. of Sidney, which was established 
as a sales subsidiary of the firm.^ The firm now expanded its 
merchanting function by negotiating agreements for them to sell 
and market a variety of other firms' products, especially 
engineering products which could be marketed and serviced in
Q Qline with their own equipment.00
The three case studies have highlighted a number of 
general similarities. Firstly, all firms were constrained in 
market transactions and the growth of cheap mass produced 
standardised goods placed firms at an increasing cost 
disadvantage. The slow adoption of standardised production was 
a clear indication that firms failed to respond to changing 
market trends, especially in the important US market. Secondly, 
firms displayed a clear trend towards direct marketing, and in 
the case of Burgon & Ball in Australia, this had clear 
advantages. However, the constraints placed on the firm by the 
increasingly organised nature of the market was clearly evident 
in the case of Wostenholme' s, who found it difficult to 
circumvent the large middleman. This chapter has explored 
marketing strategy from a case study approach, but we have
<
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noted that firms were facing competition of an increasingly 
protectionist nature. The next chapter explores the nature of 
this constraint in relation to the political response of 
Sheffield1s business community to the question of competition 
and tariff reform.
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The Political Economy of Iron and Steel: Tariff Reform in
Sheffield
The growing competitive constraints on Sheffield1s industries 
are here explored in terms of the political response of the 
business community. This takes up the challenge of Cain and 
Hopkins who have called for a political economy approach to the 
issue of British overseas expansion up to 1914. For these 
authors political economy is defined as "the management of the 
national economy and ... the strategies devised to secure state 
revenues, domestic employment, and public o r d e r . T h e  emphasis 
here is clearly on the national economy and Cain and Hopkins 
integrate an historical overview of the British economy with an 
historical analysis of British imperialism. Thus, they raise 
the general hypothesis that to evaluate the expansion of 
British imperialism "requires prior examination of the 
structure and performance of the British economy and of the 
changing bases of political authority in the metropole." The 
emphasis on the structure and performance of the economy is to 
be welcomed, and although the analysis is centred at a national 
economic and political level this "does not necessarily exclude 
... local evidence.
Undoubtedly, a key area of debate from the 1880's, both in 
relation to national politics and sectors of industry, was the 
question of rising protectionist sentiment abroad.^ The crisis 
of the great depression alerted Sheffield's business community
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to the need for a change of national policy and a greater
realisation of the economic problems of a major industrial
centre. That they failed to instigate major changes is not here
the issue, rather, the constraints they faced became central to
a view of the state which was to have important implications
for the war and its aftermath. In other words, the debate over
fiscal policy was to shape the perception of businessmen to the
role of the state in regulating economic activity.^ As Alt and
Chrystal claim, political economy is concerned with the
expected role of government in economic life.^ This expected
role first found expression in Sheffield in the debate over
protectionism and fiscal reform before 1914.
In a letter to the Sheffield Telegraph, in 1899, the steel
manufacturer Fredrick Brittain outlined the need for a
political response to the issue of foreign tariffs, and
pronounced that
Twenty years ago it was difficult to persuade anybody that there was any cause for anxiety, but now, fortunately for the country, serious statesmen are beginning to realise the gravity of the question, and the tone of the public press has changed.
Indeed, as early has 1881, referring to the failure to renew
the French commercial treaty, Brittain had claimed that the
increased duties on Sheffield goods had virtually destroyed the
trade in common and medium cutlery "and many important
industries were seriously damaged."^ For Brittain, at least,
the problems of increased competition and bouts of periodic
depression were directly related to the maintenance of a system
181
of free trade in the face of "unfair" and hostile tariffs from 
foreign nations. As he claimed in 1885, "foreign competition, 
assisted by protective duties, has produced most of the misery 
that we see around us." In crude terms, the solution was 
simple, Britain should adopt a pragmatic stance to the question 
of trade policy instigating a system of retaliatory tariffs to 
protect industry from unfair treatment. This was not simply a 
plea to protect sectorial interests, but rather that the 
doctrine of free trade was being undermined by the resistance 
of foreign nations to provide equitable treatment.^
Fair trade sentiment and its association with protection 
was gaining ground in Sheffield from the 1880'S, and as Smith 
points out, "Both the steel industry and the cutlery trades 
were increasingly attracted by protectionist ideas which found 
a stronghold in the Conservative Party." In particular,j
Sheffield businessmen found strong political support from their
parliamentary representatives, A.J. Mundella and Sir Howard
Vincent.^ Mundella, as Minister at the Board of Trade, was in a
powerful position to put forward Sheffield's view but it was
mainly Vincent, through his association with the Chamber of
Commerce, who was the leading advocate of protectionism for
Sheffield. In a speech to the Chamber in January 1894, he urged
them to take a practical stance on the issue of trade policy:
without introducing ... any matter of a controversial character of fair trade or free trade, of protection or free imports ... they must not deal with this matter from a theoretical point of view. They must adopt their legislation to the day in which they lived, and conform to
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the rest of the world if they wished to hold their trade and advance their manufactures. u
The question of fair trade and protection was, however,
inextricably linked to the political issues of Empire and 
imperial preference. The fair trade movement of the 1880's and 
1890's was the forerunner of Chamberlain's tariff reform 
campaign, nevertheless, at the heart of both campaigns was a 
strong sentiment towards Empire trade and unity.^ Although 
fair trade did not find unquestioned support from leading
British politicians, "a number of Conservatives took it
seriously and it could easily be worked into the mood of 
greater interest in the empire that was d e v e l o p i n g . A t  the 
level of national political economy, these ideas were expressed 
through bodies such as the National Fair Trade League, founded 
in 1881, the Imperial Federation movement and the Colonial 
Conference of 1887 which all promoted plans for reforming the 
country's trading policy. What were the views of Sheffield's 
business community to these political movements and how did 
they relate to the business interests of the iron and steel 
industry? We have already referred to the efforts of Sheffield 
firms to forge links in Colonial markets, we now turn to the
political voice behind this business strategy.
Before developing these arguments in relation to the 
period after 1880, it is necessary to point out that the mid­
nineteenth century witnessed a growing trend amongst Sheffield 
manufacturers towards government involvement in trade 
expansion, particularly in India. According to Inkster, by 1859
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the opinion of Sheffield manufacturers had "tuned in with that 
harmony of free trade doctrines and imperial interests that was 
created by the rhetoric of the Manchester s c h o o l . I n  other 
words, governments should intervene to create an economic 
environment conducive to trade and manufactures. Thus, 
representatives of the Sheffield trades, giving evidence to the 
Select Committees on India of 1852-53 and 1859, argued that the 
government should pursue "indirect economic encouragement" 
providing an environment for free trade to enhance Britain's 
natural technological lead.^ The doctrine of free trade 
therefore incorporated not only the ideals of free markets and 
competitive advantage but also the view that governments should 
create markets and aid the expansion of manufacturing overseas. 
Thus, Sheffield businessmen, in the 1850's, saw Colonial areas 
as vital to the extension of markets for steel products.
In this sense, the political rhetoric of Sheffield 
businessmen in the 1890's was comparable to that of the 1850's. 
However, the rhetoric was now reinforced by a call for 
protectionism, Empire unity, and a conscious government effort 
to expand into new trade areas. This call for a more energetic 
response by government to new areas of trade was given a 
political dimension by the Chamber of Commerce in 1893. 
Referring to Britain's influence in West Africa, the Chamber 
resolved that
it was very unwise to allow large tracts of country upon which civilisation appeared to be just about to dawn to pass away from British influence, and in all probability to be closed to the free entry of British commodities.
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Gain and Hopkins have claimed that the "extension of Britain's 
presence overseas can be seen as an expression of her failure 
to dominate her chief competitors, and especially to prevent 
their industrialisation."-^ Behind this ideal was a conscious 
attempt by businessmen to persuade government to defend 
Britain's overseas interests from annexation by her foreign 
rivals. Indeed, Foreman-Peck argues that British expansionary 
policy only changed in the 1890's as Britain's trading 
interests were threatened by the annexation of territory by 
other nations. °
The protection of trading interests^ especially in 
Africa, was viewed by Sheffield businessmen as a matter for 
government intervention in the 1890's. This was partly a 
response to foreign infiltration into the African Continent but 
more importantly new areas of trade were seen as vital to the 
expansion of market demand in the face of rising tariff 
barriers. For example, in the case of Swaziland the Chamber 
petitioned the Board of Trade to the effect that they should 
resist any cessation of this territory as it was necessary to 
preserve "all possible markets for British products." 
Furthermore, they argued that British capitalists had a vested 
interest in this market, due to the large amount of capital 
invested there, and thus their interests should be protected at 
all costs. ^  Africa was now seen as essential to Sheffield's 
long term interests and in the case of Uganda they informed the
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Board of Trade that,
Your Council feel very strongly ... that in view of the hostile tariffs which at present so greatly impede commercial relations between this and so many foreign countries, the Government ... ought in no case to surrender its hold upon districts ... to become in the future consumers of British goods. 0
The question of foreign tariffs was high on the agenda of 
the Chamber's business throughout the 1890's. In particular,, 
attention was focussed on the French tariff of 1892 and the 
Mckinley tariff in the USA of 1890. Fredrick Brittain had 
little doubt that these tariffs were detrimental to Sheffield's 
trades. Referring to the French tariff, he claimed that this 
had "given the coup de grace to the few remaining trades that 
showed any signs of v i t a l i t y . I n d e e d ,  even the Economist, 
hardly noted for its anti-free trade views, bitterly complained 
that
The new French tariff has only been in operation six months, and English firms in certain trades are already convinced that it is impossible to do business as hitherto, and are changing their system. Manufacturers have the alternative before them of dropping their French trade altogether, or, if it is of sufficient importance, of starting works there, and manufacturing in France. ^
The French tariff was also seen as discriminating against
the higher quality steel produced by Sheffield manufacturers.
The tariff in effect demarcated between common steel and fine
steel for tools, the latter being subjected to a higher duty.
This in itself was viewed by H.P. Marsh as an attempt to force
specialist steel makers out of the French trade. However,
conceding that this was inevitable, he argued that a standard
based on value should be applied to steel, replacing the crude
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French test, which would then set the demarcation of the 
tariff. This was unanimously adopted by the Chamber who urged 
the Board of Trade to defend the interests of the Sheffield 
trades. An ad valorem standard was introduced in January 1894, 
however there were still continual complaints that French 
customs were unfairly treating Sheffield steel. For example, 
Bedford & Sons, steel and tool producers, complained that the 
customs were discriminating against even the commonest steel 
under the lower duty.23
Saul argues that during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century the existence of "administrative protection" was a
major source of complaint for British businessmen. Foreign
customs practice was bureaucratic in nature, and hampered
effective trade even under the umbrella of the most favoured
nation clause.^ The above example of French practice serves as
a case in point, but was also a source of irritation to
Sheffield producers in the US market. For example, in 1899 the
Chamber of Commerce received numerous complaints from Jonas &
Colver concerning the practice of US customs officials, who
were refusing certificates of import to firms who did not
certify the grade, temper and carbon content of the steel 
9 Sexported.
It was the issue of the US tariff, however, which created 
the major area of debate for Sheffield producers^ given the 
importance of this market for the city's commerce.^ The effect 
of the Mckinley Tariff on Wostenholme's trade was referred to
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in Chapter 3. Indeed, the imposition of the tariff could alter 
the pattern of trade relations. As J.C. Wing argued, the firm's 
future profits depended largely on this market, and in view of 
the tariff agitation in the US the company should respond 
positively by shipping goods as quickly as possible, and 
increasing their New York stocks at the pre-tariff rates. This 
in turn required an extension of credit to potential 
importers.^ Apart from increasing the costs of exchange, the 
imposition of the US tariff on cutlery changed the relations 
between the firm and their US customers. According to Edward 
Beckett, the effect of the tariff was to place the cost 
advantage in favour of low quality cutlery thus discriminating 
against the company's reputation for high standards. This made 
the firm more susceptible to cyclical fluctuations and the ad 
valorem duty restricted sales.^ On a more general level, Saul 
argues that the more a specific industry was forced by tariffs 
to specialise on quality products, "the more susceptible it 
became to cyclical fluctuations."^
Of equal concern to businessmen was the establishment of 
most favoured nation treaties by the USA in the neutral markets 
of Cuba and Brazil in 1891. For example, the Cuban Treaty 
between Spain and the USA imposed a severe cost burden on 
finished and semi-finished steel exported from Britain, ranging 
from 78% on the invoice price for sheet iron to 72% for bar 
iron, 70% for steel rails and 44% for cast iron.-^ According to 
the President of the Chamber, W.H. Brittain, the effect of the
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treaty with Brazil was to exclude his company from entering
this market, and was counter to the spirit of free trade:
the very things that the United States were to admit free from Brazil for such enormous and valuable concessions as they obtained were admitted by us free. We received no concession, but yet we had the duties against our produce enormously increased. 1
This now brought to the fore the question of Britain's 
reciprocal agreements in Colonial trade. Until the 1920's, the 
mainstay of Britain's commercial policy was freedom in the 
domestic market for foreign goods and an adherence to a most 
favoured nation system.^2 By 1893 the use of this system in 
Colonial trade was a maior area of debate in the Sheffield 
Chamber. For example^ in January 1893 W.C. Leng, a staunch 
supporter of protectionism and editor of the Conservative 
Sheffield Telegraph, proposed a resolution condemning the 
Belgian Treaty of 1862 and the German Treaty of 1865 which was 
carried by a majority in the Chamber. The focal point of the 
resolution was a condemnation of the clauses prohibiting 
British Colonies from admitting British goods on more 
favourable terms than foreign goods. Such a policy impeded "any 
commercial understanding between different portions of the ... 
Empire" and excluded the use of retaliation as a weapon to 
combat increased tariffs.^
Such arguments found a political platform at both the 
national and local levels. For example, Vincent was prominent 
in the Parliamentary debate over the establishment of 
commercial leagues by colonial nations and his views echoed the
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Chamber!s concern over the most favoured nation principle. In a 
question to the First Lord of the Treasury, A.J. Balfour^ in 
March 1892, he expressed his concern over the possible 
formation of Colonial customs unions, which would admit foreign 
nations on preferential terms but prohibit Britain "from 
entering into similar mutually advantageous trading 
arrangements ... by provisions in treaties made with two alien 
s t a t e s . T h u s ,  Britain should respond positively to the 
changing tide of world trading policy. The rhetoric of Vincent, 
his supporters in the Chamber, and the local Tory press 
conformed to an ideal of fair trade; Britain should develop 
mechanisms based on Empire trade to retaliate against adverse 
tariff barriers. However, for many the line between fair trade 
and outright protectionism was a thin one. Vincent's stance 
for example was roundly condemned by opposition politicians and 
the local Liberal press. For his opponents his views smacked of 
"protectionist heresey"^ of which the concept of fair trade 
was a mere cloaking device. But what was the view of the 
Sheffield business community on these issues?
It is difficult to gauge the exact numerical support for a 
more protectionist stance on trade issues; however, from the 
resolutions passed by the Sheffield Chamber there was clearly a 
growing support amongst businessmen for the views of the fair 
trade movement, and in particular the related issues of closer 
economic links with Empire and market expansion. For example, 
in 1894 the Chamber adopted the following resolution:
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That the attention of Her Majesty's Government be called to the disastrous consequences that have ensued from the operations of hostile customs tariffs, and to the necessity of undertaking such measures as may ensure the defence of British Imperial interests.36
However, this does not infer a united front by Sheffield
businessmen on this issue. Indeed the local Liberal press,
represented by the Sheffield Independent. continued to
vigorously defend the maintenance of a free trade stance.
Commenting upon the Agricultural Conference in London of 1893
and a meeting of the local Conservative Party in Sheffield, the
paper vigorously attacked the use of protection as a remedy to
the depression on the grounds that tariffs would lead to
retaliatory tactics by foreign competitors. The editorial
gleefully predicted "that if a certain noisy section of the
Tories persist in pushing protection, however disguised, to the
front, they will inevitably wreck their party.
On the business front these views were supported by
Fredrick Thorpe Mappin who has been described by Smith as "one
of the few leading industrialists to maintain a public
identification with the Liberals."^® For Mappin, free trade had
provided an enormous expansion in British trade, and the
effects of hostile tariffs, in particular the McKinley tariff,
were viewed as temporary; the ingenuity of British businessmen
would forge a new path to competitive success in foreign
markets. However, this orthodox defence of free trade went
further, into a direct attack on the fair trade movement as a
protectionist ideology whose main aim was the defence of
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sectorial interests, namely agriculture and the business 
interests of the steel sector. In essence then, a protectionist
O Qpolicy ran counter to the general national interest. ^
Mappin1s views were clearly directed at the growing 
dissent of the Sheffield Chamber against the principles of free 
trade. Indeed, Fredrick Brittain saw it as a personal attack 
which had to be rigorously defended. However, Brittain1s 
arguments reflect the difficulties of presenting a political 
case for fair trade outside the realms of full blown 
protectionism. In fact Brittain denied any political motivation 
claiming that "he had never been a partisan, he belonged to no 
association, and was neither a protectionist nor a free 
trader." Dismissing Mappin's "hopeful view" of trade revival he 
appealed to national self interest claiming that the McKinley 
Tariff had been detrimental to large sectors of industry. 
Furthermore, he appealed directly to working class interests 
arguing that tariffs were an indirect tax on the output of 
labour. On his moral high horse, he claimed that "We wanted 
trade. Our workmen, many of them were starving. Their trade had 
been stolen from them by foreign protection." Thus the crux of 
the argument was not directed towards the protection of 
sectorial interests but rather was a matter of "national self 
d e f e n c e . T h i s  essentially set the terms of the later debate 
concerning tariff reform and colonial preference and it is to 
this debate that we now turn.
The question of foreign tariffs again became a major issue
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with the passing of the "stringent" Dingley Tariff in the USA 
in 1 8 9 7 . Now, however, the debate took on a much more 
political character which was exemplified in 1899 by a debate 
over the functions of the Chamber. In July 1899, the Chamber 
assumed corporate status to provide a broader democratic base 
for commercial debate. The liability of each member was limited 
to £1, the electoral procedures simplified, and provision made 
for various trades to have sections of their own within the 
Chamber. However, the new constitution contained a clause 
which, according to W.C. Leng, prohibited the discussion of 
party political issues. As Leng argued, it was not "proper that 
any question intimately connected with trade or commerce should 
be excluded on account of its being associated with political 
p a r t i e s . U n d o u b t e d l y ,  the question at the top of Leng's 
agenda was the politically sensitive issue of tariff reform. In 
a reply to Leng, the Chamber's Secretary Herbert Hughes argued 
that the rule was to guard against encroaching on party 
political issues; "questions of Liberalism or Conservatism." 
However, with a naivety that could only be wondered at, he 
agreed that the tariff question would not be excluded under 
this rule.^
The event which was to bring the question of retaliation 
to the forefront of political debate was a proposed increase 
of the German tariff in 1900. According to Buchheim, waves of 
hysteria against Germany reflected the penetration of markets 
in the 1880's, when UK exports stagnated, and the increasing
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importation of German consumer goods in the 18901 s . ^  However, 
this fails to consider the interrelated nature of Anglo-German 
trade, and how businessmen perceived the motives of Germany in 
relation to fiscal policy. In Sheffield, it was the proposed 
increase in the German duty on tool steel, an expanding 
speciality of Sheffield's industry, from 2.5 Marks per 100 
kilos to 15 Marks which became the focal point of concern. 
According to the Chamber this "would practically mean putting 
an end to the steel trade with Germany." Indeed, the Chamber 
saw this has a direct attack on their economic interests by 
German steel producers who had persuaded the German Government 
to protect their own sectional interests.^
Here the question of German business organisation became 
a central issue, in particular the power of cartels to 
artificially depress export prices in the face of high tariff 
barriers. The Chamber noted in January 1904 that some steel 
products were being placed on the British market by cartels at 
or below cost price, while the profits of the cartel was 
determined by the high price obtained in their domestic 
markets. The relationship between tariffs and business 
combinations was also emphasised in evidence to the 1904 Tariff 
Commission, where it was claimed that the cause of severe 
German competition was protective tariffs which had stimulated 
production to exceed consumption "so the excess must 
necessarily be exported at any price, sooner than the works 
should stand idle."^ While realising the difficulty of
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combatting this problem, the Chamber argued that it was counter
to the principles of free trade and
however profitable it may be for this or that industry to be able to avail itself of dumped goods at an unnatural price ... in the long run the natural price of the commodity is, in commerce, the safest to pay for its use. °
The Chamber's response to the German tariff was to set up 
an interim sub-committee which reported in January 1901. The 
findings of the committee illustrate the desire of Sheffield 
businessmen for more positive action on the tariff question. 
Firstly, the sub-committee argued that an increase in the duty 
on bar and sheet steel, in some cases representing 50% of the 
value of steel, would "arouse an inimical feeling towards a 
reciprocal trade with Germany .•. Such a duty ... is liable to 
destroy a trade between Sheffield manufacturers of steel and 
German manufacturers of tools which as grown up during the last 
50 years." What was at issue here was the economic interests of 
Sheffield's basic steel producers who feared a reduction in the 
supply of steel to German tool fabricators, centred on the 
regions of Remscheid and Solingen who were "large exporters of 
t o o l s . S e c o n d l y ,  the committee questioned the economic 
rationality of the Germans, arguing that if the tariff was 
imposed to combat US steel imports into Germany then it "should 
only be applied to those countries who impose a similar tariff 
against German iron and steel." Thus retaliation was recognised 
as a legitimate commercial weapon, and it therefore logically 
followed that thirdly, as Britain allowed large quantities of
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German iron and steel to enter free of duty any increase in the 
tariff would strengthen the case for a retaliatory tariff on 
German exports.^
The hysteria generated by the German proposals was clearly 
related to the downturn of trade towards the end of 1900. In 
this environment, an effective response to commercial policy 
was deemed essential.Indeed, the question of party politics 
could no longer be ignored and this view was forcefully 
portrayed by the Tory member for Sheffield Hallam, Stuart 
Wortley. In relation to the German tariff, he urged the Chamber 
that the "proposed German crusade against British manufacturers 
will be deterred only by consideration of purely German 
interests." Thus, according to Wortley, the German interest was 
best served by avoiding retaliation against German exports and 
therefore a tariff would provide a powerful weapon to British 
businessmen. For Wortley, this was now a party issue and he 
argued that the political interests of businessmen were
C Oinextricably linked to that of the working class electorate.  ^
To reinforce these arguments, Wortley alluded to the 
reaction of the USA to the threatened German tariff. He had 
little doubt that the USA would retaliate but warned that "The 
parting of the ways would come if, and when, by such a threat 
the United States had secured for themselves a separate 
arrangement with Germany." Such a response would reinforce the 
already "formidable prospect" of growing US competition in iron 
and steel, and reduce Sheffield's competitive position. The
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crux of the argument was therefore that the threat of 
retaliation was essential to effective trade negotiations and, 
in relation to the US challenge, he claimed that "If we are to 
believe our American friends ... their enterprising methods and 
gigantic combinations are going to annex the commercial world. 
I doubt whether British skill and enterprise are going to 
capitulate so e a s i l y . T h e  use of a tariff as a retaliatory 
mechanism found widespread support from leading Sheffield 
businessmen. For example, C.W Kayser, the managing director of 
the steel firm of Kayser, Ellison & Co., called for political 
agitation on the issue of retaliation and this was supported by 
the Chamber’s President W.F. Beardshaw. In fact, Beardshaw took 
the argument further, claiming that if the German tariff came 
to a head it would induce the Colonies to give preferential 
treatment to British trade.^
The German tariff was thus clearly viewed as an attempt to 
stifle Sheffield's trade in basic and semi-finished steel. 
Indeed, the bulk of steel imports into Britain before 1913 were 
of a semi-manufactured form to be fabricated in the UK.-^ For 
example, in 1911-13 Britain imported on average 524,000 tons of 
semi-finished steel from Germany and 159,000 tons from the USA, 
compared to 412,000tons and 64,000 tons respectively for 
finished steel.^6 However, for Sheffield the development of 
high grades of steel for the production of tools was an 
expanding area of business, and for a particular sector of the 
business community the German tariff was a flagrant attack on
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their economic interests. One could even argue that the export 
of tool steel was against the long-run interests of Sheffield 
tool fabricators who faced growing competition from the 
emerging industries in Germany and the USA. As early as 1885 
Fredrick Brittain had argued that the bulk of semi-manufactured 
steels were exported to countries within Europe "where they are 
finished and in many cases compete with articles entirely made 
in E n g l a n d . T h u s  the export of semi-processed materials 
augmented the expansion of foreign industry to the detriment of 
Sheffield fabricators. Such arguments were to have a strong 
influence on producers of tools when the details of the German 
tariff were finally announced in August 1901.
To the surprise of the Chamber, the new tariff proposed no 
increase on tool steel, but rather a considerable increase in 
the duty on fabricated steel such as files, saws, sickles, and 
a variety of other Sheffield products. This brought forth a 
barrage of protest from Sheffield manufacturers and led Charles 
Belk and W. Beckett to propose an immediate letter of protest 
to the Foreign Office.58 The Chamber's Tariff Committee had 
little doubt that the effect of the changes was to raise the 
tariff from a protective to a prohibitive tax on finished 
s t e e l . M o r e o v e r ,  the tariff was highly specific in 
construction, effecting various Sheffield products. For example 
an increased duty was placed on small files whilst the duty on 
large files, which were seldom imported into Germany from 
Sheffield, was decreased. Furthermore, specific duties were
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imposed on scissors and knives and on small sizes of steel bars 
of less than 1 kilogram in weight "of which the Sheffield 
manufacturers have made a speciality and upon which the cost of 
production is already high."8^
For Sheffield producers this was viewed as blatant 
commercial aggression on the part of Germany, based on a 
spurious economic rationale. For example, in the case of files 
the Tariff Committee argued that the increased duty on small 
files was intended to "destroy" a trade in which Germany 
already held a significant competitive lead: "for several
successive years ... contracts for files have been taken by 
Remscheid manufacturers in neutral markets at 20% cheaper rates 
than the cost of manufacturing similar files in Sheffield." 
Similarly, in the case of scissors and knives, they argued that 
the free importation of these goods into Britain "is permitted, 
and larger quantities of German scissors and knives are 
imported into England than are exported to Germany from 
S h e f f i e l d . I n d e e d ,  similar points were made by H. Spear, the 
London agent of Beardshaw1s in relation to US competition in 
saw and engineering files, which were being sold for 65% and 5% 
and 67%% off Sheffield lists.
There was clearly now a case for government protection, 
and the Tariff Committee condemned the Board of Trade for 
inaction in the face of the German penetration of British 
markets, and claimed that "well known German manufacturers 
through their agents in London sell larger quantities of steel
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sheets and other articles than the whole Sheffield trade 
combined, these articles are all admitted free ... whilst the 
new tariff will effectively prevent reciprocal trade." Thus 
tariffs were opposed to an "open door policy" in the face of 
Sheffield's efforts to "contain" German competition, and the 
committee recommended that the Board of Trade should not enter 
a new commercial treaty and not accept the new tariff
c ostructure.00
This plea to the Board of Trade, to defend the interests 
of businessmen, had earlier been applied to issues such as the 
protection of trade marks abroad and the establishment of a 
commercial intelligence department to provide information to 
British business. The false use of Sheffield's trade marks 
abroad, particularly by German producers, was a maior area of 
concern to the trade from the 1850's and continued to occupy a 
great deal of the Chamber's business from the 1880' s. ^  The 
Chamber had been influential in the passing of the Merchandise 
Mark Act of 1887 but the continuation of false marking and the 
legal costs involved in prosecution remained a major problem 
for the Sheffield trades. In 1892, the Chamber called for a 
common international trade mark and government assistance to 
meet legal costs.00 Under the guidance of the Chamber and the 
Cutlers company a number of large Sheffield cutlery firms took 
legal action against German firms for fraudulent marking^, 
however, a direct appeal to the Government by the Cutlers 
Company for financial assistance fell on deaf ears. For the
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Master Cutler, F.C. Wild, there was now a clear case for
» 67government intervention to protect Sheffield s name abroad.
Attached to the trade mark issue was the agitation for the 
formation of a commercial intelligence department, to mediate 
in foreign trade disputes and to provide commercial agents in 
key centres to report upon the extent and progress of Sheffield 
trade "and the opportunities of developing British interests." 
The formation of this new government department in 1899 was 
welcomed by the Chamber as a major innovation in the promotion 
of trade and "the collection and speedy dissemination of 
commercial intelligence." However, by 1902 Vincent could argue 
that the intervention of government to promote trade should be 
reinforced by a commercial action department, to defend 
industry against foreign tariffs and "look ahead for the
n68commerce of England.
The preceding analysis of Sheffield's political economy
indicates a growing movement towards a policy of retaliation to
combat rising foreign competition under a tariff umbrella. In
this sense, the response of the business community contained
large doses of pragmatic self interest, tariffs were utilised
as a catchword to explain competitive decline and the periodic
bouts of recession which disrupted the Sheffield trades in this
period. However, it does not indicate a more positive move
towards radical fiscal reform as outlined by the proposals of
Chamberlain in 1903. Indeed, Harrison claims that business/
organisations followed a cautious approach to the question^ the
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complex nature of the tariff reform debate was fta political as 
much as an economic question." It was an unwelcome fact for 
many businessmen "that their own position had become a primary 
issue of party conflict/1 and "the very word protection invoked 
contempt." Furthermore, divisions within the Unionist ranks and 
the confusion and uncertainty of Chamberlain's proposals hardly 
provided a concrete platform on which businessmen could 
formulate a decisive policy on the tariff question.^ As Lloyd- 
George remarked, at the height of the tariff debate in May 
1903, "I do not think any Honourable Member has the slightest 
conception of what the policy of the Government is."^
This was equally true of the business debate in the 
Chamber of Commerce.^ Although the Independent could claim 
that "There are some interesting cross-currents in motion 
(which) will unite in an appeal to the country on the question 
of an Imperial protectionist union",^2 the policy debate in the 
Chamber highlights the difficulties of formulating and 
presenting a united front. Indeed, at a meeting of the Chamber 
in March 1904, to formulate a resolution to the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce, the members were faced with three 
contradictory resolutions from the London, Dublin and 
Nottingham Chambers. All three proposals varied in their 
intensity of action. For example, the London resolution 
proposed an ad hoc retaliatory tariff controlled and sanctioned 
by government; the Dublin resolution proposed a fact-finding 
Royal Commission to obtain information on the effects of fiscal
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reform^ the Nottingham resolution went further advocating 
Balfour's policy of using retaliation in defence of domestic 
industry's faced with hostile tariffs.^ The discussion on 
these resolutions highlights the complex nature of the tariff 
reform question for British businessmen.
For representatives of the cutlery trades, such as Sir 
John Bingham of Walker & Hall, the Nottingham resolution with 
its obvious protectionist overtones provided a solution to the 
industries competitive decline. However, he argued for an 
amendment to the resolution claiming that governments should 
utilise tariffs as a bargaining counter. This was to be 
implemented through closer economic links with the self- 
governing colonies, based on a policy of preferences. However 
this found little support from A.J. Hobson who argued that 
neither resolution was framed as to provide a direct and sound 
economic rationale for a change in fiscal policy. Referring to 
the London resolution, he claimed that "It seemed to ... have 
been drawn up by Free Traders who wished to advocate free trade 
but were not quite frank enough to do so", while the Nottingham 
resolution was seen as a means of arriving at the "haven of 
protection" through retaliation.^ Hobson's views are 
interesting as they set out the framework of the debate 
concerning the question of tariff reform within the Chamberlain 
proposals, and also set out the anti-tariff stance within the 
Chamber.^5
Firstly, Hobson argued that the resolutions contained no
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reference to Colonial preference which was the mainstay of
Chamberlain1s proposals.^ The Birmingham speech of May
1903;^  did not so much advocate preference but rather urged
political discussion, a ’’great inquiry” into the fiscal policy
of the British nation. The economic measures at the centre of
the campaign awaited his Glasgow speech of October 1903.
However, it was now only too obvious to the supporters of free
trade that Colonial preference involved the taxation not only
7 8of food imports but also raw materials.0 This point was 
hammered home by Sir Charles Dilke, the Liberal MP for 
Gloucester, in May 1903, who for good measure also included 
semi-manufactured goods to the list of taxable imports.^ For 
Hobson this had now become the crux of the debate and as he 
argued,
the original departure that has led to the raising of the whole question ... contained in ... Chamberlain’s speech at Glasgow, admittedly needed taxation of food in this country to carry it out with success, and every day that the controversy went on we were getting further from the original issue and nearer to the advocacy of courses that meant pure protection.00
Thus, for Hobson the debate was now taking on a much wider
meaning, and the original conception of Imperial unity was
being manipulated into a policy of straight forward
O 1protectionism under the political disguise of retaliation.0±
This of course diverted the debate away from policy 
obiectives and focussed discussion on the means and 
implications of a preferential tariff structure. For Hobson, 
the obvious effect of taxing foreign food imports was an
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increase in real wages, which as he argued would effect the 
cost structure of industry and reduce the ability to 
compete.^ This obviously had implications for Sheffield 
producers who were acutely aware of the cheap labour of German 
competitors. Furthermore, in support of Hobson, the steel and 
tool manufacturer, S.E. Howell, referred to the benefits of 
free trade in securing cheap imports of raw materials and semi­
finished goods. Using steel billets as an example, he claimed 
that !lThe cheaper they could be bought the greater was the 
capacity of English manufacturers to compete in neutral 
markets."^ This defence of free trade mirrored the comments of 
the Economist in July 1903 which claimed that British steel 
manufacturers had imported billets, girders and various 
descriptions of manufactured steel from abroad because prices 
were lower than could be offered by UK producers. Although this 
competition had been severely felt by British steel 
manufacturers it had benefited consumers by dampening prices, 
due to competition, and by enabling firms to produce more 
cheaply, thus increasing consumption. Furthermore, on the 
question of food imports, the Economist claimed that a tax 
would have detrimental results to the steel industry whose 
methods of production were highly labour intensive.^
Secondly, the issue of Colonial preference was condemned 
as a back door route to protection. For Hobson, the very notion 
of a preference signalled a call for tariffs to be imposed on 
neutral trading nations which smacked of protectionism.^
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Furthermore, he quoted the views of Robert Giffin tothe effect 
that "the chief obstacle to the federation of the British 
Empire was not the free trade of the home country, but the
it 8 6protectionist notions of our self governing Colonies. 
Indeed, the political problems of introducing a preferential 
tariff had been a stumbling block for the Chamber in the 
1890's. For example, in a heated debate in the Chamber in 1892, 
concerning a pro-federation speech by Alexandra McNeil, a 
member of the Canadian Parliament, little agreement could be 
found on how this was to be achieved. This led W.H. Brittain to 
propose that no action should at present be taken over the 
question of preferential treatment "whatever difference of 
opinion might exist among them."^
Thus the political problem of negotiating preferential 
agreements was a powerful argument to the free trade group. As
H.H. Bedford claimed in 1905, even with a preferential duty of 
33&l/3% Sheffield cutlery manufacturers were unable to sell in 
the Canadian market as duties were still too high and Canada 
did not really "encourage i n t e r - t r a d i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
Beardshaw's encountered fierce competition in the South African 
market, and they noted that orders were being placed with US 
tool producers "on account of the cheaper price; this is a new 
d e p a r t u r e . I n  fact, the Economis t in 1904 attacked 
Chamberlain's scheme, claiming that there was no political 
guarantee of preferences and even when granted "the duties 
levied on staple British products are ... of a very substantial
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nature.
Thirdly, the argument turned to the question of 
retaliation and the possibility of commercial wars. In 
particular, Hobson pointed to the importance of shipping and 
the detrimental effect of tariffs on commercial interaction. In 
conclusion, he argued that free trade was the most advantageous 
policy for the country to follow, it provided opportunities for 
the employment of labour and capital "and it would be a very 
great sacrifice ... to sacrifice the open markets of this 
country, the freest and cheapest in the w o r l d . H o b s o n ' s  
defence of free trade clearly put the onus back on the tariff 
group to justify their arguments. The defence for tariffs was 
put forward by a number of Sheffield businessmen and was summed 
up by Beardshaw: "The country might gain temporarily by cheap 
dumped material, but it was building up a business on a false 
f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s  of course was again no more than an appeal 
to sectional interests and the formation of a national policy 
relating to all sectors of trade and industry was clearly 
missing from the pro-tariff view. Nevertheless, a resolution 
was passed by a majority of 27 to 19 supporting a retaliatory 
tariff and Colonial preferences.
Appendix D, Table 1, provides a breakdown of the above 
voting pattern, and Table 2 shows the membership of the local 
Tariff Reform League in 1904. Although it only represents a 
small cross-section of Sheffield businessmen it indicates that 
there was support for tariffs across a wide range of
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Sheffield’s trades, finding support from cutlery, steel, and 
tool producers. As Harrison claims, an hypothesis based on 
economic determinism is too simplistic, "Foreign competition 
... was felt unevenly, not only between different branches of 
the same indusrty, but also between different firms within the 
same b r a n c h . H o w e v e r ,  a survey in 1904-1905 by the Chamber 
showed a widespread, if variant, support for tariff reform. The 
inquiry was claimed to be "representative of the large and 
small manufacturing firms in Sheffield", and there was a 3:1 
majority, of those firms who responded, in favour of 
retaliation. However, the "substantial minority" clearly 
indicated a continuing diversity of opinion. For example, 
numerous firms claimed that tariffs excluded their products 
from foreign markets, but largely for lower quality goods, and 
specialist steel firms could still compete on the basis of 
quality. Furthermore, there was considerable confusion in the 
returns concerning preferences, with firms evenly split on the 
issue of high colonial duties and their effects on trade. 
Indeed, no consensus could be found on what the exact level of 
preference should b e . ^
Politically, Sheffield businessmen displayed a confused 
response to the issue of tariff reform. The free trade group 
within the Chamber put up a sophisticated defence of the 
doctrine which was hardly matched by the economic rhetoric of 
their opponents. No unified and coherent policy is evident in 
Sheffield before 1914, although a majority of businessmen were
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moving to a pro-tariff position, which called for government to 
intervene to protect key industrial interests. Whatever the
disagreements, one thing they all accepted was the need for an 
effective response to competition by British businessmen. As
Pollard argues, there was the possibility of another response, 
outside of tariff reform, involving the development of business 
organisation, increased mechanisation, and an enhancement of 
technical education.^ As Batty Langley argued in 1906, "it was 
no good ... craving assistance from Parliament to save
ourselves. This - takes us back to the question of resource 
development, which was to be intensified during the War years, 
however, the question of protection was to re-emerge as a
response to anti-German sentiment and the depression of the 
1920's.
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8War and Business Development: Sheffield 1914-1920.
Hannah claims that there remains a consensus of opinion that 
"In the United Kingdom the First World War marked a watershed 
in economic and business development as well as in political 
and social life."^ The emphasis on the political as well as 
economic is to be welcomed and in particular the changing 
relationship between the state and business, during and after 
the First World War, has been a focal point for economic, 
political and social historians.^ Government control over key 
industrial sectors during the war and the de-regulation of 
economic life after 1919 has been constantly emphasised. In
turn, government was now in a "unique position to influence 
business firms" and direct them towards more efficient methods 
of production and organisation, and there was now a growing 
tendency towards business cooperation "which questioned the
virtues of competition."^ This chapter will focus on the 
changing pattern of production in Sheffield’s industry which
was vital for Britain's war time needs.^ This required both a 
dynamic response by business to changes in the human and
physical resource base of firms, and in structural changes 
related to increased business concentration. Furthermore, the 
development of business cooperation, both formal and informal, 
was a maior development of this period.^
In earlier chapters, the tendency towards the increasing 
scale of operations, and the introduction of rational 
production methods combined with scientific research, has been
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noted in the area of specialist steel production, at least in 
the larger business firms. Furthermore, the heavy engineering 
sector expanded rapidly under the impetus of government demand 
prior to 1914. For example, in 1913 Admiralty orders were 
"overflowing” and firms had orders in hand for Spain and France 
has well as home demand. In consequence, "Several Sheffield 
manufacturers have recently had to increase their works and 
plant" and "The export trade generally has reached a very high 
level, all classes of steel, twist drills, milling cutters and 
machinery ... being shipped."^ However, the pre-War boom in 
trade could easily outrun the ability of firms to increase 
their productive capacity. Commenting on trade in the first 
half of 1913, the Chamber of Commerce noted a record volume of 
output but demand had "exceeded the means of production to such 
an extent that execution of orders fell seriously in arrears 
and remained in that unsatisfactory condition for a long 
period."^
An obvious constraint on expansion was the deteriorating 
relations between capital and labour in the period 1911 to 
1914, which was noted in Chapter 4. This would suggest a closer 
symbiosis between Sheffield businessmen in the years leading up 
to 1914 and the demands of war were to reinforce cooperation, 
not only in terms of labour control, but also in the area of 
technical and business interconnections. In 1916, William 
Ripper, a Sheffield engineer, claimed that employers had now 
perceived, the value of cooperation as a means of ’ maximising
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output and although
The war is not the explanation of the highly organised methods to be found in the large works ... it does explain the rapid spread of the desire among employers, large and small, to associate and co-operate for the common good of the industry ... instead of competing in the world markets, not only against foreign competition, but against one another.
Thus, the needs of war demanded reorganisation and this in turn 
depended on the interaction of firms to overcome constraints on 
production.
The war intensified the pressures on firms' physical and 
human resources and also disrupted normal market outlets. This 
therefore demanded a positive response by business to overcome 
constraints on both the demand and supply side of operations. 
On the demand side, the war disrupted trade in world markets 
which severely hit firms geared towards producing for export. 
Given the central importance of Europe in trade before 1914, 
economic relations were severely disrupted as business and 
bankers lost confidence in European currencies as a medium of 
exchange, and later naval blockades and submarine warfare 
further disturbed trade.^ The disruption of trade was 
especially acute for firms who relied heavily on trade with the 
belligerent nations where the imposition of exchange controls 
and the general disruption of trade could force firms to the 
point of bankruptcy.
For example, John Kenyon & Go had established extensive 
contacts in Russia before 1914 for the sale of tools and steel, 
and by 1914 this market accounted for 80-90% of the company's
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business. The war was to disrupt this trade severely, and the 
company's financial assets were substantially reduced as a 
consequence of the firm's large liabilities of 400,000 Roubles 
in Russia at the outbreak of war. Failure to retrieve this debt 
forced the firm to seek financial assistance from the Midland 
Bank who deposited the Roubles with a Petrograd bank on the
company's behalf. However, the locking-up of these assets and
the depreciation of the Rouble led to serious financial losses, 
compelling the directors to negotiate financial help from the 
Midland Bank, "pending the duration of the war or until such 
time as the rate of exchange becomes more favourable." In 1915, 
£^908 was written off out of profits to cover the loss, and
with the breakdown of trade with Russia and the collapse of the
Rouble in 1917 a further £21,104.^®
This of course was an extreme example, although other 
firms such as Spear & Jackson suffered disruptions to their
trading links in the European and South American markets,
entailing a loss due to falling exchange rates and the 
suspension of payments. Furthermore, government regulations 
on exports deemed essential to the war effort, under licences 
from the Board of Trade, provided further disruptions in market
exchange. Although the Sheffield Chamber supported government
action in this area as early as August 1914, a number of firms 
continued to complain that the embargo affected the export of 
non-essential products. For example, in 1914 four Sheffield 
cutlery and tool producers complained bitterly over the embargo
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on carpenters1 and "joiners' tools, ^  and the Government 
proclamation of July 1915 restricting the export of steel and 
tools, containing valuable tungsten or vanadium, was condemned 
by Edgar Allen's who were producing steel with low proportions 
of tungsten for export markets.
However, the loss of these markets was more than 
compensated for by a substantialCincrease in demand for the war 
effort. As the Economist noted in 1917, in Sheffield "The 
supplying of war requirements completely dominates the trade 
s i t u a t i o n . T h e  pressures of war demand had become apparent 
to Sheffield firms in 1915, when the demand for products was 
"larger than anticipated", and had provided work for firms not 
formerly engaged in these lines. This indicates that firms were 
now geared towards switching to war production, but the Chamber 
noted that although government contracts had provided a 
substantial part of the boom, a large amount of ordinary work 
was being undertaken which had formerly been executed in 
Germany, and with the suspension of the German cutlery trades 
there was a flood of orders from the USA.-^ However, this was 
now to put pressure on the supply side of operations, and 
although firms had intensified operations by instigating night 
work, they were operating under "the highest pressures"; local 
resources were inadequate to meet demand and "employment could 
be found for more plant and men."-^
The pressures on the firm's resource base is excellently 
illustrated by the example of the steel and tool producing
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business of Spear & Jackson which became a controlled
establishment under the Munitions of War Act of 1915. The firm
quickly adapted to war production,^ but during 1915 the
management noted the ’'extraordinary" demands on plant and
equipment, and the works "have been pushed all the way ... to
cope with the demand for munitions. A description of the
firm's operations illustrates this point:
Our mill and forge which ordinarily run both day and night have been pushed to the extreme during 1915 to supply the government s demands for bullet proof shields., armoured plates, high speed steel, etc., and in connection our hardening plant and furnaces have had to work day and night shifts to treat and harden the plates. "
The ability of Spear & Jackson to rapidly adapt
highlights the flexibility of firms both in terms of the
physical switch to war products and the implementation of new
work routines. For example, under directions from the Ministry
of Munitions the firm's agricultural and garden tools
departments were converted to producing entrenching shovels,
gas engines and electric power installed, and a double shift
system implemented in 1915. Similarly, the hardening and heat
treatment plant was geared exclusively to armoured plate
manufacture for four months in 1915 with machinery working at
double time. u The increased intensity of operations is
supported by statistical evidence on the hours of work of
employees and the running times of engines and machinery, which
is shown in Appendix E, Tables 1-3. This clearly shows the
increased intensity of work and indicates that management could
meet periods of exceptional demand by intensifying the
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operations of both its physical and human resources. This was 
achieved by running the machinery at night and on Sundays, and 
the introduction of overtime for both males and the growing 
female workforce. For example, to meet government requirements 
in March 1916, overtime hours were increased and female workers 
placed on night work.^ (Appendix E, Table 1).
The introduction of women to the work of the metals 
industries was accompanied by t.he employment of unskilled or 
semi-skilled workers owing to severe shortages of manpower 
caused by voluntary enlistment.^2 As the management of Spear & 
Jackson noted, "owing to enlistment ... a considerable number 
of changes were made and skilled workpeople employed on 
machines replaced by o t h e r s . X n  fact, the human demands of 
war left a severe shortage of both skilled and unskilled 
labour. For example, W.F. Beardshaw informed his directors of 
the necessity of making a general advance in wages owing to the 
scarcity of both unskilled and skilled employees "with a view 
to ensure continuity of work."^ The process of de-skilling has 
been referred to by Pollard as "dilution" and was implemented 
by a number of employer-union agreements in Sheffield’s 
munition and engineering trades from 1915.^5
This process of de-skilling, combined with the increased 
intensity of work, would seem to indicate a process of 
intensive not extensive growth.26 That is, firms attempted to 
intensify the workload of existing workers and machines faced 
with imbalances in the supply of skilled labour. For example,
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the workforce of Spear & Jacksons declined by 20.1% between 
1912 and 1915 although the increased work effort resulted in an 
increase in production. As Appendix E, Tables 4-5 show, by 1915 
the production of steel shovels had increased by 56.8% over the 
standard output for 1912-13, and the production of high speed 
steel rose from a mere 5 tons in 1912 to 314 tons by 1916 as 
they switched from less specialist alloy steels.^
A major development in special steels was the adoption of 
electric steel melting, first introduced by Edgar Allen’s in 
1910 and followed by Firth's and Jessop's in 1911. Before 1914, 
the process was still too costly for most producers to compete, 
where quantity was the chief requirement, however, the demand 
for special castings during the war gave an enormous impetus to 
the electric steel industry, and its advantages in producing 
high grade steel ensured it was adopted by a number of 
Sheffield firms.^ In 1915, Spear & Jackson extended their 
steel plant, installing a new electric steel and melting 
department which began production in June 1916.^9 The decision 
to invest in this process was to meet increased orders for high 
grade steel and as the management remarked, "for high speed 
steel and files we are booked up for months a h e a d . H o w e v e r ,  
growth through intensification was not without its drawbacks. 
Intensification entailed increased wear and tear on plant and 
machinery and thus increased the capital costs of operations. 
The plant was operated both night and day and Sundays entailing 
excessive depreciation costs, and in a letter to the Inland
Revenue, concerning a request to increase the allowance for
depreciation to 12%% (£3258), under the excess profit duty, the
management noted the effects of intensified production:
we are fully of opinion the allowance on such plant should and will eventually be greatly increased when your department becomes more acquainted with what is^ , atpresent, a new industry ... the melting of steel by theelectric process ... Electric furnaces are delicate andcomplicated machinery with a very short lived prospect. 1
This demand for increased allowances was based on a number
of arguments related to intensified working. Apart from the
obvious wear and tear this involved, given the production of
heavier work than ordinary lines and "more machines in action",
the management pointed to the inability to make repairs due to
a deficiency in the supply of trained mechanics, and the
pressures of work which would have stopped other processes of
production. Furthermore, they argued that the introduction of
semi-skilled operatives on machinery in 1915 had an "adverse
effect" on the machines, and "a large proportion of our
machines will need to be practically rebuilt or s c r a p p e d . i n
fact it is likely that the requirements of skilled labour on
machinery restricted the firm’s efforts to introduce unskilled
operatives. For example, the ratio of unskilled to skilled
labour working on machinery in 1915 was 1:3.5 (Appendix E,
Table 6 ).
Furthermore, the increased demand for fuel and increases 
in wages tended to push up unit costs. In terms of fuel 
consumption, firms could invest in new and more modern 
equipment to effect economies in fuel use. For example,
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Beardshaw’s in 1917 'installed a new electric generating plant 
and steam plant to economise on fuel consumption and replaced 
its rolling mill engine, which had been installed as early as
o o1858, with a new electric driven engine. J Economy was now at 
the forefront of managerial decision making in relation to fuel 
consumption. Spear & Jackson in late 1914 installed two new 
Babcock boilers "and thereafter a considerable economy of coal 
was e f f e c t e d . T h e  rapid substitution of more economic forms 
of power such as gas and electricity was clearly evident in 
Sheffield, the consumption of electricity increasing by 128% c. 
1912-15, and gas by 62%, compared to only 11.6% for coal.^ The 
general introduction of electrical power was emphasised by F . A 
Warlow, the managing director of Edgar Allen's in 1916, who 
claimed that the City Corporation had spent £1,344,000 on 
developing electrical supplies since 1910 and "There has been a 
very considerable increase in the demand for electricity with 
the various Sheffield trades.
Turning to developments in cutlery, Pollard has argued 
that "Progress was made mainly between 1914 and 1920, when 
investment in new equipment was speeded by the labour shortage 
and by existing and future prosperity." Increasing 
mechanisation of processes, particularly in forging, reduced 
labour inputs and labour-saving innovations were adopted in 
other stages of production.^ Furthermore, electric welding 
machines and power presses had, by 1919, been introduced in 
larger firms such as Wostenholme’s and Needham, Veale and
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Tyzack.^ However, this did not involve major changes in the 
structural characteristics of the industry, new machinery was 
not very costly, within the reach of even smaller firms, and 
few machines reduced labour inputs by more than half. Thus, the 
new techniques required the same degree of skill and training 
as the old.*^
This however may underestimate the extent of managerial
initiative, particularly within larger cutlery establishments.
Firstly^ there was a growing integration between large cutlery
firms and steel producers in procuring supplies of materials
for manufacture, particularly stainless steel.^ For example,
Needham, Veale and Tyzack's entered into collaboration with the
steel and tube manufacturing firm of S.E. Howell & Co. in 1917
for the supply of 25 tons, for three years, of non-corrodible
steel for manufacturing table cutlery at existing market
prices. The inability of this firm to offer larger quantities
led to a joint purchasing agreement between Needham's and
Wostenholme's to purchase steel from Firth's, securing
preferential treatment on output, bulk purchasing, guarantees
of the "lowest price", and exclusive use of trade marks.^
Secondly, attempts were made to introduce the US system of
mass production. Herbert Senior, a Sheffield systematist
working in the USA, wrote to Needham's in January 1915:
I have been studying systems under the best man in America ... and I will explain the amount of work that can be done ... and show you ... how much Sheffield is behind in the manufacture of spring knives ... Sheffield ought to be the leader in the manufacture of knives as she is world famed
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but American firms can pay double wages and sell knives cheaper ... because she has paid more attention to detail, and got the machinery to do the hand work, working to 
1 0 0 0 1 ths of an inch.^
Senior was appointed as works manager in March 1915 and
directed to systematise operations with the aim of producing
"economies" in manufacture. This entailed intensifying working
hours, the introduction of machinery from the USA, and bonus
schemes to induce increased work effort. Furthermore,
production was now increasingly centralised, with the firm
directly supplying its own steel to the workers thus,
circumventing outside suppliers. However, the trade in general
still remained sceptical and "We want to have everything on
hand and show we are a success instead of a failure as
predicted by ... the trade." The major obstacle here revolved
around the problems of developing systems of supervision on a
factory basis which would overcome the traditional bias of
workers for outwork.^
By 1918 there was growing interest amongst the larger
cutlery firms in US techniques which intensified with the
threat of post-war competition. The American Cutler noted in
February 1918 that the US cutlery trade was buoyant; factories
were organised to take advantage of the demand for standardised
lines and manufacturers are "increasing facilities, building
additions to their plants, and planning general developments of
their productive facilities for turning out an increased volume
of output with the limited supply of skilled labour at their
c o m m a n d . C e r t a i n l y ,  Wostenholme's were keenly aware of the
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future threat of US competition in cutlery and the need to
introduce US techniques. In January 1918, George Quirk, an
employee of the firm, was dispatched to the USA to study the
machinery being utilised in the manufacture of knives. The high
degree of mechanisation he encountered, and the increasing use
of unskilled and semi-skilled labour across the various stages
of production, from forging, grinding, stamping, cutting to
final assembly is clearly emphasised in his report. For
example, describing the grinding stage he noted that
The blades ... are ground and sharpened on automatic grinding machines ... One man tends to four machines, he stands in the centre ... and it takes the four machines to grind two blades ... the machine in the front of him grinds the right hand side ... and the machine behind him grinds the left hand side of the same blade.
Clearly impressed, the management proposed the
introduction of US grinding machines to the Sheffield works in
December 1918. However, this ran up against technical
difficulties in installation and adaptation, and in acquiring
supplies of the most technically sophisticated machinery. To
counteract these difficulties the company employed an American
consulting engineer, James Nell, to install equipment and
A (Lsupervise operations. ° Indeed, by 1919 the advantages of the 
USA had induced management to negotiate to set up an American 
subsidiary. In May 1919 Bunting, a director of the firm, set 
out a detailed report on the advantages of setting up a cutlery 
factory in the USA. Firstly, it was argued that the loss of the 
US market by large German producers provided an ideal 
opportunity for capturing a large share of this trade.
Secondly, the firm could maintain its production of quality 
knives in Sheffield, shipping forged blades to the USA and 
utilising the modern methods and higher productivity of 
American workers.^ This "Interchange of ideas" would have 
clear advantages for the firm: "Labour costs per dozen knives 
in the States are in most cases no greater than in Sheffield 
while the earnings of the workers are much greater. This is 
accomplished by the use of machinery.
This had a dual advantage; on the one hand, the firm 
could maintain its high quality lines in Sheffield and, on the 
other hand, utilise the USA factory for "popular Priced" 
products using Wostenholme forgings and brand names and 
develop a market for "moderately priced goods." As Bunting 
argued, they would have to conform to US practice, using the 
best methods which the Americans had copied from Germany, and 
they are "getting further and further from their original ideas 
which came from S h e f f i e l d . D u r i n g  1919, the firm made a 
number of advances to USA producers with the aim of purchasing 
works and finally agreed on the purchase of the Middleton works 
of the Schrade Cutlery Company for $250,000. However, these 
plans were aborted due to government restrictions on capital 
exports, and, as an alternative, working arrangements were 
undertaken for the production of Sheffield forged blades in the 
USA.-^ The example of Wostenholme1s both emphasises the efforts 
at modernising and the fact that cutlery lagged significantly 
behind best US practice by 1918. Indeed, a visit to 70 German
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cutlery factories in 1919, by representatives of the Sheffield 
Cutlery manufacturers Association, noted the superior degree of 
mechanisation in German works. x
The increasing output of cutlery also focussed managerial 
attention on the need to reorganise their administrative 
mechanisms. For example, in 1917 the Sheffield Cutlery 
Manufacturers Association , responding to the recommendations 
of Government auditors, noted that accurate "scientific” 
systems for cost accounting in firms were inadequate, many 
firms having little conception of the need for accurate 
departmental accounting. This led to a distorted view of 
profits and a reliable industry wide system would alleviate the 
"unnecessary cutting of prices which often arises more for the 
want of knowledge of cost than from i n t e n t i o n . W o s t e n h o l m e 1s 
in 1915-16 were already acutely aware of these problems
complaining of inefficiency and "a scramble in the entire 
business." To counter this, they employed government auditors 
and an outside advisor from the steel firm of Jonas & Golver to 
thoroughly investigate their accounting and office practice. As 
a result their book keeping procedures, foreign agency
accounts, wage payments, and the general efficiency of the 
office and dispatch department, to deal with increased
business, was upgraded.^
The growing recruitment of technical engineers and the 
greater technical interconnections between firms is more
clearly evident in the steel sector. In particular, the
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complexity of electric steel production required trained 
engineers with a scientific knowledge of the process. For 
example, Beardshaw’s noted the "necessity'1 of employing a 
trained metallurgist in 1917 to take charge of the electric 
steel plant, and a Sheffield man, C.L. Carlisle was appointed 
on a generous bonus scheme.Furthermore, war demands required 
the increasing standardisation of steel products, especially 
for aircraft and vehicle parts, which in turn necessitated an 
increase in the number of trained technicians and "the
supervision of output by the lab."-’-*
In terms of technical cooperation, the war marked a 
significant shift, particularly in the production of armaments; 
though closer cooperation had been evident before 1914 through 
firms such as the Sheffield Steel Makers Ltd, founded by Marsh 
Bros, in 1904,-*^ and trade organisations such as the High Speed 
Steel Association, founded in 1907.-^ Although "secret
organisations", they retained the services of the University
metallurgist Oliver Arnold, and his services were made
available to dozens of Sheffield firms. The connection 
between industry and education was continued during the war 
through the work of the Sheffield University Scientific 
Advisory Committee, a body representing both businessmen and 
academics who offered their "scientific and expert advice.
In terms of inter-firm links, companies had made formal 
arrangement for the supply of basic steel and avoidance of 
competition before 1914. For example, Beardshaw’s had made a
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number of arrangements with Seebohm & Dieckstahl to make twist 
drills from steel produced by the company and extending patent 
rights. To avoid competition in European markets a formal 
agreement was entered into whereby the firms fixed prices to 
avoid underselling. However, the effects of competition from 
large producers such as Vickers were all to obvious to the 
management by 1914. In 1911, the firm had arranged a loose 
partnership with the Sheffield firm of Tidswells to produce 
twist drills which had proven unsatisfactory and this, together 
with increased competition from Vickers, induced the management 
to enter negotiations with "a suitable firm possessing up-to- 
date machinery for an alternative supply of twisted drills."^ 
Cooperation on the supply of scarce alloys, essential to 
the production of high speed steels, was a key area of business 
integration during the war. This was partly forced on firms by 
government regulations in 1916 which set a standard scale of 
prices for high speed steel and tungsten and took control over
r  athe supply of Wolfram ore.01 However, cooperation between 
individual producers was clearly emphasised by the formation of 
the High Speed Alloys Co. Ltd., a Wigan based firm, in 1914, to 
secure a regular supply of tungsten and vanadium. A number of 
Sheffield firms invested in shares in this proiect, including 
Beardshaw’s, Hadfield's, Spear & Jackson, Sanderson Bros. & 
Newbould, and Vickers, and by 1916 the firm had acquired 
extensive mining rights in Burma and Rangoon. In 1921 this firm 
supplied 85% of the country’s tungsten supplies and Beardshaw's
alone held debenture stock to the value of £165,000 in 1925.^2 
Cooperation on the crucial issue of wage control, however, 
was still a difficult policy to enforce, given the complexity 
of the labour market and the scarcity of workers in the heavy 
sector. As one would expect, the drain of labour to the war 
effort put a considerable upward pressure on wage rates in the 
heavy steel trade which affected unit costs. The expansion of 
wages during the war was emphasised by the president of' the 
Chamber, Arthur Balfour, in 1920 who argued that it was 
essential that this reflected increases in productivity, and 
labour cost were seen as crucial to post-war competitiveness. J 
Attempts were made to establish across the board wage 
settlements, for example through the High Speed Steel 
Association, but often with only limited success.^ Increased 
union agitation by the engineering workers during 1917 led to 
pay increases being made on a national basis, three times a 
year, and this was largely adopted by the various employers 
organisations in the steelmaking trades. This structure of 
arbitration remained in force until 1920,^5 however, the 
control of wage advances was a difficult procedure, given- the 
scarcity of labour, and wage rates in the heavy trades rose 
steadily from 1914 to 1920 until it dropped dramatically in the 
depression of 1 9 2 2 . ^ 6
In the cutlery trades, cooperation on labour matters was 
directed by employer agreements under the guidance of the 
Sheffield Cutlery Manufacturers Association. By an agreement of
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December 1915, members of the Association agreed not to engage 
workmen employed by other members without consultation, and not 
to offer higher wages than those already paid under various 
agreements between the Trade Unions and the Cutlery 
Association. Disputes between employers were now to be settled 
by an elected board of arbitors.^? This was a general trend in 
Sheffield and by 1918 Union amalgamation had been mirrored by 
the development of the Sheffield Light Trades Employers 
Association, formed of eight federated trade branches, all 
interlocked by agreements covering wages and hours and in some 
instances procedures of arbitration to avoid disputes.^8
However, employers' efforts to keep wages down were 
unsuccessful and wages rose steadily up to 1920 across all 
sections of the trade.^ Pressures on wage rates due to labour 
shortages was especially acute in the cutlery trades, as the 
growth of controlled munitions firms in the City absorbed 
skilled workers, particularly from smaller firms.^0 For 
example, the Spring Knife Workers who had amalgamated and 
joined the National Amalgamated Union of Labour in January 1914 
forced through significant wage advances between 1914 and 1917 
with the employers' association. In August 1914, wages were 
advanced 5% for cutlers and grinders whether employed by piece 
or datal rates; in March 1915 an all round 5% with special 
bonuses for government contracts; in October 1915 and February
1917.a further 5% and 10% respectively. In November 1917, wages 
were set by arbitration and datal wages advanced to all sectors
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of the trade.^ However, that these arrangements were tentative
on the part of employers was emphasised by the Union's
president, William Cooke in 1918:
Many firms are now paying in accordance with our lists; some are paying more; then there are others who are paying less ... It is to those firms who do not pay the Union rates that we must concentrate our attention. ^
So far, the notion of cooperation has focussed on loose
trade agreements between employers and structures of
arbitration. However, the war witnessed a number of large
company mergers which increased the intensity of operations. In
the heavy steel trade the most notable was the formation of the
United Steel Company in 1917.^ Such organisational
developments were not simply confined to the heavy steel sector
and in 1919 five large Sheffield cutlery firms forged closer
links, with the aim of economising production and modernising
plant and equipment. ^  It was noted that this was little more
than a loose cartel structure, there was no effort to
/
centralise managerial control, the firms still operating as 
individual business units. Nevertheless, the "coordination" of 
business activity, especially joint marketing agreements, was 
viewed as a mechanism for countering post-war competition and 
eliminating "that wasteful, throat cutting rivalry which has 
been a bane of the trade in the past." Such arrangements were 
thus seen as a means of maintaining individual identity, 
economising on marketing and purchasing, and avoiding 
duplication of products. This, argued the Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, was a message which the still numerous small scale
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firms would do well to follow.^
In 1919, H.F. Smith outlined the advantages of combines
and syndicates which,
based on economic principles are organised so that all firms taking part are linked up as one huge producing and distributing machine, with every department administered by a specialist, who brings to bear on his particular sphere of activity the highest form of scientific business training ... these surely are of Ogre value than dozens of small firms acting independantly. °
The reference to "economic principles" clearly defined
combination for Smith in terms of a competitive market
rationale, a rationale which despised the growth of monopolies
aimed at maintaining prices and eliminating competition by the
"unfair suppression of capital." Thus syndicates based on
economic principles were designed to reduce competition "purely
by methods of efficiency and superior organisation." The
advantages of combination in cutlery would therefore take the
form of increasing competitive strength through economies of 
7 7scale.''
Such arguments addressed fundamental problems in the 
cutlery trades which have been noted in earlier chapters. For 
example,, Smith argued that combination would lead to increased 
specialisation by firm, thus reducing the duplication of plant 
and machinery and allowing factories to concentrate on specific 
types of machines. This would allow longer production runs and 
eliminate the costs of employing machinery to deal with a wide 
range of cutlery lines, thus leaving machinery idle for long 
periods. In turn, firms could simplify product lines,
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concentrating on a few articles which would allow the
application of the "scientific" principles of mass production
and reduce the costs of marketing and transport. Furthermore,
he argued that combination would reduce managerial and
administrative costs and larger business units would gain
7 Reasier access to finance capital. °
Such arguments clearly applied to firms outside cutlery as 
emphasised by a proposed amalgamation of Spear & Jackson’s edge 
tool business with a combine of four other firms in 1917, under 
the advice of Webster Jenkinson, an employee of the Ministry 
of Munitions.^ The advantages of amalgamation and its 
association with economies of scale were clearly evident in the 
management's motives. The firm had "dissipated" their 
productive resources on producing three distinct types of 
articles, each conditioned by different customer preferences 
and the necessity for different plant, sales organisation, and 
technical and office staff. As the management claimed, "with 
the present state of commercial conditions and competition, the 
best success can only be secured by concentration and bulk 
production." This was crucial given the firm's perception of 
intense foreign competition after the war.^ Furthermore, the 
firms could assimilate production techniques adopting the best 
methods and disseminate technical knowledge.
However, managerial motives went further than securing 
economies of bulk production. Firstly, they argued that 
economies in marketing and sales was crucial to competitive
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success and the concentration of the sales organisation both at 
home and abroad would effect a large saving in selling 
expenses. ^  This involved the use of joint agencies and sales 
staff, the pooling of resources to create an advertising 
department, and the development of centralised distribution 
which would stock large quantities and save on the costs of 
changing equipment. Secondly, the purchase of raw materials 
could be undertaken at reduced costs by utilising the cheapest 
supplier to the combined firm. Thirdly, combination would 
reduce the costs of holding large inventories which in 1913 had 
accounted for half Spear & Jackson's annual turnover. This 
large ratio of stock to turnover was in turn related to the 
economics of mechanised production. It was not economical to 
change machinery to produce less than a certain quantity, which 
in many cases would represent "an excessive stock", and the 
value of stocks in proportion to the turnover, and the interest 
on capital locked up in them, "could be very greatly reduced by 
combination and organisation." Finally, combination would 
facilitate a move towards the formation of a public company. 
Given the dominance of family share ownership within the 
various companies, and the fact that there is "no young blood 
coming in", the death of the maiority shareholder under 
existing legislation would restrict the executprs from selling 
the shares publically.^
This clearly illustrates a drive for economy through 
combination, however the obstacles to merger were
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insurmountable. The participation of Spear & Jackson in the 
merger depended on the retention of their steel business which
O Cwas a continual stumbling block in negotiations.OJ The 
management argued that they were the only firm with experience 
of this business and they would be restricted by a joint board 
of management from undertaking the necessary investment for 
expansion. Indeed, the heavy capital outlay during the war in 
plant and experimentation and training, together with a glut in 
the market in 1920 caused by surplus government stocks of
ocsteel, had made this sector of the business unprofitable.00 
Furthermore, the question of managerial control became a 
central issue. In 1917, William Mclintock, a Glasgow accountant 
acting for the combination, proposed the continuation of the 
existing firms in their corporate capacity on the lines of the 
Imperial Tobacco Co. "whose branches continue to use their 
original firm n a m e s . T h i s  held little sway with Spear & 
Jackson who desired a centralised managerial structure, but for 
firms such as Skelton's it offered the opportunity of 
combination and the retention of a certain degree of individual 
control.^ The major factor, however, was a lack of commitment 
by the firm's proposed partners to pool profits and investment 
in a centralised large and modern factory^, and probably the 
failure of the firm to find any support amongst the large 
Sheffield firms such as Sorby's and Ward & Payne.^ 
Negotiations broke down in late 1920, and in 1921 the firm 
acquired G.T. Skelton & Co. which was converted to an holding
company, subsequent to the formation of the new Sheffield Edge 
Tool Manufacturers Ltd. A
This chapter has identified the pattern of business 
expansion during the war; and illustrated a desire for closer 
business cooperation and formal amalgamation. However, in the 
last respect the response of businessmen was muted by the 
difficulties of overcoming the restraints on reorganisation. 
Furthermore, the ideals of merger came in the wake of a growing 
realisation that competition would resume its pre-war pattern 
and businessmen would have to develop more rational production 
and distribution mechanisms to compete. The slump of 1920, and 
the economic problems of the next decade, combined with 
increasing protectionism, was to bring these problems to the 
fore. The final chapter thus explores the 1920*s' in the context 
of the need for business reorganisation and the political 
response to foreign protection.
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Business and the State: Sheffield in War and Depression, 1914- 
1930
The general approach of this thesis has been to explore the 
growth and development of Sheffield's business structure from 
the point of view of business strategy, which incorporates both 
an economic and political view of the business system. The 
economic constraints on growth have been emphasised and it has 
been argued that the response of businessmen to these changes 
was incomplete, especially in cutlery where the reliance on 
quality and skilled labour militated against successful 
competition in the long-run. However, developments in special 
steel making skills up to 1918 provided new market 
opportunities for specialist steel and tool firms, and the 
expansion of armaments saw the growth of large business units. 
Furthermore, chapter 2 argued that the day of the small-scale 
firm was by no means at an end by 1900, although the war in 
particular saw a business movement towards growth through 
combination and merger. It is not here the intention to 
reiterate these points in detail but to explore these issues in 
relation to developments in the 1920's, a decade which 
witnessed mass unemployment and problems of overproduction^ and 
brought back memories of the 1880's and 1890's as a period of 
economic crisis. It was a decade too, which saw the re- 
emergence of the fiscal debate, and the protection of steel as 
a special interest became the political prop of Sheffield's
ailing industrial sector.
The last chapter outlined a process of growing economic 
interconnections between business firms in Sheffield up to
1920. The unity of Sheffield’s business system was also to take 
on a political expression during the war and its aftermath. 
This expressed itself in a number of ways. Firstly, there was 
growing interest in local trade bodies such as the Chamber of 
Commerce which witnessed a large increase in members during the
■iwar years. Indeed, this was to mirror a growing interest 
amongst businessmen in developing wider links with corporate 
institutions such as the Federation of British Industriesy 
founded in 1916, which attempted to represent the general 
interests of business in relation to Government.^ The Sheffield 
Chamber, in 1916, commented on the need for national industrial 
representation to promote and debate the policies for post-war 
recovery, and this was to be achieved through institutions such 
as the F.B.I.3
Secondly, Sheffield businessmen united behind a policy of 
government intervention to facilitate and protect Britain’s 
post-war commercial position. In February 1916, the Sheffield 
Telegraph ran an article entitled "Tariff Converts in 
Sheffield", and concluded that "Whatever differences of opinion 
there may be in the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on the 
subject of trade after the war, none was apparent in 
Sheffield."^- In January 1916 the Chamber unanimously passed 
nine resolutions outlining policies for reconstruction and
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defining their attitudes on trade policy after the war. This 
included a plea for the government promotion of Empire trade, 
preference in Colonial markets, and the establishment of 
"countervailing" duties aimed at suppressing dumping and 
promoting exports to the Empire.^ Such views were clearly to 
influence the conclusion of the Departmental Report on the Iron 
and Steel industry of 1918 which claimed that protective duties 
were now essential to the safeguarding of this vital national 
industry, and recommended anti-dumping legislation.^
For Sheffield, the development of trade was now seen as a 
"key area of government activity" and they argued for an 
"infusion" of businessmen into government ministries and the 
establishment of a Ministry of Commerce. Attached to these aims 
was a clear desire for financial aid to key industries defined 
in terms of "national safety", sectors which had previously 
been the monopoly of alien countries,^ and the role of 
government should now be extended to the development of 
scientific and commercial education which was viewed as a
Ocrucial part of national expenditure. In many ways, these were 
an extension of earlier aims to promote the expansion of 
overseas trade, but were now linked to a sweeping analysis of 
Britain’s position.vis-a-vis the likely resurgence of Germany 
as a maior post-war force in world markets.^ According to 
Tolliday, fears of intense competition, economic nationalism, 
and a breakup of the established economic order, was a potent 
force in the steel industry's claims for protective action.
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Indeed, the economic collapse of Germany muted the steel 
industry's call for protection and the brief post-war boom 
witnessed a "swing back against protectionism ... with free 
trade as an acceptable corollary to speedy de-control of the 
industry.
A swing back to free trade, however, is not evident in 
Sheffield, although the assumed German threat was at the 
forefront of proposals for post-war recovery. For example, 
Herbert Hughes, the President of the Chamber in 1916, alluded 
to the economic aggression of Germany before 1914,-^ and in 
1917 a proposal to form a UK Manufacturers Export Company was 
directly linked to counteracting the assumed advantages of 
Germany in cartel structures and superior sales organisations. 
This last point is interesting, as the notion of promoting 
trade was clearly linked to the need for the structural 
reorganisation of industry. An export company would promote the 
reorganisation of sales methods, coordinate the changes of 
patterns to suit various markets, provide commercial . and 
technical information, foster the development of new product 
lines, assist small business to meet foreign competition, and 
investigate the operations of underselling by cartels. Firms 
were now adapting in preparation for the return to normal 
competition and "Premises are being extended, improved plant 
installed and up-to-date methods adopted ... This forward 
movement is conspicuous in the old craft industries as well as 
in the more modern steel trad e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , they took up
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eagerly the recommendations of the Farrington Committee on the
Financial Facilities for Trade, of 1916, which advocated the
establishment of a UK Trade Bank.^
In terms of trade protection, this remained high on the
Chamber’s agenda, even after the collapse of Germany, and
business remained committed to pressure government for
intervention. However, the exact role of government in
industrial affairs was here clearly demarcated. For example,
government control over industry and the role of the state in
restructuring the steel industry was, from the beginning, a
non-starter. In 1915 the Chamber had accepted the general
principle of government taxation but had firmly resisted the
introduction of excess profit duties as a clear "interference"
by government to the legitimate operations of individual
enterprise. ^  That this tax was still in force in 1921 caused
consternation amongst businessmen, especially as the preceding
inflation had increased the valuation of stocks for tax
calculation, leaving firms with a high tax burden in a period
of business contraction and falling inventory values. As Arthur
Balfour forcefully argued,
It was simple ruination ... to take a partner ... the Government ... in 1914 when there had been low priced stocks and low priced contracts, and that the Governmentshould calmly walk out of the business . . . and leave theoriginal proprietor with ... large taxation and
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liabilities owing .. on the strength of the valuation of these stocks. ^
A similar stance was evident in their objections to Government 
interference in the railways proposed in the Government White 
Paper of 1920. Unanimously adopting a resolution by W.S. 
Skelton, they claimed that "the form of management and
direction of the railways should be left to the Railway
Companies ... without interference from the Ministry of 
Transport ... it will diminish individual incentive to good 
working and would certainly tend towards eventual
nationalisation.
Here of course was a maior contradiction in business
policy, on the one hand an undying faith in the ability of the 
market to promote business efficiency and growth, and on the 
other hand the use of tariffs to protect industry was a clear 
denunciation of the market. The ending of the short post-war 
boom in mid-1920 reinforced the argument that industry must 
protect itself against foreign competition. Indeed, the "steel 
industry was the only major industry that continued to seek 
protection throughout the 19201S’V^ However, for the steel 
industry it was to be a decade of frustrated efforts to secure 
a political response by government to the industry’s 
competitive decline. As Arthur Balfour put it in 1921, "The 
government had promised an Anti-Dumping Bill and a Key 
Industries Bill. Both of these Bills ... were of vital
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importance to the Sheffield industries."18 The passing of the
Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921 placed a 33% ad valorem
duty on 6,500 products considered to be of strategic
importance.^ This included tungsten and magnets which was well
received in Sheffield as a crucial step in protecting the
inputs of key raw materials to the steel and engineering
90trades.^
However, legislation went no further, and the world wide
slump of 1920, together with wide variations in exchange rates,
put increasing pressure on Sheffield firms. The depreciation of
European Currencies was of especial concern to steel producers
and "robbed progressive firms of the advantages of capital
investment in new plant ... and increased capacity." In
particular high speed steel producers, although competing in
terms of cost, quality and uniformity, found that high grades,
although in demand, were restricted by high prices due to
91unnatural competition caused by currency depreciation.
Beardshaw’s, for example, were forced to close their crucible 
and high speed steel plant for a time in 1922 and noted the 
difficulty of the high, exchange rate with Europe.^2
Similarly John Kenyon & Co. were optimistic about the 
outlook of trade with the Continent in 1920 although working
under the considerable handicap of depreciated currency. 
However, by 1921 depreciation and the stagnation of Continental 
markets, especially the virtual loss of Soviet trade, forced 
the management to cut wages and introduce economies in general
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expenses "with a view to bringing the costs, and charges into 
harmony with the reduced turnover." For this firm, continued 
stagnation and currency instability was to force the firm to 
seek financial loans. In 1925, a partnership was arranged by 
the Midland bank with the Engineering and Mercantile Co. of 
London, to iniect new capital, and take over the firm’s sales 
operations in the USSR and Poland, under the title of J.Kenyon 
& Co. (Export) Ltd. However, the collapse of the firm's foreign 
sales in 1929, and the failure of the bank to intervene forced 
the company to wind up its affairs in 1930.^3
Furthermore, the loss of markets during the war, and the 
build up of steel capacity after, severely disrupted Sheffield 
markets. The Chamber in 1919 commented on the fact that since 
the end of war both France and Italy were "planning to make 
themselves as far as possible independent of Sheffield for high 
speed and crucible steel and t o o l s . T h e  cutlery trade was 
similarly affected. For example, Wostenholme's Canadian agent 
informed them In 1922 that the inability to guarantee a 
constant supply of IXL during the war had severe repercussions 
on their business. Canadian retailers had turned to US 
suppliers and "almost every firm got loaded up with a 
tremendous overstock, particularly on pocket knives, razors and 
... carvers.
The steel industry found little protection from these 
competitive constraints in the 1921 Safeguarding Act, and the 
failure to expand the Act to steel in 1926 meant that currency
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depreciation, which allowed foreign dumping, and the problems 
of maintaining Sterling on the Gold Standard was to seriously 
affect the industry's competitive strength throughout the 
1920'S . ^  As Tolliday points out, for the Baldwin Government in 
1925-6, support of the "ailing" steel industry had to be 
weighed up in relation to the demands of other declining 
sectors of industry. Indeed, at a national level the industry 
was hardly united, the main trade association, the National 
Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers were mute in the 
tariff election of 1923 and took a neutral stance in regard to 
applications for the extension of safeguarding to the Cunliffe- 
Lister Committee in 1925.^
A united front by the industry thus came piecemeal, region 
by region, as the impact of the changing external trading 
environment, and the labour unrest of 1926, hit home the fact 
that depression was not a temporary aberration. ^  In this 
context, the views of Sheffield businessmen on the nature and 
causes of the depression are worth considering. In 1921, Arthur 
Balfour had clearly expressed the view that the depression was 
cyclical in nature and argued that "after a great war and a 
period of great inflation there must be a period of recovery 
and great deflation, particularly on this occasion when capital 
was spent like water and regarded as i n c o m e . "^9 Thus blame was 
laid on high spending by local and national government. The 
depression was therefore viewed as a purely monetary 
phenomenon, the failure of government to control expenditure
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and thus to reduce inflationary pressures. According to 
Balfour, however, what government had not foreseen was that 
this would be accompanied by a 11 temporary" fall in exports.^0 
Therefore, trade issues were merely viewed as cyclical in 
nature, and would right themselves as currency markets
realigned and foreign nations recovered. It obviously followed,
that the remedy to depression was national economy and the 
introduction of a policy of tight money, with protection
allowing a breathing space to ride-out the slump.^ Sheffield 
businessmen were now to fully accept the orthodox policies of 
various national governments in the 1920's concerning domestic 
economic policy.
In 1921, the Chamber had unanimously accepted Balfour's 
endorsement of the increase in Bank rates on the grounds that 
it had "steadied" speculation and the "Present unemployment was 
the result of economic waste and the interference of
politicians in business."^2 They were now to pursue, with some 
vigour, a call for cuts in expenditure at all levels of the 
economy. For example, in 1923 they presented a resolution to 
the Associated Chambers arguing that reductions in Government 
expenditure and taxation were a prerequisite to the "revival in 
the industry and commerce of the country, or any reduction in 
the number of those at present u n e m p l o y e d . I n d e e d ,  the 
Chamber had presented Geddes with a stainless steel axe on his 
visit to the City in 1922, and supported cuts in social service 
expenditure, education, and defence. The last issue was of
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course controversial, given the dependence of the heavy 
industries on government contracts^ and Thomas Vickers argued 
that this would be detrimental to Sheffield trade. Indeed, by 
1923 the Chamber was vigorously petitioning the Admiralty and 
War Office to provide orders and "stimulate" business.
The pursuit of national economy was also directed at the 
Sheffield Municipal Authority. Here the attack took on a number 
of directions but the key issue revolved around the question of 
wage rates and the effects of unemployment and benefit systems. 
In 1922^ the President of the Chamber William Clarke had
condemned the Municipal Authority on the grounds that "when
Sheffield industry was cutting wages and decreasing employment 
it was not unreasonable that similar economies should be
affected by municipal authorities."^ In particular, the higher 
wages paid by the authority to employees compared to private 
enterprise was seen as a means of keeping wages at
"uneconomical l e v e l s . S i m i l a r l y ,  the coordination of 
unemployment relief, "in some districts equal to and sometimes 
greater than the standard rate of wages", was seen as a factor 
in raising production costs and keeping local rates and taxes 
high.*^
With hindsight of course these views can be seen as 
misleading, the problems of the 1920'S were related to the fall 
of world wide demand and the build up of excess capacity which
O Qhad been evident before 1914. ° Sheffield industry needed to 
restructure itself to meet changing market circumstances.
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Attached to this, the industry faced pressures from high labour 
costs, high transport costs, and the problems of the coal 
industry and the high cost of fuel. As in earlier periods, the 
issue of wage rates and the cost of production became of 
central importance to businessmen faced with competitive 
pressures. For example, there were numerous complaints 
concerning the high cost of coal and electricity supplies and 
of overcharging by the railway companies. ^  But here the 
response of the Chamber to government action was mixed. On the 
one hand, they supported the Mining Association in their plea 
to government not to impose minimum wages in 1924 which was 
seen as a "disguise for nationalisation", and further opposed 
the Government's Electricity Supply Bill of 1926, for the 
formation of a national grid, on the grounds that free 
competition would provide supplies at the lowest cost.^ 
However, the ability of the railway companies in the region to 
double their charges over 1914 levels led the Chamber in 1925 
to insist upon rationalisation of the railways and government 
should exert pressure to "ensure immediate reductions in all 
classes of rates.
These factors now merged in 1925 with the realisation that 
the slump in world trade, apart from the brief interlude in 
1923, when the Rhur crisis revived Sheffield's heavy 
industry,^ was more protracted than had been realised in 1921. 
Furthermore, businessmen now resented the protection of 
sheltered industries such as coal and railways from foreign
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competition, and the Chamber bitterly denounced the government 
subsidy to the coal industry in 1925 as a "serious handicap to 
those industries subiect to independent foreign competition, 
and a serious grievance to manufacturers endeavouring to secure 
export business. Thus the principles of protection should be 
extended to steel and as Arthur Balfour argued in 1932, "You 
cannot allow this country to fall as a producer of iron and 
steel (which comes as near to being a key industry as anything) 
to the point where our imports are greater than our 
manufactures."^ This was reinforced by the intensification of 
dumping and the raising of tariff barriers against the 
industry. In other words, as in the pre-1914 period, unfair 
competition, which distorted the free operations of the market, 
was the driving force behind calls for protection.
The question of dumping and increases in foreign tariffs 
was after 1925 to become the cornerstone of the Chamber’s 
attempt to extend the principles of safeguarding to the 
industry, and in the depression of 1929 in their call for a 
general protective tariff. That the extension of safeguarding 
was widely supported by all sections of Sheffield's trades was 
shown by a referendum in 1928 which was overwhelmingly in 
favour (Table 9:1). The question of foreign tariffs was 
particularly relevant to high speed steel producers. For 
example, an increase in the French Tariff in 1921 discriminated 
against "fine steel for tools and special steels",^ and the 
Fordney Tariff in the USA of 1922 placed an ad valorem duty of
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47% on high speed steel as against 20-26% for ordinary crucible
steel. The US tariff, was viewed as highly
prohibitive unless the fall in the value of the Pound as compared with the Dollar ... has the effect of enabling manufacturers on this side to secure for special lines and well known brands a certain amount of business, even against the prohibitive duties now imposed. °
In 1924, C.W. Kayser, giving evidence to the Balfour Committee
on behalf of high speed steel firms, argued that exports had
virtually ceased owing to increased duties of 230% since
1918.47
Table 9:1: Ballot of Sheffield Businessmen in 1928 on the Question of Extending the Principle of Safeguarding to the Iron and Steel Industry.____Industry Yes % No %
Iron & Steel Trade 208 93 15 7Cutlery, Tools, Silver & Allied 115 92 10 8Engineering 22 96 1 4Other Trades 70 86 11 14
Total 515 92 46 8
Note: 62% of all ballots were returned.Source: Sheffield Chamber of Commerce, Annual Reports 1920-29, 26 March1929.
The US tariff clearly hit those trades which were geared 
towards quality and high market prices. What was true of 
quality steel was also true of quality cutlery lines.^ For
example, Wostenholme’s like a number of large Sheffield
producers had since the war expanded their foreign
stockholdings. In 1922, they complained of continual 
correspondence from the USA and Canada which claimed that 
prices were 100% above pre-war levels. The management were
forced to offer a discount of 33%% on the grounds that "If we 
can‘t sell them now it is unlikely that we shall do so after
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they have been replaced on our shelves by makers less dilatory 
than we.u^  In 1931, the Company discontinued the maintenance 
of its New York office as "The duties on our goods are so high, 
the expenses so heavy and the sales so small that the office 
has not paid us for some y e a r s . B e t w e e n  1926 and 1930 the 
company made a continual loss on its New York business as US 
sales and shipments fell and stocks were reduced (Appendix F, 
Table 1).-^ In 1931, when the firm attempted to sell off its 
remaining stocks worth £5,764 at invoice prices they calculated 
that 20% of the invoice price was accounted for by import duty 
which virtually prohibited a sale, unless prices were slashed 
leaving little margin for profit.^2 Thus high duties worked 
against a strategy of holding large foreign stocks and as one 
of the directors argued, "I often thought it better to have 
nothing in America except samples and to let customers import 
themselves and pay their own duty."^
Certainly, evidence presented to the Balfour Committee by 
a number of Sheffield businessmen in 1924 supports the argument 
that foreign tariffs were a severe constraint on trade. 
Attached to this, dumping was seen as a maior factor in the 
inability of Sheffield to resist foreign competition.^^ Arthur 
Balfour had little doubt that dumping was a maior factor in the 
steel industries competitive decline when he claimed in 1932 
that "We have become the safety valve which enables high 
protectionist countries to keep going on dumping their surplus 
g o o d s . I n  December 1920, the Cutlery Research Association
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noted that German producers were increasing the range of their 
product lines and dumping goods in Sheffield at low prices and 
bearing no mark of origin. ° German dumping was also evident m  
Dominion markets. For example, in 1925 three small Sheffield 
firms complained of the penetration of cheap German cutlery and 
tools in Australia, and a series of letters from Commonwealth 
importers supported the view that since the removal of the 
embargo German cutlery was being imported in large quantities 
at less than cost price.^ In 1922, W.F. Beardshaw argued that 
steel producers should switch to Dominion markets given the 
high exchange rates operating in E u rope.However,  the extent 
of German competition in Australia was such that even with a 
15% preference in favour of Sheffield steel in 1927 "it was 
considerably difficult for firms to compete t h e r e . "^9
That the problem was linked to German business 
organisation was exemplified in 1923 when the Chamber 
petitioned the Foreign Secretary to the effect that trade was
hampered by the "great activity and ample financial resources
of German firms ... supported by their German principles at 
h o m e . "60 This was again to reinforce the response to closer 
ties with the Dominions which had been a major part of the 
protectionist stance of the industry before 1914. In 1928, the
Chamber called for the removal of restrictive tariffs in the
Dominions, and at the height of the depression in 1930 
supported a resolution from Robert Hadfield supporting greater 
cooperation with the Dominions through the formation of an
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C -1Empire Development Board.OJ-
As Capie argues, dumping became a "catchword for unfair
competition", but also has an economic meaning in the sense
that it represents the difference in the selling prices in
domestic and foreign markets. He further argues that the
existence of long-term dumping below the cost of production is
problematic for the 1920's although there "would appear to be
short-term dumping." In terms of iron and steel, he claims the
evidence from businessmen was never convincing and no
protection was given to the industry under the Abnormal
Importation Act of 1931.62 This, however, misses two important
points. Firstly, as noted above, dumping was not simply viewed
as a problem of the domestic market but was being felt in
overseas markets. Secondly, although we can agree that the
evidence for dumping below cost in Sheffield supports the
notion of short-term dumping, businessmen related the problem
to the long-term competitive strength of industry, and the
superior production power of German manufacturers who were
being cushioned by tariff walls. This was evident in the
Chamber's response to the Imports and Exports Regulation Bill
of 1919 which had attempted to counteract dumping. As they
argued in 1921, this was adequate for preventing goods being
dumped at a lower price than in the country of origin but
those provisions were not in the nature of protection of home industries, and gave no safeguard against ... foreign producers, who, on account of their superior means of production, are able to sell their goods here at less price thpn they can possibly be sold by the home producer.
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Thus dumping was related to the structural problems of the 
industry and the ability of Germany to undersell because of 
larger-scale and cheaper methods of production. In turn this 
demanded that industry should be protected in the short-run 
from such competitive disadvantages. This, in itself, denied a 
key assumption of free trade theory, namely that firms should 
be allowed to compete in the cheapest market. Nevertheless, the 
pricing strategy of firms in the slump indicates that 
underselling by foreign producers was a short-run factor in 
pushing prices downwards. The Foundry Journal noted in 1921 
that German and Belgian steel producers were pursuing "a 
vigorous undercutting price campaign", forcing Sheffield firms 
to respond by pushing prices down often to unremunerative 
levels. For example, in March 1921 the Bright Steel Makers 
Association decreased prices from £32 to £25 and the price of 
steel hoops fell from £39 in October 1920 to £20..5s by April
1921.^  Firms producing Open-hearth and Bessemer steel were, in
1922, quoting at marginal prices "and some Sheffield 
manufacturers, working practically without profit, tried to 
stimulate a demand in steel for export. In this they were 
partially successful.
The pressure of foreign competition on the downward spiral 
of prices was especially acute in the specialist quality lines. 
In December 1919, the steel firm of Wilfred Burkinshaw Ltd. had 
noted that prices for high speed steel were "on a continually 
upward path due to the large demand both in domestic and
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foreign m a r k e t s . " ^  However, by 1921 prices were so high as to 
be "almost prohibitive ... in most of the world's markets.
The reliance of firms on quality was again at the forefront of 
business strategy. In 1921 Professor C.H.Desch, a member of the 
Sheffield branch of the Cast Iron Research Association, had 
argued that "The great and essential feature of Sheffield 
Industry was not the quantity or cheapness of the steel 
produced, but the making of good s t e e l . "68 This of course was 
hardly feasible given the collapse in demand in 1921 and the 
enhanced and cheaper production of foreign competitors. For 
example, the price of Sheffield crucible steel in 1921 was 
considered too high, and the rapid introduction of the electric 
furnace for producing tool steel in the USA, and on the 
Continent, gave a cost advantage over the high cost steel 
manufactured in coke-fired crucibles. Thus producers were 
forced to push down prices and reduce the cost of production. 
However, the advantages of Germany in cheaper labour, fuel, and 
transport costs, put the industry under severe competitive 
pressures and forced prices down further.69
A particular problem facing the steel sector was the 
competitive decline of the specialist steels, which had 
provided a bulwark for the industry against US competition 
before 1914. Here the failure to widely adapt the electric 
process to the production of bulk high grade steels has been 
levelled at the industry. For example, in 1928 the UK produced 
86,800 tons of electric steel compared to 612,599 tons in the
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USA.^ The slow diffusion of this process in Sheffield, a city 
which had been at the forefront of this technology before the 
war, has been analysed by Tweedale. He claims that a number of 
factors restricted the process in Sheffield. These included the 
high cost of capital investment where tonnage was the chief 
requirement in the finished product; the high comparative cost 
of UK electricity; the conservatism of steelmakers who argued 
it produced an inferior product; the problems of adaptation 
which required skilled labour which was fully conversant with 
the technical problems of the process.^
However, this fails to consider the consequences of 
overcapacity during the war which with the end of the boom in 
1920 left producers with a falling demand for high grade bulk 
steel. In 1921; the smallest commercial electric furnace was 10 
tons which was found to be uneconomical for many brands of 
steel. The demand for armaments and large castings during the 
war had made the process economical, but with the end of the 
boom firms were faced with excess capacity as the industry 
returned to the production of high grade steel castings, 
stainless steel, and medium-sized orders ‘'which are found to be 
too small for the open-hearth and too large for the crucible." 
To combat this, firms attempted to reduce costs by introducing 
the "Duplex Process" which combined traditional cupola smelting 
with electric smelting. ^  Nevertheless, one is left with the 
impression that the decision to invest in electric production 
was constrained by purely technical and cost considerations.
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Firms did not realise that the process provided the opportunity
to develop new high quality product lines, and thus
"comparative costs as regards other processes can be ignored,
as an entirely new market is created.
Therefore, the collapse of the post-war boom in 1920 had
left the industry facing a serious overproduction problem, and
surplus stocks could not be sold given the cost constraints on
the industry and the high prices charged vis-a-vis her foreign
competitors. As the Foundry Journal noted in 1921, the recovery
of Sheffield steel was retarded by low demand and excessive
costs, and although prices had fallen "competition ... is keen,
and price cutting is reported in more than one department of
the steel trade. One obvious consequence of this was a
breakdown in the pricing policies of the various trades
associations as competition forced firms to pursue an
individual strategy. In 1921 a number of firms cut rates below
those fixed by the High Speed and Crucible Steel
7 SAssociations, J and a number of firms discontinued the price
agreements with the Saw and Edge Tool Manufacturers
76 *Associations. ° In 1924, Beardshaw s resigned from the High
Speed Association on the grounds that competitive pressures
militated against joint action on prices.^ Similar problems
were faced in the cutlery trades. In 1922 the management of
Wostenholme’s split on the question of breaking with the
Cutlery Manufacturers Association and introducing separate
wage bargaining structures, allowing greater flexibility in
pricing. The desire of the directors, J.G. Wing and F.B. Colver 
to reduce selling prices and follow the lead of the Association 
in cutting wages was firmly resisted by the Managing Director, 
J. Paine.^ These problems resurfaced in the depression of 
1929-31. For example, in 1931 Firth’s complained of 
underselling by Beardshaws and, in 1932, the Crucible and Tool 
Steel Association noted the difficulty of persuading firms to 
maintain prices for high grade steel.^
The movement towards protection was therefore related to 
competitive pressures, in the face of fierce price competition. 
One obvious response was to meet competition head-on and 
rationalise production to meet the larger output and cheaper 
production of competitors. According to Tolliday, British steel 
manufacturers, by 1925, saw an intimate connection between 
tariffs and the reiuvenation of the industry. A prohibition on 
imports would transfer demand to domestic producers and thus 
stimulate investment in larger plant and equipment. Thus 
reorganisation required increased demand which could only come 
from the prior protection of the home market. However, 
government fears of creating monopoly conditions in an industry 
vital to large sectors of the economy concentrated government 
on private rationalisation through merger and slimming-down of 
inefficient plant.ov In other words, rationalisation was a 
prerequisite for protection, and was used as a bargaining 
counter by government in relations with business. Nevertheless, 
there was now a clear message for business that they would have
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to emulate and face up to "foreign competing firms of larger 
scale"^
Such remarks were clearly evident amongst Sheffield
businessmen in the 1920's, indeed they had been prevalent
before 1914. But now, induced by depression, and faced with the
realisation of absolute competitive decline, there were
numerous calls for the introduction of mass production
techniques, the expansion of scientific research, and the
amalgamation of small firms to meet foreign competition. This
was put forcefully by the President of the Chamber S.J.
Robinson in 1923:
Although our mechanical appliances are much better than they were one or two generations ago, we are not getting the same output per unit of labour and capital that our fathers and grandfathers obtained ... we are living on our capital, not on the capital we have created, but on that which our fathers and grandfathers have created for us. 1
Furthermore, picking up on the theme of national unity which
had been strong in the Chamber since the war, he argued that if
bankers, manufacturers, shippers and workers would "work
together with goodwill British trade would surmount all
obstacles, and depression would be converted into
prosperity.
The call for reorganisation was clearly demonstrated by a 
number of articles in relation to the foundry sector of the 
industry in 1921. Attacks on inefficient organisation, the slow 
adoption of new techniques, the scarcity of trained manpower, 
the lack of coordination and planning between the technical 
departments were amongst a host of complaints levelled at the
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O  Aindustry.OH> Indeed, these deficiencies in organisation had been 
noted before 1914. The American Machinist claimed in 1913 that 
organisation lagged behind the productive techniques operating 
in Sheffield's foundries, and there was no application of the 
principles of scientific management defined in terms of the 
"systematic use of experience", the "economic control of 
effort", and the "promotion of personal efficiency. The 
application of scientific management to foundry production was 
clearly recognised by the Sheffield Branch of the Cast Iron 
Research Association in 1921. For example, the President J.R. 
Hyde claimed that "In England the moulding shop was the last 
place engineers thought of visiting, whereas in America by 
their aid they were able to produce quite remarkable castings 
with unskilled labour". Similarly, J.G. Pearce proclaimed that 
the use of scientific research in the US foundry was an 
"economic weapon" which was undermining Sheffield's ability to 
compete.
The aim of the Research Association was to promote 
cooperation amongst firms in the area of scientific research, 
but as Thomas Vickers argued, the small-scale structure of the 
industry, and the low volume of output in relation to the 
capital costs of setting up research labs and employing 
technicians, worked against this principle. Although some 
large, "more enlightened firms", had introduced scientific 
principles of research, there were a large number of small 
foundries "who still conduct their operations without the least
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appreciation of scientific principles and are working by rule 
of thumb." He further argued that the number of labs is "still 
very small indeed." Thus the industry required a process of 
amalgamation to allow economies to be realised in research and 
development.^ That such a plea came from a representative of a 
large firm such as Vickers suggests that the call for the 
modernisation of scientific research came from the top, but one
suspects that it filtered down only slowly to smaller business
units. As the Chamber remarked in 1928, in relation to the
introduction of mass production on scientific lines, in
Sheffield the "adoption proves costly and is necessary slow."^ 
Nevertheless, the depression of 1930 saw a new resurgence 
of interest in amalgamation in the steel industry in response 
to the problem of over-capacity. As Burn argues, the 1920's 
witnessed an over-expansion of steel making capacity which 
became all to obvious to the industry as falling demand in 1929 
led to problems of overproduction.^ In 1928, Sheffield's heavy 
trades experienced an upsurge in overseas demand , but in 1930 
the volume of output fell by 2 5%.^0 Thus firms were faced with 
the need to rationalise, introducing more cost effective 
methods of organisation and production, and the late 1920's 
witnessed a number of important horizontal mergers in steel in 
which Vickers played a leading role.^l Furthermore, a number of 
large steel firms developed foreign subsidiaries, especially in
Q Othe USA.  ^ For example, in 1925 Spear & Jackson acquired the 
ailing Oldham New York Saw Company motivated by the desire to
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have a large outlet for the export of their steel and to
q qprovide orders on the spot quickly. J
However, businessmen viewed amalgamation and cooperation 
with a certain degree of scepticism and caution. For example, 
the Chamber held back on its judgement on the amalgamation of 
Vickers and Cammell-Laird in 1928 to form the English Steel 
Company. Although acknowledging the "theoretical" advantages of 
rationalisation, in terms of scale economies, they argued that 
the "practical" problems associated with managerial 
reorganisation rendered "the final result problematic", and 
they noted their concern over the speculative nature of company 
formation.^ A clear objective in amalgamation and cooperation 
was attempts to counteract the falling level of demand during 
the recession. However, this was viewed with some "disquiet" as 
a defensive, conservative strategy on the part of business. The 
reorganisation of firms who were already operating at 
overcapacity implied "a tacit admission that any considerable 
increase in trade is not likely to materialise for some time." 
Thus, although the Chamber welcomed a positive reaction to the 
depression, through merging and rationalising production, this 
should coincide with a dynamic marketing strategy, and 
"cooperation is not only required at the production end, but 
also at the selling end." Furthermore, rationalisation did not 
provide a quick answer to trade recession, and although 
rationalisation schemes were undertaken in 1930 the effects of 
this in terms of reduced costs were staggered.^
It is reasonable to suggest that the problems of
reorganisation were particularly acute in cutlery, where the
retention of an industrial structure overloaded with small-
scale producers and relying on a skilled workforce restricted
the introduction of mass production techniques. In 1920, the
Cutlery Research Association had declared its aim to promote
the more extensive use of machinery and the application of mass
Q 6production techniques on the lines of Germany and the USA. 
For some firms this meant the duplication of German techniques. 
For example, Wostenholme1s in 1922 developed links with the 
electro-chemical works of Frieder, Blasberg and Merscheid, and 
imported galvanising apparatus. In 1930 they imported German 
high speed riveting machines and employed a German technical 
advisor, Henry Beckerman, to install a new nickel plating 
plant. By 1932 the firm was facing competition from direct 
foreign investment with the removal of the Solingen firm of 
Ricnartz & Co. to Sheffield. Capitalised at £1,000,000, and 
assisted by English finance, "they offer their goods cheaper 
than we sell ours."^
However, as Pollard suggests, the diffusion of new methods 
was "uneven" and the Research Association "expired quickly for 
lack of support." Nevertheless, labour-saving innovations 
expanded in the 1920's, drop stamps and presses were adopted, 
electricity utilised in hardening and annealing furnaces, and 
machine prepared parts were supplied to cutlers, thus speeding 
up the finishing process. However, this did not fundamentally
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change the structural base of the industry, new capital
equipment was not expensive, and could be undertaken even by
smaller firms, "and the new processes often required as much
skill and training as the old."^ The survival of small-scale
firms was evident as late as 1951, when out of 700 cutlery
firms 500 employed less than 11 workers, and only 4 companies
employed more than 500.^9
In 1928 the Chamber remarked that the competitive
pressures on the exports of cutlery, tools and light steel
products had reached "serious proportions", and in 1929 the
continued depression led to calls for "far reaching
reorganisation. However, a solution based on mass
production and amalgamation was difficult to impose for two
reasons. Firstly, the small-scale structure of the industry
restricted attempts at amalgamation, and thus it is "doubtful
whether mass production can be adopted with advantage."
Secondly, a continued belief in the merits of quality and
producing for order was an obstacle to mass production
techniques which required the manufacture of a standardised
item.-^^- Similar reservations were advanced by the Economist in
1921 concerning the formation of Sheffield Steel Products Ltd.,
a merger of 19 tool and cutlery producers, who argued that the
advantages of scale economies in production were as yet 
1 n?untested. u Indeed, recommendations for rationalisation 
concentrated on marketing economies rather than production 
economies. As Hannah claims, marketing economies of merger
"were often considered to be the most important economies
immediately available.
Thus reorganisation should follow a strategy of joint
cooperation in marketing, and changes in the physical resources
of production by concentrating on standard selling lines. As
the Chamber argued in 1928, producers must conform to lower
priced articles and although
by selling such articles, Sheffield makers may claim ... that it would be prejudicial to their name for high quality ... they must seriously consider whether it is not possible so to reorganise their methods of production that they will be in a position to compete.
Furthermore, the requirements of joint advertising were seen as
a key area of reorganisation. This had been evident as early as
1925 when the Chamber liaised with a number of advertising
agents to promote a "Made in Sheffield" campaign on the lines
of the gas, concrete, and woollen industries, and they
acknowledged the need for closer ties between industry and
advertising organisations. This was difficult to implement,
however, given the problems of coordinating action by
individual firms and the reluctance of businessmen to provide a
fund as advocated by the FJ3.I, in 1927. Indeed, the financial
costs of implementing a coordinated advertisement scheme was
here a maior obstacle, and the depletion of profits by 1929 had
left firms reluctant to commit funds to an "extensive and
costly selling scheme."105
However, the "harsh lessons" of 1930 gave a boost to
attempts to reform the marketing and production base of the
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firm.-^k Wostenholme's, for example, had by 1932 decided to 
revamp their sales techniques in the USA, now routing 
distribution directly through the mail order houses and chain 
stores, and reducing product lines to allow production for 
stock and rapid distribution. However, the emphasis was still 
here on quality. As their New York agent G.W Davies argued, the 
recession in the States had purged the distributors of cheaper 
cutlery lines who had been faced with excess capacity due to a 
reliance on "quantity merchanting" in the past 5 years. This 
would now allow an increased demand for quality products based 
on standard factory l i n e s . H o w e v e r ,  this was a misplaced 
optimism, the industry encountering an influx of cheap US and 
German cutlery throughout the 1930's.
During the 1920's the constraints on industrial 
development intensified as Sheffield lagged further behind 
Germany and the USA in terms of the structure of industry and 
the formation of more effective techniques of production and 
exchange. The process of rationalisation and reorganisation was 
limited and seemed to emerge as a response to industrial and 
competitive decline. Indeed, by ' 1930 the rhetoric of 
rationalisation was submerged in the growing problems of 
recession, balance of payments deficits, and rising 
unemployment. This reinforced the contradictions of business 
policy in relation to the state. On the one hand, company 
taxation should be cut, welfare and work legislation curtailed, 
and government attacks on inefficient industry and calls for
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rationalisation were condemned as a "salve" to the "political 
consciences of the Labour government." On the other hand,
government intervention in the sphere of tariff policy was
viewed as the saviour of industry, a prerequisite to boosting 
profits and providing needy investment for rationalisation. The 
problems of the depression were associated with factors of
"world wide import", high tariffs and dumping which "individual 
firms alone cannot combat."108 As the Chamber remarked, in 
reference to the 1932 General Tariff, in the history of 
developed economies there comes a time when "private 
enterprise" alone is unable to "affect a situation which has 
become national in its extent and effect."109 Thus Sheffield 
businessmen retreated into a conservative world where the
protection of business interests was the paramount concern.
Notes and References
1. SCL, Records of Sheffield Chamber of Commerce (SCCM), LD1986C9), 23 March 1920.2. J. Turner, "The Politics of Business", in J. Turner (ed), Businessmen and Politics (1984), p.7. As K. Middlemass. Politics in Industrial Society (1979), p.20, claims, the inter-war years witnessed a growing corporate bias, workers and employers associations being elevated from mere interest groups to governing institutions.3. SCGM, LD1986(9), 17 March 1919.4. Telegraph, 25 Feb. 1916.5. Ibid., 28 Jan. 1916. The emphasis on Colonial preference provides a degree of continuity with the pre-1914 debate.6. P.P., 1918 (c9071), 13, Report of the Departmental Committee on Iron and Steel After the War, p.29.7. Telegraph, 28 Jan. 1916. The recommendation of subsidies and loans to key sectors was proposed by a government committee in 1918, P.P, 1918 (c9035), 13. Final Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy After the War, pp.46, 49.8. Telegraph, 28 Jan. 1916.
273
9. The impact of the war in fostering a protectionist policy by business is emphasised by F. Capie, Depression and Protection (1983), p.63.10. S. Tolliday, "Tariffs and Steel, 1916-1934: The Politics ofIndustrial Decline", in Turner (ed), Businessmen, p.53. See also P. Cline, "Winding Down the War Economy: British Plans for Peacetime Recovery, 1916- 19", in K. Burk, (ed). War and the State p. 159, who claims that the flGerman problem" influenced reconstruction planning, and the sudden collapse of Germany removed the necessity for sustained state intervention.11. Telegraph, 28 Jan. 1916. Hughes was supported by three steel producers, W.S. Skelton, P. McGregor and J.C. Ward, who claimed thatSheffield should increasingly specialise to avoid "commercial iealousy."12. SCCM, LD1986(9), 22 Feb. 1917. *13. Ibid., 5 Feb. 191614. Ibid., 9 Oct, 1915. The duty was seen as temporary, for the durationof the war. The Chamber also advocated an immediate removal of trade restrictions. Ibid., 12 Nov. 1917.15. SCCM, LD1986C10), 22 March 1921. Balfour, a Sheffield steel maker, was Chairman of the Committee on Industry and Trade, bearing his name, which made its final report in 1928.16. Ibid., 12 Oct. 1920.17. Capie, Depression, p.66.18. SCCM, LD1986(10), 22 March 1921.19. Capie, Depression, p.41.20. SCI, Records of H. Shaw Magnets, HSM34, Miscellaneous Documents, H. Shaw to Chamber of Commerce, 24 Feb. 1921. According to Balfour, out of nine tungsten producers operating during the war, only two were still in business, and only a few magnet makers were left. SCCM, LD1986(10), 22 March 1921.21. SCCM, Annual Reports 1920-29, 22 March 1921. The Foundry Trade Jnl., vol.23 (1921), p.70, referred to stagnation in high speed steel, due to high prices, credit restriction, erratic foreign exchanges, and foreign competition.22. J. Beardshaw & Co., Baltic Steel Works Magazine, vol.2, no.l (1923), p.38.23. SCL, Records of Kenyon's, 244/B4/1A, Correspondence Relating to Financial Affairs and Winding Up, 1929-30; 244/B1/1, Minute Book, 10 March 1920; 12 May, 30 Dec. 1924; 25 Sept. 1925.24. SCCM, 1986(9), 17 March 1919.25. SCL, Records of Wostenholme's, Wos R9, Canadian Correspondence, A. Macfarlane (Montreal) to W. Nixon, 24 March 1922.26. Sir Arthur Balfour, A Plain Statement on Governmental Debts, Reparations, Tariff and Gold Standard (1932). The extension of the Safeguarding Act in 1926 was partly concerned with counteracting dumping due to the depreciation of currencies. Capie, Depression, p.41.27. Tolliday, "Tariffs", pp.53-5.28. Ibid., pp.53-4.29. SCCM, LD1986(10), 22 March 1921.30. Ibid.31. A policy of "dear money" was introduced in April 1920. Bank Rate rising to 7%. The effects of this are discussed by S. Howson, The Origins of Dear Money, 1919-20" Econ Hist. Rev., vol.33, no2 (1980), pp. 88-107.
274
32. SCCM, LD1986(10), 22 March 1921.33. Ibid., 9 Jan. 1923. 22*Associations in Sheffield sent deputations to MP's urging national economy. Ibid., 29 Nov. 1923.34. Ibid., 2 May 1922. The armaments debate re-surfaced in the depression of the late 1920's. As the management of Hadfield's commented, naval disarmament, "coming on top of the worst trade depression we have ever known ... has added to our burdens in a most unexpected way." SCL, Records of Hadfield's Ltd., Shareholder's Minute Book no.2, 9 April 1931.35. Ibid., 22 March 1922.36. Ibid., 27 March 1923.37. SCCM, Reports, speech by W.F. Beardshaw, 26 March 1924.38. D.H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street 1919-1929 (1987 edn), pp.47-8.39. See complaints by R. Hyde & Sons, and Spear & Jackson on high cost of local electricity; complaints on high price of coal and overcharging by railway companies by the General Purposes Committee of the Chamber. SCCM, LD1986(10), 26 July 1922, 29 April 1924. A. Peech, the Chairman of United Steel, argued that future economy in steel production depended on reducing the cost of coal and coke. Foundry Jnl.. vol.23 (1921), p.545.40. SCCM, LD1986(10), 26 Feb. 1924; Reports, 31 March 1927.41. SCCM, LD1986(10), 2 May 1922; 25 Dec. 1925. A further criticism of the railways was their failure to stimulate domestic demand. Ibid., 29 Nov. 1923.42. Ibid., 25 March 1923.43. Ibid., 28 July 1925. For a further discussion on government intervention in these industries see, M. Kirby, The British Coal mining Industry 1870-1946 (1977); P.J. Cain, "Railway Combination and Government 1900-1914", Econ. Hist Rev., vol.25, no.2 (1972); L. Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation (1979).44. Balfour, Plain Statement, p.15.45. SCCM, 22 March 1921.46. Ibid., 24 Oct. 1922. In 1921, Balfour headed a deputation of 3 steel producers, P. Mcgregor, S. Robinson, and J.C. Ward, to plead Sheffield's case with the Senate Finance Committee, but the tariff was increased on a further two occasions up to 1930. Balfour, Plain Statement, p.7; Foundry Jnl.. vol.24 (1921), p.197.47. Reported in SCCM LD1986(10), 2 Dec. 1924.48. Ibid., 24 Oct. 1922. The Fordney Tariff was prohibitive except for well known brands.49. Wos R9, J.C. Wing to F.B. Colver, 13 April 1922.50. Wos R12(a), Letters Concerning NY Agency, Colver to Newbry Sales Co.(NY), 15 Dec. 1931. As sales fell, they could only maintain turnover "by clearing a lot of slow moving stock at a loss and further stock reductions are necessary." Ibid., Wostenholme's to F. Holroyd (NY Office), 1 March1932.51. See Appendix B, Table 6, which shows the squeeze on the firm’s profits in the 1920's.52. Wos R12(b), Financial Accounts, Memo on NY Stocks, 6 Feb. 1931. Theproportion of duty on cost price at Sheffield was a staggering 50 %.53. Wos R12(a), Memo by Colver on US Sales, 24 Feb. 1932.54. Evidence was given by J.H. Doncaster & C.W. Kayser (High Speed and
275
Crucible Steel Makers Assoc1s.), J.G. Elliot (Cutlery Manufacturers Assoc.), A.S. Pye-Smith (File Manufacturers), D. Flather. (Bright Steel Bar Manufacturers). See summary of evidence, Telegraph. 4 Feb., 24 March 1925.55. Balfour, Plain Statement, p. 14.56. SCCM, LD1986(10); Research Assoc, to Chamber, 7 Dec. 1920. Research Associations were linked with the Department of Scientific and Industrial Record, and despite underfunding, developed "as pools of research for industry to tap.11 Middlemass, Politics. p.180.57. SCCM, LD1986(10), 7 Dec. 1920. T. Rudd, surgical scissors; A. Coward, razors, C. Williamson, pliers.58. Baltic Magazine. (1923), p.38.59. SCCM, Reports, 31 March 1927.60. SCCM, LD1986(10), 30 Oct. 1923.61. SCCM, Reports, 29 March 1928; Annual Reports 1930-33, 25 March 1930.62. Capie, Depression, pp.46, 48-9.63. SCCM, Reports, 22 March 1921.64. Foundry Jnl, vol. 23 (1921), pp.22, 282, 23065. Baltic Magazine (1923), p.38.66. Private Collection (lent by the firm), Records of W. Birkinshaw, Minute Book, Birkinshaw’s to Sheffield Forgers & Tilters Assoc.. 23 Dec. 1919.67. Foundry Jnl., vol.23 (1921), p.416.68. Ibid., p.138.69. Ibid, vol.23 (1921), p.464 vol.24, pp.22, 8270. G. Tweedale, Sheffield Steel and America (1987), p.48.71. Ibid., pp. 47-51. These issues were discussed by the Foundry Jnl.. vol.23 (1921). p.217; vol.24 (1921), p.185. See also Edgar Allen News. vol.l, no.3 (1919), p.38, which claimed that the electric process was unproven with regard to quality.72. Foundry Jnl., vol.23 (1921), p.217; vol.24 (1921), p.185.73. Ibid., vol.23, p.217.74. Ibid. This was further exacerbated by the government dumping of 2,000 tons of high speed and crucible steel.75. Baltic Magazine (1923), p.41; Foundry Jnl.. vol.24, p.411.76. SCL, Records of Beardsnaw’s, MD7081(6), Minute Book, 6 Oct. 1921.77. Ibid., MD7081(7), 29 June 1924.78. Wos R9, Wing to Colver, 13, 27 April 1922. The decision by Paine to break with the Association and ignore new price lists was described as "suicidal", and the "relations between the managing director and his co­directors his unsatisfactory ... he should reconsider his position." Wing to Colver, 22 April 1922.79. MD7081(7), 28 April 1931. SCL, LD1940, Price Lists and Circulars of the Crucible & Tool Steel Assoc.80. Tolliday, "Tariffs", pp.55-7.81. L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (1983 edn), p.37.82. SCCM, LD1986TT0)“ 27 March 1923.83. Ibid.84. See speeches to the Sheffield Branch of the Cast Iron Research Assoc., in Foundry Jnl, vol.23 (1921), pp.16-17, 56-8, 86, 123-4, 138.85. American Machinist. vol.39 (1913), pp.79E-80E.86. Foundry Jnl.. vol.23 (1921), pp.86, 117.
276
87. Ibid., p.316.88. SCCM, Reports, 29 March 1928.89. D. Bum, The Economic History of Steelmaking (1940), p.360. UK steel capacity utilisation fell as low as 30% in 1921 and 1927, and rarely topped 60% throughout the 1920's. S. Tolliday, "Steel and Rationalisation Policies, 1918-1950", in B. Elbaum & W. Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British Economy (1986), p.86.90. SCCM, Reports, 26 March 1929, 25 March 1931.91. S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (1959), p.270.92. Tweedale, Sheffield Steel, p.107.93. SCL, Records of Spear & Jackson, SJC73, Correspondence with the OLdham NY Saw Works, 1925.94. SCCM, Reports, 26 March 1929. The issue boom of 1928 produced a number of "spectacular casualties", Hannah, Corporate Economy, p.61.95. SCCM, Reports, 26 March 1929; 25 March 1930.96. Ibid., 7 Dec. 1920.97. Wos Rll. Letters and Accounts Concerning Erection of machinery, Frieder & Co. (Solingen) to Wostenholme's, 10 Dec. 1922; H. Kaufman & Sons to Wostenholme's, 9 April 1932.98. Pollard, Labour, pp.293-5. Mechanisation allowed the increasing employment of women in some trades. Furthermore, it allowed wage reductions. See Wos R9, Colver to Wing, 12 April 1922.99. H. Townsend, "The Cutlery Trade", in D. Bum (ed), The Structure of British Industry (1953), pp.379-80.100. SCCM, Reports, 29 March 1928; 26 March 1929.101. Ibid., 29 March 1928.102. Economist. (1921), pp.338, 877, 916.103. Hannah, Corporate Economy, p.36.104. SCCM, Reports, 29 March 1928.105. SCCM, LD1986(10), 30 June, 28 July 1925; Reports, 31 March 1927, 26 March 1929.106. Reports, 25 March 1931.107. Wos R12(a), G.W. Davis (NY) to Colver, 8 Jan., 14 Feb. 1932.108. SCCM, Reports, 25 March 1930; 25 March 1931; 23 March 1932, 28 March1933.109*. Ibid., 23 March 1932.
277
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Data Relating to the Reconstruction of the Sheffield Iron and Steel Industry 1880-1901.
Table 1: Description of Sheffield Industrial Classifications.
Industry:
B Basic producers of iron and steel including foundries.C Cutlery producers, including pure fabricators and integratedconcerns producing both cutlery and basic steel.aTE Tool and engineering goods producers, including purefabricators and integrated concerns producing both tools, engineering goods and basic steel.CT Cutlery and tool producers combined, including pure fabricatorsand integrated concerns.
Note: a. This category includes electro-plating firms.
Source: R. Lloyd-Jones and M.J. Lewis, "Industrial Structure and FirmGrowth: The Sheffield Iron and Steel Industry, 1880-1901," Bus. Hist., vol.25, no.3 (1983), p.260.
Table 2: Grouping of Firms by RV, Sheffield 1880.RV Firm Type(£) B C TE CT Total1-50 7 36 25 1 6951-100 10 24 27 3 64101-150 11 10 25 3 49
151-200 6 6 12 2 26201-250 3 5 9 0 17251-300 4 3 5 2 14301-350 4 2 3 1 10351-400 3 2 5 1 11401-450 1 2 2 0 5451-500 0 1 7 1 9
501-550 1 1 1 0 3551-600 2 1 2 0 5601-700 1 1 3 0 5701-800 1 0 2 0 3801-900 0 1 1 0 2901-1,000 0 1 2 0 31,001-1,100 1 0 0 0 11,101-1,200 2 0 0 0 21,201-1,300 0 0 3 0 31,301-1,400 0 0 0 0 01,401-1,500 0 0 2 0 2
1,501-+ 3 1 12 0 16
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Source: Rate Books 1880.
Notes: Three clusters are apparent with the first cut off clearlyoccurring at RV £150. The subsequent sub-ranges, apart marginally for one, all have values less than half of those attained between RV £151-500; four of the seven sub-ranges have double figure values but for the final cluster RV £501-1,500. no sub-range attains more than half double figure value. Furthermore, the value of the last sub-range in each cluster is not approached by any sub-range in the subsequent cluster.
Table 3: Largest Three and Four Firms by RV and Industry Type 1880, Industry type Firm RVB W. Cook & Co. Ltd. 2,743Sheffield Forge & RollingMills Co. 1,957Charlton Iron Works Co. Ltd. 1,596Neepsend Rolling Mill Co. Ltd. 1,139
Joseph Rodgers & Sons 1,849J. Dixon & Sons 928George Wostenholmes & Sons 860John B. Roberts 630
TE John Browns & Co. Ltd. 18,749Charles Camells & Co. Ltd. 10,844Brown, Bailey & Dixon Ltd. 6,893Edward Vickers, Sons & Co. Ltd. 6^157
CT Thomas Turner & Co. 493William Jackson 365Joseph Fenton & Sons 315J. & R. Dodge Ltd. 300
Source: Rate Books 1880.
Table 4: The Large Sheffield Cutlery Firms 1880-1901. (RV £501+)Firm RV 1880 RV 1901 Employment(£) (£) (Approx)Joseph Rodgers & Sons Ltd. 1,849 1,436 2,000J. Dixon & Sons 928 949 1,000George Wostenholmes & Sons 860 920 1,000John B. Roberts 630 Exit -Needham, Veale & Tyzack 600 720 -Unwin & Rodgers Ltd. 530 Exit -E.G. Draper Entry 510 -William Hutton & Sons 364 750 -Mappin & Webb 345 900 1,000Harrison Bros. & Howson 255 845 -Arthur Lee & Sons 43 881 -
Source: a. Rate Books 1880, 1901.b. S. Pollard. A History of Labour in Sheffield (1959) p. 132.279
Table 5: Biographical History of 1880 Finns b/ Industry Type, 1880-1901.Type of Finn Size category
Snail Maditm Large Giant TotalNo % Nd 1 No % No t No %
B:Survival Firms:Static?Mobile: 9 32.1 8 38.1 4 50.0 2 66.7 23 38.3
Up 4 14.3 5 23.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 15.0Dcwn 0 0.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.7All Survival 13 46.4 14 66.7 4 50.0 2 66.7 33 55.0
Exit FirmsP: 15 53.6 7 33.3 4 50.0 1 33.3 27 45.0
Total 28 100.0 21 100.0 8 100.0 3 100.0 60 100.0
G:Survival Finns: Static 33 47.1 11 52.4 3 60.0 0 0.0 47 48.5Mobile:
Up 11 15.7 4 19.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 15.5Down 0 0.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 1 100.0 2 2.1All Survival 44 62.8 16 76.2 3 60.0 1 100.0 64 66.0
Sat firms 26 44.2 5 23.8 2 40.0 0 0.0 33 34.0
Total 70 100.0 21 100.0 5 100.0 1 100.0 97 100.0
TE:Survival Finns: Static 31 40.2 24 55.8 5 31.25 11 91.7 71 48.0Mobile:
Up 16 20.8 7 16.3 5 31.25 0 0.0 28 19.0Down 0 0.0 3 7.0 2 12.5 1 8.3 6 4.0All Survival 47 61.0 34 79.1 12 75.0 12 100.0 105
Exit Firms 30 39.0 9 20.9 4 25.0 0 0.0 43 29.0
Total 77 100.0 43 100.0 16 100.0 12 100.0 148 100.0
CT:Survival Firms: Static 3 42.8 4 57.1 0 0.0 0 0.0. 7 50.0Mobile:
Up 1 14.3 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 21.4Down 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0All Survival 4 57.1 6 85.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 71.4
Exit Firms 3 42.9 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 28.6
Total 7 100.0 7 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 100.0Notes: a. The ruiber of firms \£rich survived but ranained in the same s:called static firms. 280
b. The rurfcer of films vhLch moved betweai size categories, either upwards or downwards, called mobile firms.c. The nnfcer of firms ;hdch left the industry, called exit firms. Bat firms are those listed in the 1880 rate bock vhich lose an independent listing b/ 1901.
Source: Sate Books 1880, 1901.
Table 6: Owner-occupiers and Renting in Sheffield Firms 1880.Industry Size CategoryType SmalL Medium Large Giant Total0Ca R OC R OC R OC R. OC RNo No No No No No No NoB 12 16 16 5 6 2 3 0 37 23C 30 40 16 5 4 1 1 0 51 46TE 34 43 31 12 14 2 12 0 91 57CT 3 4 6 1 0 0 0 0 9 5
Total 79 103 69 23 24 5 16 0 188 131
% Distribution by Size Category
Of a/ a/ a/ 7 7 7 7 7 7
B 42.8 57.2 76.2 24.6 /o75.0 /o25.0 100.0 /a0.0 /rt61.7 /o33.3C 42.9 57.1 76.2 24.6 80.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 52.6 48.4TE 44.1 55.9 72.1 27.9 87.5 12.5 100.0 0.0 61.5 38.5CT 42.9 57.1 85.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 64.3 35.7
All 43.4 56.6 75.0 25.0 82.8 17.2 100.0 0.0 58.9 41.1
Notes: a. OC relates to firms who are recorded in the rate books asboth owning and occupying property.b. R relates to those firms who occupied property but did not own it, the premises being rented.
source: Rate Books 1880.
Table 7: Profile of Giant Firms,a Sheffield 1880 and 1901.Firm Industry RV 1880 RV 1901 %Type (£) (£) changeJohn Brown & Co. Ltd. TE 18,749 23,316 + 24.4Charles Cammell & Co. Ltd. TE . 10,844 23,940 +120.8Brown, Bailey & Dixon Ltd. TE 6,893 5,325 - 22.7Edward Vickers Sons & Co. Ltd. TE 6; 157 28,002 +354.8Thomas Firths & Sons. TE 5,551 10^097 + 81.9Thomas Turton & Sons TE 2,907 2,667 - 8.3William Jessop & Sons Ltd. TE 2,212 3,249 + 46.9Sanderson Bros. & Co. Ltd. TE 2,070 2,850 + 37.7Davey Bros. & Co. Ltd. TE 1,992 2,479 + 24.4Bury & Co. Ltd. TE 1,778 1,495 - 15.9Willson, Hawlcsworth, Ellison& Co. Ltd. TE 1,690 1,850 + 9.5Samuel Osborne & Co. TE 1,594 2,903 + 82.1J.H. Andrew & Son TE281 1,500 2,386 + 59.1
Craven Bros. & Co. TE 1,240 2,250 + 81.4Ibbotson Bros. & Co. TE 1,240 1,938 + 56.3Hallamshire Steel and FileCo. Ltd. TE 1.113 1,807 + 62.3Henry Bessemer & Co. TE '970 2,193 +126.1W. Cooke & Co. Ltd. B 2,747 i;,925 - 29.9Sheffield Forge and RollingMills Co. Ltd. B 1.957 1,524 - 22.1Joseph Rodgers & Co. Ltd. C 1,849 1,436 - 22.3
Notes: a. The Charlton Iron Works Co. Ltd. (industry B. RV 1880,£1,596), was excluded as the firm exited the industry c.1880- 1901.
Source: Rate Books 1880, 1901.
Table 8: Company Records of Sheffield Firms and their Status. Firm Industry RV 1901 StatusType (£)J.Kenyon & Co. TE
Joseph Beardshaw & Co TE
Cooper Bros & Co.
Marsh Bros. & Co. "TENeedham, Veale& Tyzack C
Spear & Jackson TE
Edgar Allen & Co. TE
Burgon & Ball TE
George Wostenholmes C
Trusteeship, converted to private limited liability co. in 1910. Family partnership, converted to privatelimited liability in1894.Family Partnership, converted to privatelimited liability in1895.Family Partnership.
Partnership, converted to private limited company in 1894. Partnership, converted to private limited liability in 1905. Family partnership, converted to privatelimited liability in 1907.Family partnership, converted to publiclimited liability, 1.898.Family partnership / trusteeship, converted to private limited in 1875.
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Appendix B: Data Relating to Company Profits and Exports.
Table 1: Cutlery Exports to the USA Invoiced Through the US Consulate 1868-1910.__________________________________ ____________Year Ending (£000) Year Ending (£000)Sept.30 1868 574 Dec.31 1890 228Dec.31 1869 284 ...... 1891 113....  1870 N/D ....  1892 124....  1871 N/D Sept.30 1893 119Sept.30 1872 350 ..... 1894 81..... 1873 N/D .....  1895 148..... 1874 226 .....  1896 136..... 1875 191 June 30 1897 159.....  1876 132 .....  1898 61..... 1877 141 ..... 1899 76156 .....  1900 95161 .....  1901 93N/D ..... 1902 75..... 1881 N/D ..... 1903 N/DDec.31 1882 246 .....  1904 N/D242 Dec.31 1905 78170 ....  1906 85147 ....  1907 N/D176 ....  1908 56206 ....  1909 64....  1888 210 ....  1910 581889 226
Source: G.I.H. Lloyd, The Cutlery Trades: An Historical Essay in the Economics of Small-Scale Production (1913), p.482
Table 2: Gross Profits Arising from UK Ironworks Assessed to Income Tax1870-1884
Year (£Million) Year (£Million)
1870 2.0 1878 2.31871 2.7 1879 1.91872 3.1 1880 1.71873 4.8 1881 2.21874 7.2 1882 2.91875 7.3 1883 3.01876 3.9 1884 3.01877 2.8
Source: P.P., 1886 (c4621), 21, First Report of the Royal Cdmmis
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W b 3i Shffi£QdLmtedIi£bi3ity Cfcnpgys 1886: CgitaLValiBtimadWs
Firm ffl CaUai IP CaitaL Prpcmt- Capital llEEEBSe D33B39S£ dacSfrem TbtaL I&rShace TbtaL £ £d £ d £J.Eton&Cb. 18,749 75 3), 03 3 63,03 - 13,03C.Camell & Cb. 10,844 80 83,03 75 73,03 - 3,031-m.Gode & Go. 2,747 45 147,03 4 14,03 - 123,03Code: Boos. &Cb. 63 80660 41,03 2229 3,43 - 3,53EawSrs. 1,992 7h 67,53 3 3,03 - 7,53tMlardHB SteeL & File Cb.1,884 15 45,03 15 45,03 - —fefevcrth, fyce&Cb. 112 6 6,03 & 2,53 — 3,53WnJesscp & Sens 2 $2 3 240,03 25 23,03 — 40,03KeDnan Rol 1 ing Mills 79L 4 . 40,03 £ 3,53 - 17,53lSbppCTr^TV>1lTrg;Mi1l5=s Cb. 1,13 ~k 18,73 11,23 — 7,53SJfebcM&Cb. 267 3 44,93 3 3833 — 6,63J. Rr^=rs&Scn 1,8© 100 13,03 2© 315,03 185,93 —J.Eoni&Scn 23L 6 3,03 % 46,23 16,23 -SadasonEKs. im 3 3,03 3 45,03 - 15,03S-rffield Fcrsp &MTirg 75,03 18,73 55,23mi 1,957 10 a —TmsLe/ Rnl.iirg MOls 30 6 9,03 6,73 - 2,23Vidas, Scre&Cb. 6,157 100 73,03 212 1,30,03 840,03 -\beataan & Srdih 461 1062% 3,107 20610^ 3,107 2L357
Sarce: SheffieMIbilyTd^ p^ ii, 25Dac.l886.
Table 4: Net Profit and loss, Cooper Bros & Co. 1889-1922.Year Net Protit Year Net Profit£ £1889 3,878 1906 2,0321890 3,576 1907 1,0971891 4,356 1908 -1401892 3,156 1909 1,4051893 2,103 1910 3,2621894 4,681 1911 4,7301895 N/A 1912 6,1781896 3,278 1913 5,3471897 3,122 1914 4,5121898 3,162 1915 5,1261899 4,037 1916 7,5601900 1,803 1917 4,8651901 3,692 1918 3,6921902 1,971 1919 10,9421903 1,965 1920 4,6161904 1,234 1921 -1,9581905 1,741 1922 3,864
Note: The firm produced cutlery and electro plated goods
Source: SCL, Records of Cooper Bros, 499/B1/9, Private Ledger,
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Table 5: Net Profit and Loss and Rate of Dividend, Ibbotson Bros & Co. Ltd. 1872-1911Year Net % Year Net %Profit Dividend Profit Dividend£ £1872 10,294 10 1892 - 3,575 01873 9,753 10 1893 - 516 01874 8,967 10 1894 222 01875 11,387 10 1895 5,065 01876 10,889 10 1896 12,448 01877 4,232 5 1897 10,822 01878 8,281 lk 1898 11,553 Ik1879 7,149 Ik 1899 12,433 Ik1880 5,807 1 1900 18,678 Ik1881 4,926 5 1901 18,397 Ik1882 7,075 6 h 1902 18,960 Ik1883 9,441 Ik 1903 16,900 Ik1884 9,038 Ik 1904 18,282 Ik1885 9,518 Ik 1905 17,842 lk1886 10,000 Ik 1906 19,691 lk1887 10,036 10 1907 20,093 lk1888 4,194 5 1908 19,766 lk1889 7,089 Ik 1909 23,155 101890 7,846 Ik 1910 22,964 101891 2,790 5 1911 21,551 10
Note: The firm produced steel, engineering goods and tools.
Source: SCL, Records of Ibbotson Bros, LD1146, Private Ledgers.
Table 6: Trade Profit and Loss, Wostenholme!s, 1881-1934Year Profit Year Profit£ £1881 17,522 1908 6,9011882 18,867 1909 7,2141883 18,873 1910 10,1391884 16,919 1911 11,7471885 7,683 1912 10,2511886 14,971 1913 9,3321887 13,106 1914 11,4751888 13,617 1915 10,2791889 16,320 1916 10,1531890 13,869 1917 10,7781891 6,353 1918 8,1281892 5,138 1919 6,9771893 4,279 1920 8,9531894 316 1921 8,7821895 9,571 1922 -1,0981896 8,502 1923 -2,1251897 8,753 1924 1,2141898 1,560 1925 - 7401899 3,198 1926 - 2481900 4,913 1927 1,288285
1901 4,223 1928 2,2571902 4,559 1929 1,7021903 6,311 1930 - 2,3061904 5,593 1931 - 2,0961905 5,760 1932 - 2,8071906 6,953 1933 - 2571907 9,569 1934 2,911
Source: SCL, Records of Wostenholmes, Wos R145, Private Ledger
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Appendix C: Data for Wages and Sub-occupancy
Table 1: Index of Money Earnings in the Sheffield Trades5 1868-1896(1900 = 100)Year Money Year MoneyEarnings Earnings1868 79 1883 921869 81 1884 821870 86 1885 771871 97 1886 731872 102 1887 771873 101 1888 80 .1874 93 1889 901875 86 1890 921876 82 1891 911877 83 1892 821878 80 1893 781879 78 1894 811880 82 1895 851881 86 1896 931882 93
Note: a. Includes both light and heavy trades.
Source: S. Pollard, A Historv of Labour :in Sheffield (:
Table 2: Approximate Total Value of Output of Sub-Occupiers of Tenement _______________ Factories in Sheffield and District. 1907____Cutlery Products Value(£)Steel Cutlery 105,000Electro-plated Goods 21,000Other Products 4,000
Total of Goods Made forSale 130,000
Work Done On:Cutlery 119,000Electro-plated Goods 10,000Other Products 1,000
Total Value of Work Done for the Trade on Materials Supplied 130,000
Total Value
Tools and Implements3 Value(£) Agricultural 2,000Files & Rasps 32,000Saws & Machine Knives 9,000Edge Tools 34,000Engineers Tools 2,000Other Sorts 12,000Other Products 2,000
Total of Goods Made for Sale 93,000Total Value of Work Done for the Trade on Materials supplied 63,000
Total Value 156,000
260,000
Notes: a. includes parts of and repairs.
Source: P.P. (1907), Census of Production, pp. 20, 22.
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Appendix D: Business and Tariff Reform, Sheffield 1904-05.
Table 1: Voting Patterns of Markers of the Sheffield Chanter: Tariff Meeting March 1905. Individual Finn Business Vote3
1 H.H. Bedford Jdn Bedford & Sons Steel & Tools Y2 Sir Jdn Bir^ nam Walker & Hall Electro Plate & Cutlery Y3 W.F. Beardsha* Joseph Beardshav & Son Steel & Tools Y4 J. Dixon J. Dixon and Sons Electro Plate & Gitlery Y5 F. Brittain S.S Brittain Steel & Tools Y6 B. Brittain S.S Brittain Steel & Tools Y7 Brailsford fbbw Vale Steel Go. Steel Y8 W.H. Brittain William Hall Steel & Tools Y9 H.Y Marsh IfarshBros. Steel & Tools Y10 W. Beckett A. Beckett & Sons Steel & Tools Y11 P. fhcgregpr Sanderson Bros. & Nshould Steel & Tools Y12 W.T. Beesley W.T. Beesley & Go. Steel, Wire and Castings Y13 S.J. Robinson S.J. Robinson & Go. Goal Merchants Y14 Arthur Balfour Seebchn & Dieckstahl/A. Balfour & Go. Steel & Engineering Y15 Gol. Wbtscn Seebchn & Dieckstahl Steel & Engineering Y16 W.F. Osborne S. Osbome & Go. Steel. & Tools Y17 George Senior G. Senior & Son Heavy Steel Forgings Y18 Albert Senior G. Senior & Son Heavy Steel Forgings Y19 J.H. Hibbard S. Hibbard & Sen Electro Plate & Gitlery Y20 C.H. Gilhprt Hay Bay & Son Wine & Spirit Merchants Y21 J.K. Baker J. Baker & Sons Steel & Tools Y22 W. Golver Jonas & Golver Steel & Tools Y23 Joseph Jonas Jonas & Golver Steel & Tools Y24 W.T Himer Txmas Himer & Go. Steel, Tools & Cutlery Y25 ThoiHS Harrison W.W Harrison & Go. Electro Plate & Gitlery Y26 R. Belfitt G. Butler & Go. Electro Plate & Gitlery Y27 C.W. Kayser Kayser, ELlison & Go. Heavy Steel & Engineering Y28 A.J. Hcfeson R. Hornsby & Son/W. Jesscp & Son/Savoy & Go. Cutlery, Steel & Tools N29 H. Hq^ nes Hughes & Go. Accountant N30 Sir C. Skelton C.T. Skelton & Go. Tools N31 Alderman W. J. CLe^ g Clegg & Sons Solicitors N32 J. Jackman J. Jackman & Go. Steel & Tools N33 W. Gnesterman J. Chesterman & Go. Engineering Tools N34 J. Derry Sheffield Independent Editor N35 S.E. Howell S.E. Howell & Go. Steel & Tools N36 C.D. Bettinger S. Laycock & Sons Railway Equipment (Government) N37 R.G. Holland Holland & Go. Iron & Steel Merchants N38 E.M. Gibbs E.M. Gibbs Accountant N39 C.E. Pearson F.G. Pearson & Go. Steel & Tools N40 J.J. Hounsfield N/A lV a N41 J. /^ pleyard Appleyard & Go. Blinniture Manufacturers N42 J.W. Best J.W. Best Accountant N43 R.P. Richardson R.P. Richardson Solicitor N44 G.H. Mellor G.H. Mellor Estate Agent N45 E. Priestman Singleton & Priestman Cutlery Ffanufacturers N46 W.L. Thonpson W. Spencer & Go. Steel & Tools N288
Notes: a. The vote vas far or against the introduction of a retaliatory tariff.Source: Independent, 5 Iferch 1904; Directory, 19C4.
Table 2: Members of the Sheffield Tariff Reform League 1904Individual Firm BusinessSir John Bingham Walker & Hall Electro Plate & CutleryJ. Dixon J. Dixon and Sons Electro Plate & CutleryJ.W. Dixon J. Dixon and Sons Electro Plate & CutleryW.F. Beardsnaw Joseph Beardsnaw & Son Steel & ToolsF. Brittain S.S Brittain Steel & ToolsB. Brittain S.S Brittain Steel & ToolsJ. Brailsford Ebbw Vale Steel Co. SteelW.H. Brittain William Hall Steel & ToolsP. Macgregor Sanderson Bros. & Newbould Steel & ToolsS.J. Robinson S.J. Robinson & Co. Coal MerchantsGeorge Senior G. Senior & Son Heavy Steel ForgingsAlbert Senior G. Senior & Son Heavy Steel ForgingsJ.H. Hibbard S. Hibbard & Son Electro Plate & CutleryC.H. Gilbert Hay Hay & Son Wine & Spirit MerchantsR. Belfitt G. Butler & Co. Electro Plate & CutleryEarl Fitzwilliam - -Earl of Whamcliffe - -Col. C. Allen Allen & Darwin Electro Plate & CutleryE.L.W. Bellhouse N/A N/AE. Dickson Dickson Bros & H. Rossell. Steel & ToolsB.A. Firth T. Firth & Sons Heavy Steel & EngineeringJ. Shaw J. Shaw Ltd. Wire ManufacturersC.E. Siddall Sheffield Forge &Rolling Mills Steel & ForgingsT.W. Ward T. Ward Ltd. Heavy Steel & EngineeringW.T. Bescoby A.T. Bescoby & Son Paper ManufacturersGeorge Clarke J. Clarke & Sons CutleryA. Craven Cravens Ltd. Railway EquipmentAid. T.R. Gainsford Sheffield Coal Co. Ltd. CoalJ.J. Greaves F. Greaves & Sons CutleryMaior Hutchings N/A N/AGeorge Hall C. & J. Hall Steel & Tools & EngineersF. Huntsman B. Huntsman & Co. SteelS. Levick Levick, Swift & Co. Steel & ToolsC.D. Leng Sheffield Telegraph Newspaper ProprietorS. Roberts - M.P.J. Ridge J. Round & Sons EngineeringJ. Rhodes Rhodes & Co. Coal MerchantsP. Smith N/A N/AH. Sharpe R.H. Sharpe & Son Coal MerchantsHoward Vincent - M.P.H. Wilkins Martin, Hall & Co. Electro plate & CutleryA. Muir Wilson A. M. Wilson AccountantT. Wilkinson T. Wilkinson SolicitorS.H. Ward S.H. Ward BrewersC. Clifford C. Clifford Jomalis t-TelegraphSource: Sheffield Year Book and Record (1905), p.349; Directory, 1905.
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Appendix E: Data Relating to the War Time Operations of Spear & Jackson Ltd.
Table 1: Maithly Bipleyment of Warkers a d  Hairs Worked Overtime in 1916.
Mxith Nuicer of takers Normal Hours Nurfcer Working Overtime, (per veek)pb M F M Hrs Total F Hrs TotalFeb. 361 63 52 - 252 12 3,024 - - -March 381 62 50 50 243 1% 3,766 24 14 336April 378 63 50 49 243 m 3,766 30 14 420May 376 63 50 49 m 15% 3,720 24 14 336Jine 381 56 50 49 209 10 2,090 15 6 90July 384 56 50 49 195 10 1,950 15 6 90Arg. 384 55 50 49 207 12 2,484 15 6 90Sep. 383 55 50 49 208 15 3,120 16 6 96Oct. 382 57 50 49 216 14 3,024 8 6 48Nev. 389 68 50 48 147 12% 1,837 10 6 60Dec. 351 69 50 48 131 12 1,572 22 6 132
Notes: a. tfele workers.b. Female woikers.
Source: S.C.L., Records of Spear & Jackson Ltd., SJC 70, Papers in Connection with thelimitation of Profits cn Gcntrolled Establishments Uider the Munitions of War .Act, Returns mads to the Ministry of MmtLcns, 19 Jan. 1917
Table 2: Frequency of Sunday Working 1916Month No. of Times Worked No. of WorkersJuly-Aug. 5 5Sep. 3 5Oct. 4 8Nov. 5 46Dec. 4 48
Source: Ibid.
Table 3: Number of Nights Engines Were Working Overtime 1912-13and 1 9 1 5 . __________________________________________Date Number of Nights
Jan.-Dec. 1912 119Jan.-Dec. 1913 16Jan.-Dec. 1915 164
Source: SJC 70, Memorandum, 12 March 1917.
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Table 4: Output of Steel Shovels 1912-15 Year Output (doz.)1912 4,1721913 4,0131912-13 (Standard Output) 4,092 1915 6,419
Source: SJC 70, Departmental Note to Invoice Clerks, 30 Aug.1917.
Table 5: Production of High Speed and Tool and Alloy Steels 1912-16.high speed steel 1912 1913 1915T Cwt Qts T Cwt Qts T Cwt QtsHigh Speed Steel 5 11 0 8 4 2 314 8 0
Tool & Alloy Steels 266 14 0 298 1 3 63 13 3
Total 272 5 0 306 6 1 378 1 3
Source: SJC 70, Memorandum, 31 Dec. 1916.
Table 6: Number of Workers Employed on Machinery in 1917Works DepTt Unskilled SkilledA 2 25B 0 17C 24 32D 14 18E 0 59F 6 11
Total 46 162
Notes: Dep't A and B: steel production; Dep't C: shovel,spades, forks and garden tool production; Depft D: light and heavy edge tools production; Dep't E: sawproduction; Dep't F: File production.
Source: SJC 70, Memorandums to Head of Departments EnquiringInto the Numbers of Workers Employed in 1915 on Machinery; SJC 71, Papers Relating to a Proposed Edge Tool Amalgamation 1917-20, Draft Memorandum, 1917.
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Appendix F: Shipments, Sales, stock and Profit and Loss of Wostenholme’sNew York Office 1926-30
Date ShipmentsFromSheffield
US Sales GrossProfit Expenses netLoss Stock
$ $ $ $ $ $1926 32,848 88,411 20,375 20,623 247 46,7191927 29,669 78,900 17,137 17,446 308 44,0851928 30,128 80,755 16;723 17,747 1,024 39,9921929 27i351 70,647 15;316 17|701 14,487 2,385 38,9921930 9,234 36,127 6,686 7,800 28', 053
Source: Wos R 12(b), Miscelaneous Financial Accounts on the New YorkOffice 1930.
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